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Executive Summary  
This report on diversity challenges in the Netherlands examines Dutch institutional arrangements, 
strategies of governance and practices of toleration. It compiles the results of empirical studies in the 
domain of education and politics and provides an integrated analysis in light of concepts of tolerance 
and respect, exploring the ways boundaries are drawn between majorities and minorities, how cultural 
differences are socially constructed and contested, and what are the main contemporary and future 
challenges in this regard for the Netherlands.  
Background 
Contemporary debates and institutional arrangements need to be understood in the light of the 
appropriate historical, societal and political background. The first chapter of the report explores the 
formation of the Dutch nation and state. It pays particular attention to the history of religious pluralism 
and the ways civil authorities have handled this form of pluralism in various ways. It explores how 
various images of “Dutch tolerance” developed, how they relate to different legitimisations of 
acceptance and the ways these emerged in relation to different minority groups, both native (including 
religious and linguistic minorities) and immigrant (including post-colonial and labour migrants). In 
many ways institutions in the domains of education and church-state relations have been shaped by the 
history of “pillarisation”. One important change in Dutch political culture over the past decades is the 
emergence of strong voices in public and political debate who defend “secular\” and “progressive” 
values and who are increasingly unwilling to accept transgressions and exceptions to key liberal and 
democratic norms. A crucial debate concerns the balancing of, on the one hand, the associational and 
collective autonomy of religious and cultural groups, and, on the other hand, legal and liberal norms 
with regard to individual autonomy, gender equality and equality of sexual orientations, bodily 
integrity and even animal welfare.  
To conclude this part we discuss five different conceptualisations of tolerance, acceptance and respect 
that structure the Dutch debate. These include (1) the need to tolerate minorities, even if their religion 
and practices are disapproved of  by the majority, (2) principled tolerance of other groups based on 
ideas about pluralism and of the Dutch nation as composed of various minorities, (3) pragmatic 
toleration or ‘condoning’ (gedogen) of practices and forms of behaviour that transgress social and 
legal norms, in order to create a ‘live and let live’ climate, (4) multicultural recognition, based on the 
idea that immigrant communities can retain and develop distinctive cultural practices and identities 
and on normative principles such as equal treatment and non-discrimination, (5) Dutch liberal 
intolerance, focusing on the need to identify clearly the non-negotiable core of liberal values and 
principles, and arguing that religious groups and immigrants should respect these values in their daily 
lives as well as in their cultural and religious practices and institutions.  
Education 
The Dutch education system is characterized, first, by the freedom of education, including the rights of 
groups of individuals to create and operate primary and secondary schools, within certain limits, and 
the freedom of parents to choose a school for their children. Second, there is “statutory equality” of 
governmental or public (openbaar) and non-governmental or denominational (bijzondere) schools and 
both are funded by the government according to identical and equivalent criteria. Of all primary 
schools about 68% is non-governmental and of all secondary schools this percentage is 70%. In the 
Dutch public debate with respect to education and tolerance for (religious) diversity, there is the idea 
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that the school should fulfill a major role in socialization of “new citizens”. One line of argument is 
that religious schools, and especially orthodox Christian and Islamic schools, will have a poor record 
in “teaching tolerance”. Another line of argument makes a plea for more involvement of the 
government in developing, promoting and implementing the teaching of “good citizenship”. The two 
case studies clarify the different positions in this debate and investigate their implications for the 
boundaries of tolerance. 
Case Study 1: Tolerance for Religious Orthodox schools 
Reformed schools and Islamic schools in the Netherlands are under scrutiny and are often subject to 
political and media debate. Reformed schools account for 3.4% of primary and 2.0% of secondary 
schools. Islamic schools are even less common, of all Dutch primary schools 0.5% are Islamic and 
0.3% of secondary schools. From the interviews it has become clear that Reformed and Islamic 
schools in the Netherlands feel the public debate about them is too much influenced by stereotypes and 
misconceptions. They believe at present there are still enough constitutional guarantees that protect 
their educational freedom, but principals often made reference to a lack of political support and of 
indirect forms of resistance or rejection by the surrounding society. Principals of these two types of 
schools articulate slightly different discourses on tolerance and recognition. Principals of Islamic 
schools primarily expressed a need for recognition as “normal schools” and for them to be positively 
accepted as genuinely Dutch. For directors of Reformed schools tolerance was an important frame of 
reference, because to them it meant the right to exist as a minority in a secularizing society. Principals 
of Reformed school stressed there should be room for opinions and life convictions that strongly 
deviate from the “liberal norm” and that orthodox religious communities are entitled to have schools 
based on their own views. 
With respect to the ways Islamic and Reformed schools make use of their associational freedoms two 
main patterns were found: First, the identity of the school, the interpretation of associational freedoms 
and the school’s policy is negotiated between school management (principal and teachers), school 
board and parents. Contextual factors influencing these negotiations are: the need for the school to 
have sufficient pupils, the image of the school, the interpretation of educational goals, the media 
debate, and the criteria set by the Ministry of education as well as the scrutiny exercised by the 
Inspectorate of Education.  Second, it seems that Reformed schools are stricter in the sense that their 
religious identity informs the schools’ policy with regard to admission of pupils, selection of staff, 
curriculum and handling of diversity (dress codes etc.). The Islamic schools have predominantly non-
Muslim teachers and management, and there are no special text books for Islamic schools on general 
subjects (history, biology etc.). In a sense it is thus misleading to speak of Islamic schools as orthodox 
religious schools. The main reasons why they are so fiercely criticized are, first, that they are seen 
culturally more different than Christian schools and as “un-Dutch”, second, because of organizational 
weakness and recurrent problems with incompetent and corrupt boards and management, and, third, 
their relatively poor educational performance and the fact that these schools have almost one hundred 
percent “allochtonous” pupils. 
Case Study 2: Citizenship education and tolerance 
The second case study analyzes the implementation of Citizenship Education and explores which 
ideals are expressed in Dutch Citizenship Education intentions and implementations, and how these 
ideals on policy and practical level relate to intolerance, tolerance and acceptance. In 2006, 
Citizenship Education (2006) became compulsory in the Netherlands, due to an ongoing debate on 
integration and identity, and due to European developments. Because of the Dutch Freedom of 
Education, the precise interpretation of what citizenship education should encompass, is left to the 
schools. The Government provides only general guidelines, stating that it should increase social 
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coherence and “the willingness and the ability to be a part of the community and to contribute to it 
actively”.  
On the practical side, CE gets little priority. There is no money or time available, it has no book or 
method, and most of it is left to the schools. Schools develop incoherent, patch-work curricula that 
suffice for Inspectorate checks and then leave it to the individual teacher. The Inspectorate’s checks 
are sporadic and only focus on paper work, not on practices or results. The individual teacher may thus 
approach Citizenship from his or her own ideological perspective, awareness and creativity.    
While the government may envision CE to increase integration of ill-adapted migrant (Muslim) youth 
into “Dutch norms and values“, school programs may instead try to reduce the negative stereotype 
regarding Islam and reduce prejudice among the “white” youth. Researchers and experts involved with 
implementation are actively bending the policy in this direction. The freedom of education thus creates 
opportunities to teach tolerance, because it allows for deviation from the dominant political ideology.  
Politics 
The second empirical phase of the research focussed on the politics and policies of exclusion of 
minorities, notably rejected asylum seekers. A large percentage of Dutch voters believe that 
immigration should be curbed to a minimum and Dutch immigration and asylum policy now have a 
reputation as among the strictest in Europe. But there is also protest: against the unfair treatment of 
asylum seekers during their asylum application, against (rejected) asylum seekers being excluded from 
basic social rights, against the bad circumstances of alien detention, and many people worry about the 
situation of children without legal status. There is also highly mediatized public protest on behalf of 
individuals who are at risk to be expelled and who are said to be “well integrated”. The empirical 
research on policies of exclusion and tolerance focusses on contestation and protest against Dutch 
asylum policy. It maps out the reasons and arguments used by the protesters, the way they draw on 
concepts such as tolerance, toleration and basic respect, and the consequences of these protests for 
Dutch asylum and expulsion policy.  
Six main groups of protesters could be identified: 1. Political organisations, politicians, policy makers 
and bureaucrats. 2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for migrants. 3. NGOs involved with 
human rights or asylum law. 4. Religious and humanistic NGOs involved with charity. 5. Academics 
specialized in human rights, migration and/or asylum. 6. Media and journalists.  
Five main aspects of policies for (rejected) asylum seekers are contested: (1) False rejection and unfair 
asylum admission procedures; (2) Homelessness and refusal of housing/ social security; (3) Detention, 
circumstances of detention and criminalization; (4) Expulsion (protests related to dangerous 
circumstances in country of origin and inhumane treatment during expulsion); (5) The uprooting of 
children, and (too) limited use of discretionary abilities for individual cases. 
The debate about rejected asylum seekers constantly circles around two central questions: First: should 
the asylum seeker be qualified as a “victim” or an “intruder”? Second, is the government responsible 
for providing assistance? The different combinations of answers that are given to these questions are 
used to legitimize the steps that need to be taken for individuals and groups, for example, whether a 
residence status should be given, or emergency shelter provided (see table A).  
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Table A. Assessment of (rejected) asylum seekers and their right to government assistance 
 (b) (a) Assistance No assistance 
Victim ACCEPTANCE  
(e.g. residence status) 
INDIFFERENCE 
(e.g. dealt with abroad) 
Intruder TOLERANCE  
(e.g. prevention of homelessness/ assistance 
for return) 
INTOLERANCE 
(e.g. detention and forced return) 
 
Protest movements tend to argue in various ways that asylum seekers should be regarded as “victims”, 
not as an “intruders”, and that there is an obligation for the Dutch state to provide assistance. The 
varying ways in which these arguments are being developed in relation to broader narratives, 
representations and normative positions can be mapped out by distinguishing four discourses. These 
are: 
1. Asylum authenticity discourse. In this discourse the leading question is how to know whether 
or not the asylum demand has been authentic (but falsely rejected).  
2. Global injustice discourse. In this discourse, economic refugees are recognized as victims of 
poverty. Those who make use of this discourse demand more solidarity and more open 
borders.  
3. The duty of care discourse. In this discourse the (local) government is said to have a duty to 
prevent homelessness and destitution among rejected asylum seekers, especially for 
vulnerable groups like children, ill people and the elderly. 
4. Accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. This discourse draws on ideas about “cultural 
citizenship” to present the rejected asylum seeker who has become connected to the (people in 
the) Netherlands as a victim of the length of Dutch procedures.  
 
Seen in this light different discursive strategies are available. The protest movement is drawing on 
these four different discourses to establish categorization of an asylum seeker as “victim”. If one 
discourse fails to categorize an asylum seeker as victim, another discourse can be used in which this is 
possible. Such re-framing is visible in our two case studies on Mauro and Sahar. The 13-year old 
Afghan girl Sahar, who feared expulsion with her family, was successfully re-categorized as a victim, 
because she was considered too Westernised to be expelled to Afghanistan. Contrarily, Mauro, an 18-
year old Angolan boy who wished to be with his Dutch foster family, was insufficiently re-framed as a 
victim, because he was also framed as an imposter who still had connections in Angola and because 
fears of a honeypot effect could not be countered. 
Conclusions 
It is impossible to classify the changing discourses and practices of tolerance in the Netherlands in 
terms of the country becoming “more or less tolerant”. Especially in the Dutch case, it would be 
wrong to maintain the image that until recently the Netherlands was an exemplary country and that it 
recently has become “intolerant” and has fallen victim to a “backlash against multiculturalism”. Five 
distinct conceptualisations continue to structure the discursive space to think about tolerance in the 
Netherlands, but around specific issues (such as the associational autonomy of religious schools or the 
room for cultural difference in the public domain) some of these conceptualisation are seen as less 
legitimate. This is notably the case for argumentations in terms of “condoning” or “pragmatic 
toleration” and those in terms of “multicultural recognition” and “principled acceptance”. Notably in 
the domain of education the emphasis is increasingly on the need for “civic integration” and defining 
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the “intolerable”, rather than moving towards further recognition of religious groups and supporting 
the “right to be different”. However, protest against an important form of policies of exclusion, namely 
with regard to rejected asylum seekers that risk to be expulsed demonstrates that the politics of ‘liberal 
intolerance’ are also backfiring. The liberal state stands accused of engaging in intolerable practices 
and policies, and more acceptance is asked for vulnerable individuals. Yet, the prominence of 
discourses of “cultural citizenship” also pollute the asylum debate, because it is argued that only those 
who are “well integrated” deserve a residence status. Whereas debates on cultural diversity issues and 
Islam have dominated public and political debate in the Netherlands since 2000, more recently a kind 
of “fatigue” is visible and socio-economic issues tend to become more prominent and are framed as 
more urgent than issues of cultural diversity.  
 
Keywords 
Tolerance, Reformed Schools, Islamic schools, religious freedom, church-state relations, pillarization, 
associative freedoms, asylum policy, contestation, acceptance, respect, exclusion.  
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Introduction 
This report explores discourses and practices of intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition in the 
Netherlands. It is often taken for granted that the Netherlands has made a major turnaround from being 
a country of “tolerance” for cultural and religious diversity, towards being among the least tolerant 
societies in Europe. The polemical debates on Islam and East European workers – often put on the 
agenda by populist leaders – as well as restrictive policies of immigration are seen as exemplifying a 
sharp decrease of respect and recognition of difference. This reports builds on empirical research to 
nuance that picture and demonstrates how existing regimes of governance of diversity and available 
conceptualisations of tolerance are being reproduced and challenged in what is now a “depillarized 
nation of immigration”.    
The first chapter of the report presents a review of the relevant academic literature, policy documents, 
statistical data and other empirical studies. It begins with an overview of the development of Dutch 
state formation and the emergence of a regimes of government of religious and cultural diversity. It 
also discussed the forming of a national identity in relation to the emergence of a plural (“pillarized”) 
society and discusses the issue of Dutch citizenship and immigrant integration policies. The main 
religious, national and ethnic minorities are introduced. The central part of the first chapter maps out 
the main cultural diversity challenges that the Netherlands have been facing over the past 30 years. It 
demonstrates how the presence of orthodox religious groups (notably Dutch Reformed Christians and 
Muslims) and of ethnic minority groups constitute important topics to which concepts of tolerance, 
intolerance and respect are applied and discussed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of five 
different conceptualisations of tolerance that structure the discursive space in which ideas about 
toleration and acceptance are being articulated in the Netherlands.  
The second and third chapter  are based on fieldwork research in two different fields. First we looked 
at the discourses and practices of tolerance in the field of education, next we examined a political 
challenge that was closely related to policies of exclusion and the limits of intolerance. 
The second chapter “Challenging diversity in education and school life” analyses the way issues of 
tolerance arise in Dutch education. Two case studies were selected. The first case study explores 
tolerance for orthodox religious schools, notably Reformed and Islamic schools. We analyse the 
general perception of religious schools, both in public and media debate and from the viewpoint of 
principals of these schools, who were interviewed during the research. Another axes of research was to 
analyse in what ways Islamic and Reformed schools make use of their associational freedoms, for 
example with respect to their curriculum and the hiring of teachers. The second case study explores 
the question of how tolerance and respect are embedded in (compulsory) civic education classes. It 
analyses conceptions of tolerance and acceptance in the overall plans for civic education and situates 
how these ideas about tolerance are related to different views on the aims of citizenship education.  
The third chapter “Contested policies of exclusion in the Netherlands. The lamentable asylum cases of 
Sahar and Mauro” looks at a highly topical political and public debate on the execution of Dutch 
asylum policies. With the consent of the majority of Dutch voters, consecutive governments have, 
over the past 15 years, made Dutch immigration and asylum policies among the strictest in Europe. 
Yet, increasingly there is protest against the execution of these strict policies and the way they result in 
expulsion, social exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable individuals. The chapter discusses the 
reasons and arguments that are used by protesters, including municipalities, and the way they draw on 
concepts such as tolerance and basic respect, and what the consequences are of these protests for 
Dutch asylum and expulsion policy. The focus is on the debates in 2010 and 2011 around the cases of 
Sahar and Mauro, two young end-of-line asylum seekers who were to be expelled.  
The concluding part of this report highlights the new knowledge acquired during the case studies and 
outlines the main positions, discourses and practices regarding tolerance and cultural diversity. It 
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addresses the question: is Dutch society becoming more or less tolerant. It concludes that such a 
question remains unanswerable and that the focus should be on contestations around specific practices, 
cultural and religious identities, freedoms and equality and on the limits of handling immigration and 
asylum in liberal democratic states. The chapter situates changing conceptions of tolerance in the 
discursive space of Dutch tolerance and alternative framings of cultural diversity challenges.  
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Chapter 1 –  National discourses on tolerance  
and cultural diversity in the Netherlands 
Marcel Maussen and Thijs Bogers 
1.1. Introduction 
On September 11 2010 the Dutch populist politician Geert Wilders gave a speech in New York in 
which he declared his solidarity with local groups protesting against the building of an Islamic centre 
near Ground Zero. He said New York was ‘rooted in Dutch tolerance’ and observed that ‘A tolerant 
society is not a suicidal society. It must defend itself against the powers of darkness, the force of 
hatred and the blight of ignorance. It cannot tolerate the intolerant and survive’. Opposing the 
construction of a mosque was thus represented as a necessary measure to uphold a tolerant society. 
This event was paradoxical in many ways. The leader of a recently established populist party in the 
Netherlands, who has become internationally known for his outspoken anti-Islam statements, defends 
‘liberal tolerance’ in the United States. In the Dutch context Wilders has similarly argued that the 
defence of Dutch liberal values requires a stop of ‘Muslim immigration’ and a curb on the building of 
mosques and other Islamic institutions in order to halt the ‘Islamisation of Europe’. Whereas the 
Netherlands used to have a reputation as a country welcoming other cultures and respecting the rights 
of immigrants, it is now often mentioned as an example of the ways the critique of Islam and 
multiculturalism dominate public debates on immigration and integration issues in Europe. A panel at 
an international political science conference held in Budapest in 2005 was meaningfully entitled 
‘What the hell happened to the Netherlands. Public culture and minority integration in the country of 
(in)tolerance’. This reports aims to shed some light on these paradoxes with regard to the current 
conceptualisations of tolerance and the events pertaining to cultural diversity in the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands has a reputation of being a country which has played a vital role in developing the 
ideas and practices of tolerance. During the period of the Dutch republic (1588-1795) the Low 
Countries offered a safe haven to religious dissenters that were persecuted in other European 
countries. At different moments in the history of early modern Europe Jews from Spain or French 
Huguenots sought and found refuge in the Netherlands. Cities such as Leiden and Amsterdam were 
home to the major thinkers of tolerance, including Baruch de Spinoza and Pierre Bayle. John Locke 
wrote his Letter concerning toleration (1689) while in exile in Holland. Another well-known aspect of 
Dutch history which is traditionally related to its approach to pluralism and tolerance is ‘pillarisation’. 
During this period, from approximately the 1900s until the 1960s, religious and other denominational 
groups – Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals – lived ‘parallel lives’ in separate institutions 
and organisations. Elite agreements and avoidance of sensitive topics in public and political debate 
ensured societal stability between the different groups. The ‘rules of the game’ belonging to 
pillarisation and the related Dutch consensus democracy have often been represented as important 
lessons on how to organise stability top-down in deeply divided societies (cf. Lijphart 1990). A third 
historical period in which Dutch practices of toleration became internationally renowned was in the 
wake of the cultural revolutions of the 1960s. New forms of permissiveness and openness to life-styles 
associated with youth culture of the 1960s were tolerated in the public sphere. Especially Amsterdam 
was seen as one of the most ‘tolerant’ or ‘permissive’ cities in the world. This openness to different 
life-styles and the decline of religious adherence also resulted in new liberal legislation in domains 
such as medical ethics (euthanasia, contraception, and abortion), gender equality and equality of 
sexual orientation (gay rights, gay marriage). Finally, a Dutch reputation of tolerance was established 
when in the 1980s and 1990s, it was one of the first countries to adopt a form of ‘multiculturalism’ in 
response to large scale immigration. A policy slogan such as ‘integration with retention of cultural 
identity’ served to demonstrate that also in the domain of immigrant integration the Dutch would 
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pursue strategies of governance that were grounded in respect for cultural difference and equal 
treatment of minority groups. Governments responded positively to emerging separate institutions and 
organisations that catered to the needs of ethnic minorities, believing these would allow newcomers to 
integrate fully in a culturally diverse society. 
In the course of this report we will argue that in the past 20 years or so, there are two categories of 
communities which are most outspokenly challenged in debates on cultural pluralism. These are 
religious groups and immigrants. We analyse public debates on Orthodox Calvinist groups, which 
often concern principles such as gender equality, religious freedom and associational autonomy, 
especially in the domains of education and politics. We discuss the ways Catholic leaders were 
challenged around issues of equality of sexual orientation. In the report we also include analysis of the 
main immigrant groups and how their cultural and religious differences have given rise to public 
contestation. In debates on migrant groups the focus is usually on specific ethno-religious practices, on 
the need for ‘integration’ and on a wide range of societal problems that are associated with cultural 
difference and socio-economic areas, such as unemployment, social isolation and crime. The group 
that is most outspokenly seen as both ethnically and religiously ‘different’ are Muslims and in the 
course of the report we will extensively discuss issues and events in which Islam and Muslims 
dominate the public discourse concerning toleration and diversity challenges. 
Throughout this report we constantly aim to analyse the ways in which ideas of acceptance, respect, 
recognition and tolerance, developed in tandem with institutional arrangements and practices. We 
begin with a review of the major elements of Dutch nation state formation and then proceed to discuss 
the main diversity challenges and how they relate to different minority groups. In the final part of the 
report we analyse different conceptualisations of tolerance and acceptance which structure the debates 
in the Netherlands.  
1.2. National identity and state formation 
Understanding contemporary diversity challenges in the Netherlands requires a thorough analysis of 
history, and in particular of the history of religious pluralism and the ways civil authorities have 
handled this form of pluralism in various ways. In the first place, as we will show in this section, the 
process of state formation in the Netherlands, which began in the second half of the 16th century, was 
closely related to the development of religion, shifting relations between majorities and minorities and 
changes in the institutional relations between church and state. In the second place, some important 
standing institutional arrangements for handling diversity, notably in the domains of education and 
politics, have been profoundly shaped by ideological struggles and social and political processes that 
date back to the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. In the third place, religion and migration are at the 
centre of contemporary debates about diversity.
1
 In what follows we focus on inter-faith strife and its 
settlement and in particular on the ways they left their imprints on Dutch institutions, political culture 
and strategies of governance. We then, more briefly, look at Dutch traditions of citizenship and 
nationality and on the role the Netherlands has played in the European Union. 
1.2.1. State formation 
The Netherlands emerged as an independent political entity out of the Dutch Revolt. The repressive 
reactions of Catholic Spain to the Reformation greatly fuelled anger and unrest in the Northern parts of 
the Low Countries, and local nobility and urban patricians believed the unrelenting Spanish decrees to 
be an undue imposition of power (Knippenberg 2006: 318). The 1579 Union of Utrecht was imposed 
as a defensive unity against Spanish rule but also came to form the basis of the Dutch Republic 
                                                     
1  Seen in this light, it makes sense that in this section we attribute less attention to the history of Dutch colonialism and to 
issues of race (which play a major role in other European former imperial powers such as Great Britain and France). 
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(Stuurman 1998: 168). Through the Union of Utrecht the Inquisition was renounced and each province 
of the new federal state could now decide for itself the status and practical exercise of religion in the 
public realm.  
The Dutch Republic was praised throughout the seventeenth century by foreign visitors for its 
comparative freedom of religious organisation. The Dutch Republic differed from other European 
states in its lack of uniform imposition of religion. Although religion and politics were heavily 
intertwined, power ultimately lay with the civil authorities. The tolerant stance by the civil authorities 
towards religious pluralism resulted from concerns with social stability in the highly pluralistic 
society, instead of noble convictions regarding individual freedom (Price 1994: 183-185, 203-204).  
The Calvinist Reformed Church dominated the public sphere where other denominations were 
excluded from. Its leaders often pressed for persecution of protestant dissenters and the extirpation of 
Catholicism. However, the civil authorities were not inclined to answer this request out of concern for 
the disruption of commercial and social stability. This did not mean the civil authorities could simply 
tolerate all forms of religious activity in the public realm. In practice civil authorities would choose to 
look the other way as long as the tolerated religious practices did not cause any social disturbance 
(Price 1994: 190, 203-204). Illustrative hereof are the clandestine churches (schuilkerken), buildings in 
which churches were operated behind closed doors by religious dissenters. Throughout the eighteenth 
century membership of the Reformed Church was increasingly becoming a prerequisite for obtaining 
public office (Stuurman 1998: 172-173).  
The Patriot revolution leading up to the Batavian Republic of 1795 was in part directed against the 
lack of virtue amongst the ruling class and the Reformed Church. The revolution was completed by 
invading French revolutionaries who contributed to the centralisation of the republic (Van Rooden 
2010: 64-66). In 1813 after the fall of Napoleon, William I, heir to the last stadtholder of the Dutch 
Republic, was proclaimed sovereign head of state of the Netherlands and in 1815 king of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, which included the former Austrian Netherlands, present-day Belgium. 
Encouraged by the state, the new nationalism of the nineteenth century became heavily intertwined 
with Protestantism with the aim of providing Dutch citizens with a moral upbringing (Van Rooden 
2002: 122).  
This emphasis on education and upbringing led to feelings of discontent amongst some Protestant 
ministers who questioned the heavily intertwined relationship between religion, individual piety and 
citizenship. The central government also attempted to turn the Roman Catholic Church, which was 
dominant in the southern part of the Kingdom, into an institution that could support the process of 
nation-building. However, these attempts provoked resentment among Catholics and contributed to the 
Belgian revolt of 1830. In 1839 the new Kingdom of Belgium was internationally recognised as a 
sovereign state. After the separation with Belgium, the northern part of the Netherlands above the 
Rhine-Meuse delta was a Protestant dominated area. The southern part of the Netherlands below the 
Rhine-Meuse delta consisted of strong Catholic majorities. In 1839 35% of the Dutch population was 
Catholic (Van Rooden 2002: 123). 
After the 1848 constitutional reform, liberals such as Thorbecke and Kappeyne van de Coppello were 
strengthened in their conviction that it was the task of a modern nation to create modern citizens. 
Modern for liberals entailed agnosticism and an emphasis on the natural sciences. In the 1870s the 
liberals argued for obligatory education throughout the nation, so children could be brought up to 
become modern citizens. In practice this would entail that in places where confessional schools were 
absent, children would be sent to public schools. Therefore confessional politicians heavily opposed 
these proposals. From then on, the political strife between confessional and liberal politicians was 
channelled through the question of education (De Rooy 1998: 183-184). 
In opposition to the liberal modernisation campaign, Protestant politicians under the leadership of 
Abraham Kuyper organised themselves as a political party with popular support. Although anti-
modernists, the Protestants thereby in fact introduced modern mass-politics in the Netherlands (De 
Rooy 1998: 188-189). The dispute over education was settled with a political agreement that has 
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become known as ‘the pacification’ or ‘the Great Compromise’ of 1917: privately founded 
confessional schools were entitled to equal state financing as were public schools. In return for 
conceding this confessional demand, the liberals obtained general male suffrage (Lijphart 1990: 105-
106). The 1917 law for equal financing for confessional and public schools is still part of the Dutch 
constitution.  
Since the early decades of the 20
th
 century until the mid 1960s, the Netherlands was a ‘pillarised’ 
nation, meaning that most areas of human activity were marked by separate organisations representing 
the different religious and secular points of view (Monsma and Soper 2009: 11). Each pillar was 
defined by religious conviction or the lack thereof. There was a Catholic, a Protestant and a general 
pillar (Lijphart 1990: 28). Within the general pillar socio-economic cleavages resulted in the formation 
of a Socialist and a Liberal pillar (Lijphart 1990: 34). In pillarised Dutch society, individuals’ 
allegiance to the nation was effected through the group membership of their pillar. Also, because 
religion had become inextricably linked to a specific part of the population, religion had in fact 
become ‘ethnicized’ (Van Rooden 2010: 70). People lived in relative isolation from those who did not 
belong to their pillar. Only the pillars’ elites were in regular contact with each other (Lijphart 1990: 
106). These elites endeavoured to reach consensus on issues that were controversial between, but not 
within, the homogenous pillars. The resulting politics of pacification led to noticeable democratic 
stability during the period of pillarisation (Lijphart 1990: 110). 
Two comments have to be made concerning the phenomenon of Dutch pillarisation. First, instead of 
being uniquely Dutch, pillarisation should rather be seen as a national version of an international 
phenomenon (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010: 260). Second, the emphasis on Dutch society as a pillarised 
society obstructs attention to occurrences of disharmony within the pillars. For instance, the divisions 
between Dutch Protestants not only led to different church organisations but also to different 
Protestant political parties. Within the Catholic pillar there was strife between the working class wing 
and the bourgeois wing (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010: 257, 259). Since 1917 the political coalition 
between the Catholics and Protestants managed to retain an electoral majority until the mid 1960s 
(Van Rooden 2010: 69).  
In the period following World War II Dutch society and politics have undergone significant changes. 
These societal transformations occurred especially in the period following the cultural revolution of 
the 1960s. In the first place, the rise of a modern welfare state meant that the state would take over 
many tasks and services that were carried out by different organisations belonging to the various 
pillars until then. In the 1980s the welfare state receded again and neo-liberal policies of reform were 
implemented. In the second place, a widespread process of secularisation and decline of religious 
participation set in, which brought an end to the authoritarian character of pillarised Dutch society 
(Van Rooden 2010: 71). Gradually a society developed that conceived of morality in secular terms 
which resulted in legislation of abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriages. In many respects, the 
Dutch came to think of itself as a progressive ‘guiding nation’ that set an example for other countries 
with liberal legislation on gender, sexuality and drug use. The emancipation of the voter from the 
confines of the pillars resulted in a changing political landscape. In the 1970s the three confessional 
parties merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA). From 
1994 to 2002 the Netherlands were governed by the ‘purple’ coalition governments composed of the 
Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, 
VVD), and Liberal-Democratic Party (Democraten 66, D66). This was the first time that the 
Netherlands was governed solely by non-confessional parties. The current coalition government is a 
minority government, a novelty for the Netherlands, consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and 
the Liberal Party (VVD), condoned in parliament by Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (Partij voor de 
Vrijheid, PVV). Finally, over the past 60 years successive waves of immigrations have changed the 
religious and cultural composition of Dutch society. In later sections of this report the main diversity 
challenged that are related to post-war immigration will be discussed extensively.  
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1.2.2. Citizenship 
Until 1892 Dutch nationality was acquired on the basis of birth on Dutch territory (ius soli). In 1892 
this principle was substituted through the first Dutch Nationality Act with the principle of ius 
sanguinis: Dutch nationality was now acquired when being born to a Dutch father. In 1953 the 
principle of ius soli was partly reinstated, mainly with regard to Germans living in the Netherlands. In 
1985 a new Dutch Nationality Act was enforced with the aim of minimising the differences in legal 
status between immigrants and Dutch nationals. Immigrants were given voting rights on the European 
and local level. Also, second generation immigrants could now opt for Dutch nationality instead of 
having to go through the more complicated procedure of naturalisation. First generation immigrants 
however became required to pass a language test if they wanted to obtain Dutch nationality, although 
enforcement of this requirement was less stringent towards illiterates and elderly people. Also, Dutch 
nationals now received both their father and mother’s nationality (Van Beek et al. 2010: 16-17). In 
2003 an adjustment was made to the Nationality Act making opting and naturalisation more difficult. 
This reflected overall policy changes by the Dutch government, which tried to develop immigrant 
integration policies with a much more assimilatory character (Van Beek et al. 2010: 16).  
With the aim of designing policies specifically for immigrant minorities, the Dutch government has 
chosen to keep detailed statistical records concerning ethnic identities. In statistical terms all Dutch 
nationals with at least one parent born abroad are labelled allochthonous (allochtoon). Dutch nationals 
of whom both parents are born in the Netherlands are labelled authochthonous (autochtoon). It follows 
that third generation immigrants are counted as authochthonous. Although these statistical categories 
were introduced without any bad intent, the term allochtoon has come to denote all non-Western 
immigrants in popular speech (De Zwart and Poppelaars 2007: 387, 389). In practice, the debate on 
immigrant integration has become structured around the place of allochthones in Dutch society. 
In recent years there has been increasing debate concerning citizens with multiple nationalities. A 
second passport is seen as an impediment to integration into Dutch society. In 2009 over one million 
Dutch nationals were in possession of a second passport. Of them 282,000 also held a Turkish 
passport, 260,000 a Moroccan passport and 237,000 a passport from an EU member state, although the 
political debate rarely mentions the latter. In 1992 the principle of renunciation of the original 
nationality when acquiring Dutch nationality, introduced with the 1985 Dutch Nationality Act, was 
abolished. This led to a considerable rise in requests for Dutch nationality especially by Turkish 
nationals living in the Netherlands. A side-effect was a steep rise in new Dutch nationals partaking in 
local elections. However in 1997 the renunciation principle was reinstalled and in the 2008 changes to 
the Dutch Nationality Act it was accentuated. An implication was that second generation immigrants 
too are required to give up their non-Dutch nationality. Also, an individual who has committed a crime 
against the state can now be deprived from his or her Dutch nationality (Van Beek et al. 2010: 17-18). 
1.2.3. The Netherlands and the EU 
The Netherlands is one of the founding members of the EU and driving forces of the European project. 
During the Second World War plans were made for an economic union between Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg. In 1946 the Benelux was created and two years later customs duties were 
removed and a common external tariff was created. During the 1950s economic harmonisation was 
perfected, resulting in an economic union in 1960 (Urwin 1997: 79). In 1952 the Netherlands was the 
first nation to raise the idea of a common European market and the only country in which there existed 
a broad consensus between the different parties on the notion of economic integration (Urwin 1997: 
99, 104). The Benelux served as a working experiment whilst serious consideration was given 
throughout Western Europe to a pool of coal and steel resources (Urwin 1997: 83). The Netherlands 
was one of the six original members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) (Urwin 1997: 101). 
With this role of the Netherlands as protagonist of the European project in mind, it is especially 
surprising that the Dutch voted with 62% against the European constitution in the 2005 referendum, 
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which had a noticeable high turnout of 63%. This surprise is strengthened when taking into 
consideration that the Dutch have been the most enthusiastic of the European project when compared 
to the peoples of the other five founding members. Also, 128 out of 150 seats in parliament favoured 
ratification of the European constitution showing a large gap between popular and elite sentiments 
(Aarts and Van der Kolk 2006: 243).  
The Dutch ‘no’ can be explained by growing feelings of discontent with the rapid pace of European 
integration. The EU has increasingly come to be seen as costing money instead of ensuring what it was 
designed for, namely economic growth. There is an overall feeling that the introduction of the Euro 
has made life more expensive. Also, the vast expansion of the EU has led to expectations that the 
wealthier nations will have to contribute more than they already do. The rapid eastward expansion of 
the EU, and the question of Turkey’s accession, was seen as a threat to Dutch culture and Dutch jobs 
because they would possibly be relocated to cheaper member states. Also, with increasing expansion it 
was feared the Netherlands would lose its political influence within the EU (Aarts en Van der Kolk 
2006: 244-245). 
1.3. Cultural diversity challenges  
To outside observers it sometimes seems as if at present cultural diversity challenges in the 
Netherlands are exclusively related to immigration and Islam. However, as we will show in this 
section, diversity challenges continue to concern both native minorities and post-war immigration 
minorities. In addition, the way the Netherlands has dealt with diversity challenges concerning post-
war immigration minorities is in part influenced by notions stemming from diversity challenges 
concerning native minorities in the past. For each minority we briefly mention its historical 
background, its current position in Dutch society and events around which religious, linguistic, ethnic 
and cultural differences become public issues. We present relevant statistical information on the 
minority groups in separate tables.  
In the last part of this section we analyse in greater depth different challenging events that have taken 
place in recent years. The reason we proceed in this way is because diversity challenges in the 
Netherlands are usually discussed in relation to different combinations of minority groups. Mostly 
they focus on more conservative or Orthodox religious groups and on immigrant groups. We 
distinguish between three different clusters of events. These are events and discussions related to (1) 
the existence of special institutions catering to different ethnic and religious groups (faith-based 
schools, ethnic organisations) and whether or not these enhance segregation and feelings of alienation 
between different groups in Dutch society; (2) gender equality and equality of sexual orientation 
versus religious autonomy, especially in relation to conservative religious and immigrant groups; (3) 
free speech and its limits, especially with regard to vulnerable groups and Islam. We discuss crucial 
events in these clusters and the ways in which Dutch institutions and society have dealt with them. 
Hereby we aim to identify the relevant practices, norms, and institutions at play, and, if relevant, the 
various usages of concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, respect, pluralism, national identity and 
national heritage.  
1.3.1. Minority groups and cultural diversity challenges in the Netherlands: an overview  
For the Netherlands it makes sense to make a rough distinction between ‘native minorities’ and ‘post-
war immigration minorities’. The first category contains those groups that continue to be seen by 
others (and continue to define themselves) as different from the mainstream society, mostly for 
linguistic, cultural or religious reasons. These include religious groups, some of which are (at least to 
some extent) geographically concentrated (Catholics in the Southern provinces of Brabant and 
Limburg, Orthodox Protestants in the ‘Bible belt’ from the South West province of Zeeland to the 
North East part of the country) and some of which are less clearly geographically concentrated (Jews). 
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The category of native groups also contains two regional-linguistic minorities: the Frisians, who have 
their own language (Frisian), and a political party, the Frisian National Party, which seeks and actively 
promotes regional autonomy, and the Limburgers, who share a dialect and have a somewhat 
ambivalent relation to the western provinces of Holland. The second category contains post-war 
immigration groups. Here we make a distinction between colonial migrants (Indonesians, Moluccans, 
Antilleans and Surinamese), labour migrants (Turks and Moroccans) and Asylum seekers. Given the 
prominent role issues around Islam has played in public debate over the past decade we briefly discuss 
Muslims as a separate group.  
Table 1.1: Religious Minorities in the Netherlands in % of the population 
  1990 2000 2009 
None 38 40 44 
Roman-Catholic 33 32 28 
Dutch Reformed 17 14 9 
Orthodox Reformed 8 7 3 
Protestant Church Netherlands n/a n/a 6 
Other religious (including Islam) 5 8 10 
Source: Statline - Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 2010) 
Table 1.2: Native Regional-Linguistic Minorities in the Netherlands 
  2006 2009 
Inhabitants of the province Friesland 642,230 644,811 
Inhabitants of the province Limburg 1,131,938 1,122,604 
Source: Statline - Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 2010) 
Table 1.3: Dutch population and main post-war immigration minorities 
   1996 2000 2005 2010 
 Total 15,493,889 15,863,950 16,305,526 16,574,989 
 Autochthonous 12,995,174 13,088,648 13,182,809 13,215,294 
 Allochthonous 2,498,715 2,775,302 3,122,717 3,359,603 
 Western Allochthonous 1,327,602 1,366,535 1,423,675 1,501,309 
 Non-Western Allochthonous 1,171,113 1,408,767 1,699,042 1,858,294 
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s Indonesian 411,622 405,155 396,080 382,411 
Moluccan n/a 40,000* n/a n/a 
Surinamese 280,615 302,514 329,430 342,279 
Antillean and Aruban 86,824 107,197 130,538 138,420 
Turkish 271,514 308,890 358,846 383,957 
Moroccan 225,088 262,221 315,821 349,005 
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Polish 5,910 5,645 10,968 43,083 
Bulgarian 550 713 1,924 12,340 
Romanian 1,466 1,397 3,020 7,118 
Hungarian 1,133 1,385 2,029 5,294 
Slovakian 205 579 1,239 2,844 
Czech 350 887 1,707 2,602 
Lithuanian 127 338 970 2,126 
Latvian 63 146 361 1,143 
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e
rs
 Former Soviet Union 13,485 22,625 44,419 55,896 
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Former Yugoslavian 56,220 66,947 76,301 70,119 
Somali 20,060 28,780 21,733 27,011 
Sudanese 943 3,919 7,285 6,329 
Iraqi 11,278 33,449 43,708 52,102 
Afghanistani 4,916 21,468 37,021 38,664 
 Source: CBS Statline 2010 
 *estimate, see Smeets and Veenman 2000: 41 
Table 1.4: Minorities and Dimensions of Difference 
Dimensions of difference Citizenship Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Linguistic 
Native religious 
Catholics    X   
Orthodox Protestants    X   
Jews   X X   
Native linguistic 
Frisians   X   X 
Limburg      X 
Immigrant colonial 
Indonesians  X X X X  
Moluccans  X X X X  
Surinamese  X X X X  
Antilleans  X X X X  
Immigrant labour 
Turks X X X X X X 
Moroccans X X X X X X 
 
1.3.2 Cultural diversity challenges concerning native minorities 
The native minorities we will discuss in this section are religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, orthodox 
Protestants, and regional minorities: Frisians and Limburgers. 
Catholics 
In 2009 Catholics were by far the largest religious group in Dutch society with 30% of the population 
belonging to the Roman Catholic Church (CBS 2010). Regular church visits in this group are in 
decline, with 23% of all Catholics visiting church at least once a month in 2008 (CBS 2009: 23). 
Catholicism remains dominant in the provinces south of the Rhine-Meuse delta, North Brabant and 
Limburg (CBS 2009: 42). For a long time in Dutch history Catholics were a tolerated but marginalised 
minority in the Netherlands and they played only a secondary role in the nation state. Catholics only 
managed to become a minority partaking in the power sharing structure of Dutch society in the late 
19
th
 and 20
th
 century (Sengers 2004: 131). One can argue that Catholics thus emancipated from being a 
group that was merely tolerated into a group demanding recognition and equality. Key to dealing with 
their marginalised position in society was organisation: a wide array of Catholic social organisations 
were founded like schools, charity organisations, labour unions and sports organisations. In these 
organisations Catholics were socialised in Catholic values, strengthening their attachment to the 
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Catholic movement. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century preservation of Catholic unity 
was emphasised by authoritative figures in the Catholic community (Sengers 2004: 132-133). Dutch 
Catholics created a Catholic pillar which could not be marginalised in society anymore. The Catholic 
Peoples’ Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP) became a permanent member of Dutch coalition 
governments since 1917 (Van Praag 1998: 295-296). At present Catholics hold prominent positions in 
the governing Christian-Democratic Appeal (CDA). 
Illustrative of the ways Roman Catholics were marginalised until quite recently is the fact that until 
1972 local authorities had the possibility to forbid Catholic processions if these were not a familiar and 
established practice in the local community. In local communities that were dominated by Protestants, 
processions thus remained outlawed until the constitutional revision of 1972. The nature of the 
emancipation of Catholics in Dutch society has changed since the 1960s, because secularisation and 
the diminishing of the adherence to church life were especially strong in the Catholic sub-culture 
(Kennedy and Zwemer 2010). Since the 1980s many Catholic social institutions, such as newspapers, 
media and also schools, have chosen to no longer advertise their confessional identity in a prominent 
way. In the 1980s Dutch bishops sought to re-emphasise the Church’s role by combating secularism 
and the permissive trend in sexual morality. This conservative policy remained largely without effect 
both within the Catholic community and in Dutch society as a whole (Sengers 2010: 91).  
One set of issues around which Catholics and especially the leaders of the Catholic Church tend to be 
exposed and criticised in public debate concern ethical issues (euthanasia, abortion) and sexual 
morality (contraception, gay rights). This demonstrates how the norms of liberal-secular ‘tolerance’ 
can be perceived as a form of intolerance by Catholic groups. Actually, the more secularism and 
progressive values with regard to gender equality and sexual morality have gained the upper hand in 
Dutch society, the more the Catholic Church is criticised. Not surprisingly the recent scandals around 
sexual abuse of children in Catholic institutions have contributed to this as well. Recently the values of 
the Catholic Church clashed with values dominant in Dutch secular society, when in February 2010 
the parish priest from Reusel refused to give communion to an openly homosexual parishioner. The 
incident led to a protest by gay interest organisations at the church service of the diocese in Den 
Bosch. At the service the priest stated that ‘correct’ sexual conduct forms part of the preconditions for 
taking communion, whereupon the protesters loudly left the service. The diocese has settled the matter 
by deciding that from now on it is up to the parishioners’ own conscience if they can accept 
communion or not. In practice this means that the priest will not refuse communion, but that the 
individual believer should understand that being openly gay and being a devout Catholic do not go 
well together (NRC Handelsblad, 4 March 2010).  
Jews 
In the second half of the twentieth century the Jewish presence in the Netherlands had declined 
considerably due to the Holocaust. When compared to other European countries, a relatively high 
number of Dutch Jews were murdered in the Holocaust. From the 107,000 Jews that were deported 
only 5,200 survived. In 1941 the Jewish population in the Netherlands counted more than 160,000 
people. In 1966 this number was a small 30,000 (Knippenberg 2001: 196-197). In 2009 there were 
almost 52,000 Jews in the Netherlands, less than 1 percent of the total population (Solinge and Van 
Praag 2010). 
Where Calvinists and Catholics developed their own pillar within Dutch society, Jews developed 
along the opposite route of assimilation. Areas with a large presence of Jews were the cities of 
Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Groningen. Although Jewish organisations did exist within 
these cities, they were also the places where socialism, liberalism and the process of secularisation 
prospered. Through their dominating presence in sectors as the diamond industry, commerce, banking 
and clothing, Jews were continuously brought into contact with liberals and socialists and their ideas 
and organisations. It is therefore no surprise that there are many Jews among the founding members of 
various Socialist and Liberal organisations (Knippenberg 2001: 202-203). 
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Several factors can explain why, on the whole, there is little public concern about the Jewish 
community and its distinctive religious and cultural practices. The Jewish community in the 
Netherlands is relatively small, and because of secularisation and the fact that mixed marriages are 
more common than marriages with Jews the number of religious (as opposed to ethnic) Jews has been 
declining (De Vries 2006). Besides, the Jewish community is well integrated in Dutch society and the 
memory of the events during the Second World War and of anti-Semitism in Europe constitute a 
barrier to public criticism of Jewish practices and institutions. Although there has been contestation 
around specific Jewish practices, such as ritual slaughtering. In February 2011 the Dutch parliament 
discussed a proposal by the Animal Party (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD) to ban ritual slaughtering 
without pre-stunning. In June 2010 the existence of a hidden synagogue in Amsterdam became 
national news and led to an emergency debate in parliament. The congregation of thirty orthodox Jews 
feels unsafe to present themselves as Jews in public. Jews are harassed and bullied in public and 
Jewish organisations like schools, but also family celebrations, are in need of protection (Het Parool, 
19 June 2010). This is not a mere incident and the rise of anti-Semitic violence has been a concern for 
several years in the larger Dutch cities. The Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel 
(CIDI) reported that there have been 167 anti-Semitic incidents in 2009, a sharp increase of 55% 
compared to 2008 (CIDI 2010). In October 2010 one city district in Amsterdam decided to allocate 
135,000 Euro a year for the protection of Jewish institutions such as schools and synagogues. In 
December 2010 former EU commissioner Frits Bolkestein stated that orthodox Jews, who are 
recognisable as Jews in public, are better off emigrating to Israel or the US. Bolkestein sees no future 
for them because of the rapidly growing anti-Semitism among especially Moroccan youths (De Pers, 6 
December 2010). There was criticism towards Bolkestein’s remarks which some considered being 
one-sided given the role of scapegoat that has been attributed to Muslims and the Moroccan youth, and 
the accompanying widespread instances of criticism towards them. 
There is also a repeated debate upon the growing difficulties to teach about the Holocaust in Dutch 
schools, especially because of the growing polarisation around the Israel/Palestine conflict and the 
increase of anti-Semitism among pupils.
2
 Incidents with Moroccan youth (who disturbed the annual 
commemoration of the Second World War in 2003 in Amsterdam) resulted in special programs to 
teach tolerance and include children of immigrant background in the commemoration of the 
Holocaust. A related project was called ‘radicalisation in the classroom’. Several cities, including 
Amsterdam, have developed initiatives to also involve migrant organisations in ceremonies of 
commemoration of the Second World War. 
Orthodox Protestants 
One native religious minority that figures repeatedly and prominently in public debates on diversity 
challenges in the Netherlands are Orthodox Reformed Calvinists, who live mostly in a ‘Bible belt’ 
from the South West province of Zeeland to the North East part of the country. Orthodox Reformed 
Calvinists adhere to a strong version of neo-Calvinism and seceded from the mainstream Dutch 
Reformed Church in the 19
th
 century. Within this group the so-called pietistic Dutch Calvinists 
(bevindelijk gereformeerden) adhere even more strictly to the Bible as the word of God and they are 
characterised by conservative teachings, opposing abortion, euthanasia and work on Sundays, rejecting 
modern amenities such as television or cinema and opposing mandatory vaccination (Schuster 2009: 
157). Of the Dutch population in 2009, 9% sees itself as Dutch Reformed, 3% as Orthodox Reformed 
and 6% as belonging to the Protestant Church Netherlands (CBS 2010).
3
 In these communities of 
                                                     
2 A study among 339 history teachers in secondary schools held in April 2010 showed that one in five teachers has experienced 
Muslim students objecting to classes on the holocaust. See “Muslim pupils have difficulties with Holocaust class” in 
Elsevier April 27 2010. 
3 In 2004 the Dutch Reformed Church merged with the orthodox Reformed (Calvinist) churches and the Evangelic-Lutheran 
churches into the Protestant Church Netherlands (Protestantse Kerk in Nederland, PKN). The first two find themselves 
reunited since the 1834 secession. The new congregation has 2,5 million members (Trouw, 1 May 2004). However the 
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pietistic Dutch Calvinists, the Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) 
finds most of its voters. The party program of the SGP is founded on the Bible as the word of God and 
states that the political aim of the party is a political order based on the word of God. Since the 
election of 1922 the Political Reformed Party has consistently obtained between 1 and 3 out of 150 
seats of parliament and is the oldest Dutch political party. 
In Dutch public debate several events have been raised over the past decades concerning Orthodox 
Reformed Calvinist groups. Often these debates are about drawing boundaries between what is 
tolerable and what is intolerable. An important set of issues involve the boundaries of the forms of 
associational and collective autonomy that Orthodox groups can legitimately claim. In the domain of 
education, for example, the debate has been about whether or not Orthodox Reformed schools can 
discriminate against gay teachers, either by refusing them or by asking them not to be explicit about 
their homosexuality. Another set of issues relates to the associational autonomy of schools with regard 
to the curriculum, for example whether these schools can refuse to teach about evolution theory or 
whether they can refuse to distribute educational material on homosexuality. The refusal, on religious 
grounds, of parents to have their children vaccinated also leads to debate. Also in the political domain 
Orthodox Calvinists are challenged, notably around the position of the Political Reformed Party. In the 
final part of this section we will discuss more elaborately the diversity challenges that involve 
Orthodox Reformed Calvinists.  
Frisians 
Next to religious minorities, there are also cases of diversity challenges concerning geographical 
minorities in the Netherlands, even though we hasten to add that these challenges appear less often in 
the newspaper headlines than those involving religious groups or immigrants. In 2009 the province of 
Friesland inhabited 644,811 people (CBS 2010). Frisians used to inhabit a larger area of the northern 
part of the Netherlands and Germany than the present-day province of Friesland. In 1945 the Frisian 
Movement published its program emphasising the inseparability of Frisians from the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, but also arguing, without any resonance on the national stage, for decentralisation 
(Hemminga 2006: 144). In 1962 the Frisian National Party (Fryske Nasjonale Partij, FNP) was 
founded as a federalist regional party. In 1966 the FNP obtained one out of 55 seats of the provincial 
assembly. In 2003 the FNP obtained 7 seats of the provincial assembly (Hemminga 2006: 143).  
The FNP’s slogan is ‘Frisian and Federal’. The FNP favours the principle of subsidiarity in a 
European context, arguing for governing powers for the lower administrative units. Governing power 
should belong to higher administrative units only when lower units are incapable of fulfilling them. 
Towards this end the FNP argues that municipalities should be placed above provinces and the state in 
the Netherlands, but also in the wider European context (Hemminga 2006: 149).  
There have been various international initiatives to protect regional and minority languages. For 
instance, in 1996 the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was accepted in Barcelona. In 1998 
the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages was ratified which functions as a binding 
international treaty (Gorter 2003: 3). Notwithstanding these initiatives to protect regional and minority 
languages and the fact that Frisian has officially been recognised as the second language in the 
province of Friesland, the Frisian language is increasingly under pressure in contemporary society. 
First, internal migration has caused increasing blending of Frisian and Dutch speaking people. Second, 
external migration has led to the presence of non-native languages in the Frisian cities and due to the 
government’s allocation policy of asylum seekers throughout the country, in the smaller towns too. 
Third, English has become a dominant language in everyday life, especially in the household through 
television, but also in areas of information technology, advertising, tourism, commerce and education. 
The rise in non-native Dutch languages in Friesland had been accompanied by a decline of Frisian 
dialects (Gorter 2003: 32-33). This process is likely to continue in the near future even though the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
merger was not welcomed by everyone and led to secessions between those who favoured it and those who opposed it. 
(Trouw, 2 July 2004). 
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current Minister of the Interior is proposing plans to strengthen the use of Frisian in the public sphere, 
for instance by using Frisian on governmental forms and by using it as the first language in Frisian 
schools. 
Limburgers 
A province with a distinct regional dialect is Limburg, the southernmost province of the Netherlands 
bordering Belgium and Germany. After its once prospering mining industry came to a halt, Limburg 
has been characterised by social and economic deprivation. At present, Limburg still lags behind the 
rest of the Netherlands concerning socio-economic issues. Unemployment in Limburg is higher than 
the nation’s average and the average household income in Limburg belongs to the lowest of the 
country. The people of Limburg have a relatively low education level. Since 2000 drug related crime 
has risen explosively in Limburg. The population in Limburg is shrinking, a trend that will continue 
throughout the coming decades (Aarts and Schmeets 2010: 56). In 2000 the population of Limburg 
was 1,141,192 and in 2009 it was 1,122,604 (CBS 2010). 
In the 2010 national elections one in four Limburgers voted for the Freedom Party (PVV), whose 
leader Geert Wilders is a Limburg native. In almost all municipalities of Limburg the Freedom Party 
gained the majority vote. With its support of the Freedom Party, the electorate in Limburg differs 
markedly from the national voting pattern. Wilders’ success in Limburg can be partly attributed to his 
being a Limburg native seen as other parties had no or a very limited Limburg representation. 
Regional minorities who have their own dialect, such as the Limburgers, do not cause major diversity 
challenges in Dutch society. Nonetheless, the recent support in Limburg for Geert Wilders does 
illustrate there continues to exist a feeling of discrimination among them. Also other regional groups 
have protested against what they perceive as the cultural dominance of the Western provinces of 
Holland and how this is reflected in politics and the media. In the recent provincial elections of 2011 
the Freedom Party sought to position itself as a party defending regional autonomy by loudly 
proclaimed that ‘Limburg should belong to the Limburgers’ and ‘Twente [a region in the Eastern part 
of the country] to the people from Twente’. 
1.3.3. Cultural diversity challenges concerning post-war immigration minorities 
As we have mentioned above, migration has over the past 60 years contributed to the forming of new 
identities and forms of cultural diversity in Dutch society. In the period following the Second World 
War there have been different forms of immigration to the Netherlands. Between 1946 and the early 
1960s immigrants mainly came from the former Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). In the 1960s and 
1970s immigrants were mostly ‘guest workers’ from the Mediterranean region and post-colonial 
immigrants from the Caribbean region (Surinam and the Dutch Antilles). Even though labour 
recruitment policies were ended in the mid 1970s, immigration from Turkey and Morocco continued 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s because of family reunification and family formation. Finally, asylum 
seekers constitute an important group of immigrants, especially since the 1990s (Bruqeutas-Callejo et 
al. 2007: 9-11). The Dutch government has pursued different policy approaches to deal with post-war 
immigration; these will be alluded to in this section. 
In this section we distinguish between post-war immigration minorities resulting from colonial 
immigration, labour immigration, and asylum seekers. We also discuss the position of Muslims in the 
Netherlands. 
Colonial immigrants – Indonesians and Moluccans 
Colonial immigrants to the Netherlands consist of migrants from the former Netherlands East Indies, 
from Surinam and from the Netherlands Antilles. Migration from these former colonies occurred in 
this order. From 1946-1962, as many as 300,000 repatriates from the Netherlands East Indies migrated 
to the Netherlands (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 5-6). This group consisted of people who had a 
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relation with the former colonial regime, amongst them a significant portion was of Indonesian-Dutch 
decent. The prevailing feelings of resentment within this group regarding the dissolution of the 
colonial regime and their demands for retribution to the Dutch government were largely ignored 
(Oostindie 2010: 25-26). Still, this group of immigrants managed to integrate rapidly into Dutch 
society because of a number of factors, including their relatively high level of education, familiarity 
with the Dutch language and culture, the dispersion of immigrant families over the country and the 
growing of the Dutch economy in the second half of the 1950s. 
The successful and rapid integration of the Indonesians is usually contrasted to the very painful and 
difficult incorporation of another group of post-colonial migrants who came to the Netherlands in the 
wake of the independence of Indonesia. In 1951 around 12,500 inhabitants of the Moluccan Islands, a 
part of the Indonesian Archipelago, migrated to the Netherlands. This group consisted mostly of 
soldiers from the former colonial army and their families. Both the Dutch government and the 
Moluccans believed their stay in the Netherlands would be temporary. They expected the Moluccans 
could one day return to a Free Republic of the Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS), an 
independent state that was proclaimed in 1950 but which was not recognised by the Indonesian 
government. Therefore the Dutch government’s policy towards the Moluccans was aimed at isolating 
them from wider society (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 6). In 1959 Moluccans were located in 
regular quarters in various cities spread over the Netherlands. In the 1970s Moluccan youths 
undertook violent actions against Indonesian diplomatic institutions in the Netherlands to demonstrate 
their discontent with Indonesia’s policy towards the Republic of the Moluccas. They also tried to force 
the government to alter its stance towards the position of Moluccans in Dutch society. Through the 
Memorandum on Moluccans (Molukkersnota) of 1978 the Dutch government clarified that the 
government would now view the Moluccan presence in the Netherlands as permanent (Smeets and 
Veenman 2000: 44-45). Measures were taken to enhance Moluccan participation in Dutch society, in 
particular in the domains of education and the labour market (Van Amersfoort and Niekerk 2006: 
332). The debates on the situation of Moluccans have often revolved around the need of giving 
genuine recognition to Moluccan communities, both with regard to their distinct ethnic identity and 
with regard to their political goals. Often Moluccan leaders have insisted that mere ‘toleration’ was not 
enough and they have blamed the Dutch state for their marginal position. 
It is estimated that in 2000 there were almost 40,000 Moluccans in the Netherlands (Smeets and 
Veenman 2000: 41). Experts agree that the second generation of Moluccans made a great leap forward 
when compared to the first generation, yet this trend seems to have lost some of its momentum among 
the third generation (Van Amersfoort 2004: 168). Resulting from their initial isolation from wider 
Dutch society, homogeneous Moluccan neighbourhoods still exist today. These communities are 
threatened by new policy from the social housing corporations who believe homogeneous 
neighbourhoods are an impediment to integration (Trouw, 5 January 2010). In January 2010 violent 
riots occurred in a Moluccan-Moroccan neighbourhood in Culemborg. The former Moluccan 
dominated neighbourhood mainly consists of social housing for the lower segment of the market, 
causing an influx of lower class Moroccan families in recent years. The social housing corporation has 
answered the riots with a policy towards creating more diversity in the neighbourhood in terms of the 
socio-economic background of the residents (Trouw, 15 March 2010). These recent incidents have 
made it clear to the wider public that separate Moluccan neighbourhoods still exist. Simultaneously 
there is a debate within the Moluccan community and within Dutch society at large on whether this 
form of segregation is desirable. In this process the Moluccan identity is being negotiated, both 
between generations and in relation to the wider social contexts. It demonstrates how boundary 
drawing occurs in the context of shifting power relations. 
Colonial immigrants – Surinamese and Antilleans 
The Netherlands’ other colonies, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, remained part of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands after the Second World War. The 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
created one nationality within the Kingdom. Citizens from these overseas parts of the Kingdom had 
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free access to the Netherlands. From 1965 onwards unskilled workers from Surinam moved to the 
Netherlands (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 7). Because of this influx of Surinamese and the growing 
economic support of the Netherlands to both Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, the Dutch 
government around 1970 came to favour independence for its former colonies (Oostindie 2010: 34). 
The Netherlands proposed independence to both former colonies, which Surinam accepted but the 
Netherlands Antilles rejected. In the years leading up to its independence, immigration from Surinam 
reached its peak from 1973-1975 and again from 1979-1980 towards the end of the transitional phase. 
Immigration continued after 1980 but on a smaller scale (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 7). In the late 
1970s and throughout the 1980s many Surinamese faced difficulties in integrating into Dutch society. 
Unemployment was high and Surinamese were frequently associated with drugs, crime and violence 
(Van Niekerk 2000: 72). However, Surinamese also often encountered discrimination and racism. At 
present about 40 per cent of all Surinamese people live in the Netherlands (Oostindie 2010: 33), a total 
of 329,279 people in 2010 (CBS 2010).  
Because the Netherlands Antilles has remained part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Antilleans 
can still move freely throughout the Kingdom (Oostindie 2010: 37). Immigration from the Netherlands 
Antilles grew considerably after 1985 due to crises in the local oil industry, and has remained high 
ever since (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 7). Only recently, on October 10 2010, have the 
Netherlands Antilles been dissolved with some islands becoming independent nations within the 
Kingdom, and the others becoming municipalities of the Netherlands. In 2010 there are 138,420 
Antilleans living in the Netherlands (CBS 2010). 
The vast majority of Surinamese and Antilleans have Dutch nationality. Although there is still a gap 
between Surinamese and native Dutch in socio-economic terms, Surinamese find themselves in an 
upward trend of social mobility. Compared to other immigrant groups the Surinamese were less 
dependent upon low-skilled labour making them less vulnerable (Niekerk 2000: 90). Concerning 
Antilleans in the Netherlands there is less reason for optimism. A large majority of Antillean families 
are single mother households, often dependent upon benefits. Among Antilleans unemployment is 
three times higher than among the Dutch. Furthermore many Antilleans find themselves at low levels 
of socio-economic rankings and criminality among Antilleans is high (Van Hurst 2000: 106, 119). 
Because of their skin colour Surinamese and Antilleans have been confronted with racism in Dutch 
society. Especially the murder of the Antillean teenager Kerwin Duinmeijer in 1983 by a young neo-
Nazi sent a shockwave through Dutch society and led to massive manifestations against racism. 
Another issue that has been of great concern to the Surinamese and Antillean communities in the 
Netherlands is the history of slavery. In 2002 a monument to commemorate the history of slavery in 
the Dutch colonies was opened in a park in Amsterdam. 
Labour immigrants – Turks and Moroccans 
After the Second World War the education level of the Dutch grew rapidly, resulting in a shortage of 
low-skilled labourers. This was especially felt during the economic boom from the 1960s until the first 
oil crisis in 1973 (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 10). To fill these labour shortages so called ‘guest 
workers’ were recruited from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Yugoslavia. After the oil crisis of 
1973 immigration from these nations declined significantly. Due to economic growth in these nations 
a sizeable portion of immigrants returned throughout the seventies (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 6). 
Recruitment agreements were also set up with Turkey (1963) and Morocco (1969). Where migration 
from Southern Europe declined after 1973, it grew from Turkey and Morocco mainly due to family 
reunification (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 6-7). Moroccan migrants mostly come from the rural Rif, 
where it was common that men would work elsewhere for periods of time and then return to their 
families (Nelissen and Buijs 2000: 178-178). However, guest workers from Morocco but also from 
Turkey did not return to their country of origin, as was anticipated by the Dutch government, but 
instead became permanent residents. 
The economic crises in the Netherlands of the 1970s led to a thorough restructuring of the Dutch 
economy. The industrial sector was decimated whilst the service sector expanded. Labour migrants 
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who previously worked in industry did not meet the requirements needed to work in the service sector, 
like communicative skills and being able to speak fluent Dutch (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 10-11). 
After 1983 employment in the Netherlands increased but unemployment among immigrant groups 
remained high (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 12-14).  
In 2010 there were 383,957 Turks in the Netherlands (CBS 2010). Turks in the Netherlands form 
tight-knit communities wherein traditional norms and values are upheld. However the adherence to 
traditional values forms an impediment for Turkish youths to fully participate in Dutch society and 
climb the social ladder. The relatively low socio-economic position of most first generation Turks is 
very unlikely to change. On the other hand, Turks have set up a wide network of ethnic organisations 
and there is a relative high turnout of Turks at local elections (Böcker 2000: 173-174). An issue that is 
sometimes discussed in relation to Turks in the Netherlands is honour related violence (Korteweg 
2005). In January 2011 a group of prominent Dutch-Turkish professionals published a manifest urging 
Turkish youths to focus on the Netherlands instead of on the Turkish community that lives in the 
Netherlands. The manifest stressed the importance of integration within the wider Dutch society in 
order to avoid a future of segregation (Ozdil 2011).  
In 2010 there were 349,005 Moroccans in the Netherlands (CBS 2010). Around 40% of Moroccans 
are born in the Netherlands (Nelissen and Buijs 2000: 189). The role of teenage Moroccan men often 
dominates the debate on integration in the Netherlands, more so than Turks and other ethnic 
minorities. Their integration into Dutch society is perceived as especially problematic partly due to 
recurring negative reports on certain Moroccans’ deviant behaviour. This has resulted in blindness 
towards behavioural diversity among Moroccans in the Netherlands (Nelissen and Buijs 2000: 192). 
Even though in public perception the situation of Moroccan migrants is worse than that of Turkish 
migrants, they are nowadays often subsumed under the category of ‘Muslims’. 
Labour immigrants from EU member states 
In May 2007 the Netherlands opened its labour market to citizens from new EU member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). By far the most labour immigrants from these CEE countries come 
from Poland. A period of transition is in place for citizens from Bulgaria and Romania who still need a 
permit to work in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2010: 115-116). However, because it has become 
easier for Bulgarians and Romanians to travel to the Netherlands, their number too has increased since 
the EU enlargement of 2007 (Engbersen et al. 2010: 128, 130). 
In 2010 there were 40,083 Poles, 12,340 Bulgarians and 7,118 Romanians in the Netherlands (CBS 
2010). Engbersen et al. suggest that because irregular migration, whereby migrants do not report their 
leave to the authorities, cannot be measured, these statistics underestimate the actual number of labour 
immigrants from CEE countries (Engbersen et al. 2010: 116, 127). It is estimated that in 2008 there 
were at least 100,000 nationals from CEE countries working on a temporary or permanent basis in the 
Netherlands. Most of them found work in agriculture and horticulture. Other forms of labour for CEE 
nationals include industrial production, chauffeurs and various forms of unskilled work (Engbersen et 
al. 2010: 130).  
Especially local authorities show concern for the steep influx of Poles. The municipality of Rotterdam 
organised a ‘Poles summit’ in 2007 to discuss with other municipalities how to handle problems 
resulting from Polish immigration, such as the increase of Polish children attending Dutch schools 
whilst they barely speak Dutch, or deviant behaviour from Polish men resulting from alcohol abuse. 
Seen as especially problematic was the fact that most Poles move to troubled urban areas that already 
have an overrepresentation of immigrants who barely speak Dutch and are insufficiently integrated 
into Dutch society. Lastly, many Poles live in inadequate housing, mostly overcrowded, with lack of 
sanitation and fire-hazards. Such living conditions are unsatisfactory to both the immigrants and the 
wider community (Engbersen et al. 2010: 134-135). 
In November 2010 an alderman for the Labour Party (PvdA) in The Hague, Marnix Norder, called on 
the government to take a stand in Brussels against the growing problems concerning CEE immigrants 
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in Dutch municipalities. Norder spoke of a ‘tsunami’ of CEE immigrants in the Netherlands, a term 
often used in the past by Geert Wilders whilst addressing immigrants from Muslim countries. Norder 
wanted to make clear that the real problems concerning integration evolve around immigrants from 
CEE countries instead of around immigrants from Muslim countries. According to Norder it is naive 
to think that immigrants from CEE countries will one day return home. Norder pleads for European 
legislation whereby, for instance, EU citizens who move to a member state for four years are required 
to learn the language of the host country (De Volkskrant, 2 November 2010). In December 2010 
Norder pleaded for forced repatriation of unemployed CEE immigrants (De Volkskrant, 11 December 
2010).These ideas have now found some resonance at the national level. In February 2011 the 
Minister of Social Affairs, Henk Kamp (Liberal Party, VVD) suggested that Poles who are 
unemployed should be sent back to Poland. Several parties in the Dutch Parliament and the Polish 
embassy in the Netherlands have raised questions concerning these plans, which seem to violate EU 
regulation on free movement of EU nationals. 
Asylum seekers 
From the mid-1980s the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands has risen considerably. The first 
asylum seekers mostly came from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the 1990s the 
Netherlands experienced an influx of asylum seekers from the war-torn former Yugoslavia and from 
Somalia. In 1994 a record number of 53,000 asylum seekers entered the Netherlands (Nicolaas and 
Sprangers 2007: 41). In 1998 the Netherlands obtained the second largest percentage of refugees, after 
Switzerland, relative to its population size. Governmental policy towards asylum seekers is 
increasingly directed on the European level (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 8). In 2008 the EU 
experienced a 6% increase of asylum seekers, whilst asylum seekers to the Netherlands almost 
doubled when compared to 2007. In total 13,400 first requests for asylum were made in the 
Netherlands in 2008, mostly by Iraqis and Somalis (Sprangers et al. 2009: 22-24). Asylum seekers in 
the Netherlands face different challenges. For example, in the mid 1990s there were often protests 
against the founding of new collection centres for asylum seekers. In 2005 a fire in a detention centre 
for illegal migrants and asylum seekers who were to be expelled at Schiphol Airport caused the death 
of 11 migrants. The incident provoked a wide debate on the inhumane character of Dutch asylum 
policy. One group of asylum seekers that is seen as highly vulnerable are Somali refugees. A recent 
report indicated that unemployment among this group is very high and that Somali families ‘cumulate 
risk factors’ (Regioplan 2010) 
Muslims in the Netherlands 
Over the past decade the discussions on immigration and integration in the Netherlands has more and 
more focussed upon the situation of Muslim migrants and the role of Islam in society. At present one 
finds many references to the situation of ‘Muslims’, which are now seen as a distinct group, whereas 
until the mid 1990s the main focus was on different ethnic groups. In this light it makes sense to at 
least briefly introduce Muslims as a minority group in this section.  
It is estimated that in 2009 there were 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, which is about 5.5% of the 
population. Of all Muslims in the Netherlands 73% is of Turkish or Moroccan decent (FORUM 2010: 
7). Only small minorities of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, 3% and 5%, see themselves as 
non-religious. Muslims in the Netherlands experience religion in very different ways. However, 
religious identity is connected to ethnic identity, resulting in a form of ‘religious ethnicity’ which is 
shared with members from other ethnic groups. Moroccan youths identify stronger with their ethnic-
religious identity than with their ethnic-national identity: being a Muslim means more than being from 
Moroccan decent. Younger generations of Muslims are more inclined towards religious individualism 
than older generations. Also, Moroccans and Turks who enjoy higher education or have stable 
employment are less religiously involved (Demant et al. 2007: 7-8). 
Political discourse concerning Muslims in the Netherlands has become markedly harsher in the last 
decade. In public debates a variety of societal issues, like domestic violence and deviant behaviour by 
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Moroccan youths, are presented as stemming from Islam. Islam in the Netherlands is not seen as part 
of a developing Dutch society, but as coming from outside, resulting from immigration (Maussen 
2006: 18). In the past decade the politicians Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Wilders have featured most 
prominently in this changing discourse, although various other politicians too have unequivocally 
condemned Islamic practices and a perceived ‘Islamisation’ of the Netherlands. In her autobiography 
entitled Infidel (2007) Hirsi Ali, former Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party (VVD), uses the 
experiences of her childhood years in Somalia, Ethiopia, Saudi-Arabia and Kenya to illustrate Islam’s 
oppressive character especially towards young girls and women. On 2 November 2004, movie director 
Theo van Gogh was assassinated by a young Moroccan Muslim radical for directing Hirsi Ali’s movie 
Submission I. Herein Van Gogh portrayed a naked Muslim woman wearing only a see-through veil 
with phrases from the Quran written on her body.  
In the wake of the murder of Van Gogh, mosques and Islamic schools were set on fire and Muslims 
were called on to distance themselves from radical Islam, also by leaders from minority communities 
(Penninx 2006: 250-252). More recently, Wilders argued for the deportation of all suspects of Islamic 
radicalism in the Netherlands (Demant et al. 2007: 32). In 2007 Wilders called for a ban on the Quran, 
comparing it with Hitler’s Mein Kampf. According to Wilders a moderate Islam does not exist, there is 
only a fascist Islam (Wilders 2007). In December 2010 Labour Party (PvdA) leader Job Cohen 
remarked that Muslims in Dutch society are being excluded in a similar way as Jews were being 
excluded from Dutch society prior to the Second World War. Cohen blames this mostly on Wilders 
and his Freedom Party’s agenda of sowing fear of Muslims (De Volkskrant, 16 December 2010a).  
Three major issues dominate the almost continuous debate on Islam and Muslim in the Netherlands. 
First, there is a wide debate on the degrees of collective autonomy that should be given to Muslim 
communities and Islamic organisations and on whether or not religiously motivated forms of 
behaviour should be tolerated or not. These debates usually focus on widely mediatised individual 
cases of Muslims who refuse to shake hands with members of the opposite sex, who refuse to stand up 
in court or who want to wear specific forms of dress (headscarf, face-veil). Second, especially since 
the murder of Theo van Gogh, there has been a wide debate on the dangers of radicalisation among 
young Muslims in the Netherlands. Many local governments have developed special programs to 
prevent radicalisation. Simultaneously programs have been set up to create combat discrimination of 
Muslims and create more understanding and tolerance between different communities living in the 
Netherlands. Finally, there is a more general debate on whether or not ‘Muslims’ are sufficiently 
‘integrated’. This debate primarily focuses on the need for cultural assimilation. Some politicians 
claim that Muslim immigrants lead ‘parallel lives’ and they argue that the conservative values that are 
dominant in Muslim communities clash with the norms and values of a liberal and secular Dutch 
society. In the latter context political leaders of the Freedom Party (PVV) repeatedly demand ‘less 
Islam’, meaning both a curb on ‘immigration from Muslim countries’ as well as creating obstacles for 
the creation of Islamic institutions, such as mosques, ritual slaughtering and faith-based schools. 
Overall the present debate on Muslims in the Netherlands is more focussed on defining the boundaries 
between what is tolerable and intolerable than on moving from tolerance to genuine recognition and 
equality. 
1.3.4. Three clusters of events related to diversity challenges of the last decade 
Whereas in some other European countries ‘diversity challenges’ can be neatly related to distinct 
minority groups, in the Netherlands it makes more sense to focus on clusters of events around which 
forms of ethnic, cultural or religious difference are challenged and which bring different groups into 
the picture.  
We distinguish between three different clusters of events. These are events and discussions related to 
(1) the existence of special institutions catering to different ethnic and religious groups (faith-based 
schools, ethnic organisations) and whether or not these enhance segregation and feelings of alienation 
between different groups in Dutch society; (2) gender and sexual equality; and (3) free speech and its 
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limits, especially with regard to vulnerable groups and Islam. We discuss crucial events in these 
clusters and the ways in which Dutch institutions and society have dealt with them. Hereby we aim to 
identify the relevant practices, norms, and institutions at play, and, if relevant, the various usages of 
concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, respect, pluralism, national identity and national heritage. 
Special institutions and parallel societies 
A major issue in Dutch public debates on diversity relates to the relationship between, on the one 
hand, the cultural and institutional legacies of pillarisation and, on the other hand, immigrant 
integration policies and the ways ethnic organisations and institutions have been recognised by Dutch 
authorities. In public debate Muslims are on centre stage, but depending on the events or issues that set 
off debates, other religious groups (Orthodox Calvinists or Jews) or other immigrant groups enter the 
picture. A major concern is whether the existence of special religious institutions and networks of 
ethnic organisations will not result in a highly segregated society in which different groups lead 
‘parallel lives’. Another major concern is whether there is not too much room for conservative 
religious groups and immigrants in the Netherlands to adhere to extremely illiberal ideas and values 
and to uphold forms of behaviour and cultural practices that violate liberal norms of equality and 
individual freedom. Some people argue that at present the Dutch context provides too many 
associational freedoms and grants too much collective autonomy to conservative religious and 
immigrant groups. These debates are therefore concentrated on what practices and ideas should not be 
tolerated in a liberal society. In order to understand the distinctively Dutch context of these debate we 
need to return briefly to, on the one hand, the legacy of ‘pillarisation’ and, on the other hand, the 
impact of Dutch multicultural policies of the 1980s and 1990s. 
In many respects the institutional structure stemming from pillarised society is still in place today. A 
fundamental part of the institutional inheritance of pillarisation is the Dutch educational system which 
is built on the pacification of 1917. Hereby confessional schools are granted equal material resources 
as public schools, and it ensures confessional schools are not administered by the state. Most pupils in 
the Netherlands are enrolled in confessional schools. However, the differences between confessional 
and public schools have diminished because all schools are obliged to follow the same curriculum. 
The confessional character of a school can be expressed through extra-curricular activity and 
additional religious education (Sunier 2010: 119). For religious minorities arriving in the Netherlands 
after the high point of pillarisation, this institutional opportunity meant that they could claim facilities 
in the same manner as established groups in Dutch society had done (Penninx 2006: 243-244). Thus 
religious newcomers, including Islam and Hinduism, have founded many faith-based institutions that 
now exist alongside Catholic, Jewish and Protestant institutions. In the domain of education, for 
example there were 43 Islamic primary schools and two Islamic secondary schools in 2010 (FORUM 
2010: 41).  
Alongside the legacies of pillarisation and the institutional opportunities for newcomers to set up 
religious institutions, there exist Dutch governmental immigrant integration policies and the ways the 
Dutch embarked upon policies of ‘multiculturalism’ in the 1980s and 1990s. Early Dutch immigrant 
integration policies of the 1980s, known as Ethnic Minorities Policies, showed a structural similarity 
to the foundational ideas of pillarisation. Ethnic Minorities Policies were based on the distinctions 
between cultural minority groups and the approach was driven by the twin ideals of equal 
opportunities and respect for cultural differences. A flourishing multicultural society could develop if 
immigrants would be enabled to participate fully and equally in society and if discriminatory talk and 
behaviour were not permitted. The slogan ‘integration with retention of cultural identity’ became the 
motto of Minorities Policies. Emerging ethnic elites rapidly picked up this policy slogan to argue that 
successful integration did not require cultural assimilation and to justify their attempts to create 
community based institutions (Maussen 2009: 192). Part of this policy was encouraging the creation of 
immigrant organisations through government subsidies (Penninx 2006: 243-244). For the government 
these organisations had a bridge function between the migrant and Dutch society. It was thought that 
group membership would have integrating effects on its migrant members (Sunier 2010: 122). 
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However, to be considered for subsidy, activities needed to be presented as ‘cultural’ and ‘authentic’, 
leading immigrant organisations to reproduce stereotypical notions about themselves. Also, groups 
were assumed to be homogeneous, ignoring diversity within groups and overemphasising differences 
between them. This system of subsidisation led to the fossilisation of views about minority groups 
(Schrover 2010: 335, 345, 348).  
Towards the end of the 1990s, public discourse on multiculturalism became more critical (Penninx 
2006: 252). Multiculturalism was criticised for leading to a ‘multicultural tragedy’ (Scheffer 2000). 
National and international events like September 11
th
 2001, the murder of anti-establishment 
parliamentary candidate Pim Fortuyn allegedly for his firm stance on multiculturalism, and the slaying 
of Theo van Gogh, contributed to a more critical public and political stance towards the integration of 
‘Muslim-ethnic’ minorities in Dutch society. A policy memorandum of 2003 entitled Integration 
Policy New Style intended to develop more assimilatory immigrant integration policies. The leading 
concepts became ‘citizenship’ and ‘individual responsibility’ and the emphasis is on the cultural 
adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2007: 20). 
State funding for confessional schools is still in place but over the past decade there is more and more 
debate on the structure of the Dutch educational system in relation to diversity challenges. There is a 
discussion on secularism and whether or not the state should finance faith-based schools and there are 
discussions about the degrees of associational autonomy of denominational schools, for example with 
regard to curriculum, the hiring and instruction of teachers and the right to refuse pupils who do not 
support the school’s ideological profile. Especially the will to see immigrant Muslim minorities 
assimilate into Dutch society has led to questions on the desirability of state funded confessional 
education. Instead of benefiting integration, Islamic schools are seen as instruments of segregation. 
According to philosopher Paul Cliteur, contemporary society is foremost grappling with a lack of 
social cohesion and state funded confessional education does not contribute to its re-strengthening 
(Cliteur 2004: 14).  
A second, and related, debate is about the ways the Dutch history of pillarisation and policies of 
multiculturalism continue to hinder, rather than facilitate, immigrant integration. For instance 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn conclude their book on identity politics and conflicts of values in the 
Netherlands by writing: ‘Multiculturalism has helped to make it unclear whether Muslim immigrants 
will commit themselves as a community to a liberal society like the Netherlands, precisely because it 
has made it unclear whether they should’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 138). The integrative 
effect of institutional practices associated with ‘pillarisation’ will not take place with the creation of a 
Muslim pillar, so critics argue. The institutions that support such a pillar would sooner disconnect its 
members from wider Dutch society due to the lack of a specific Dutch history among its members. 
Then, Dutch Muslims would not have the same opportunity as for instance the Catholics in the 
nineteenth century had, to bind themselves to the Dutch state. However, Jewish and Christian 
minorities strongly oppose changing the institutional structure of state funded confessional education 
and introducing a uniform public education model. The general thrust of these debates is to define the 
limits of tolerance in a liberal state that operates in a context of a society of immigration.  
Gender equality and equality of sexual orientation 
Different incidents have occurred in the last decade wherein religious and immigrant minorities 
conflicted with dominant societal norms of gender equality and equality of sexual orientation. These 
debates often focus on events related to religious diversity and especially confrontations between 
progressive values and principles and Orthodox religious groups. These debates focus on the 
boundaries between what is tolerable and what is intolerable.  
With regard to gender equality various issues arise. In the above, we have already discussed the 
Political Reformed Party’s stance towards women in politics. In 2003 the Clara Wichmann Institute 
and other advocacy groups for women’s rights, filed a court case against the state for subsidising the 
Political Reformed Party. In the Netherlands all political parties elected to parliament receive state 
subsidy. According to the Clara Wichmann Institute the Political Reformed Party discriminates against 
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women because its statutes prohibit women from becoming members of the party, a practice which the 
state should not allow let alone subsidise. Because women cannot become members of the Political 
Reformed Party they also cannot be elected into public office. The judge ruled in favour of the 
complainant motivating that there should be a level playing field for men and women in politics and 
that political parties should ensure this is the case. The Political Reformed Party has failed to do so 
and the state has failed to do anything about this, on the contrary, it is subsidising the Political 
Reformed Party (Dölle 2005: 110-114). Hereupon subsidy for the Political Reformed Party was 
cancelled for 2006. Taking this into consideration and under pressure from some of its members, the 
Political Reformed Party decided to allow membership for women, although women are still excluded 
from obtaining political office. Both the state and the Clara Wichmann Institute have filed several 
appeals in reaction to the 2005 ruling. In 2007 the Council of State (Raad van State) argued that in 
practice women are not discriminated against in Dutch politics because they can become members of 
other parties and can be elected into office through them. Due to this verdict the Political Reformed 
Party was re-allowed its 2006 subsidy. However, in 2010 the Supreme Council (Hoge Raad) ruled that 
the state should take appropriate action to ensure that female members of the Reformed Party can also 
be elected into office (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 14 April 2010). This debate is exemplary of ongoing 
discussions in the Netherlands on the scope of associational autonomy of Orthodox Calvinist 
institutions such as schools and political parties and attempts to define the boundaries between what is 
tolerable and what is intolerable. 
Another major issue concerns how principles such as equal treatment and equal respect for people 
with a different sexual orientation relate to principles such as the associational autonomy of religious 
organisations. In April 2001 the Netherlands was the first nation to allow gay marriage. Equating 
marriage between people of different and the same sexes was seen as a logical next step in Dutch 
libertarian social practices. However, there has been debate on whether or not civil servants can refuse 
on religious grounds to bind a gay marriage. Another example is the one we have mentioned above, 
namely the polemic around the recent stance of the Catholic Church towards homosexuals receiving 
communion. In relation to Islam, the political presence of Pim Fortuyn fuelled the debates around gay 
rights and homophobia. Pim Fortuyn fiercely opposed Islam for its rejection of homosexuality. 
According to Fortuyn, who was openly gay himself, Muslims view homosexuals as inferior beings. 
Fortuyn emphatically remarked that he did not want to ‘have to re-do the emancipation of women and 
homosexuals all over again’ (De Volkskrant, 9 February 2002). However, with public and political 
discourse concerning multiculturalism becoming more critical, this achievement was thought to be 
under threat from orthodox Muslims. In May 2001 Moroccan born Imam Khalil El-Moumni 
condemned homosexuality and labelled it as a contagious disease which threatens Dutch society (De 
Volkskrant, 4 May 2001). In April 2004 it became known that the Amsterdam El Tahweed-mosque 
sold Dutch translations of Islamic publications which stated that homosexuals should be killed by 
throwing them from high buildings with their ‘head first’ followed by stoning (Trouw, 21 April 2004). 
The alderman for Amsterdam at the time, Ahmed Aboutaleb (Labour Party), Moroccan born and at 
present the mayor of Rotterdam, declared that the mosque’s leaders need to be aware that such works 
have no place in a mosque (Trouw, 21 April 2004).  
The tensions between, on the one hand, gay rights and equality, and, on the other hand, conservative 
values and religious convictions do not only concern high held principles. Intolerant behaviour and 
violence against homosexuals continues to be a problem as well, in the Netherlands as well as in other 
European countries. Reports of violence against homosexuals had risen by a quarter in 2009 when 
compared to 2008, meaning that such incidents occur on a daily basis (De Volkskrant, 19 January 
2010). It is clear that attention to homophobic violence has been given more media attention in light of 
multiculturalism debates (Buijs et al. 2009: 43). Young Moroccan men are overrepresented among the 
perpetrators of violence against homosexuals (Buijs et al. 2009: 30): in Amsterdam, 16% of the 
population aged 24 and below is Moroccan and 36% of physical acts of violence against homosexuals 
can be attributed to them. Religious culture and religious education do influence opinions on 
homosexuality but this does not cause acts of violence against homosexuals (Buijs 2009: 129-130). 
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Moroccan born Ahmed Marcouch, at the time chairman of the district Slotervaart of Amsterdam, 
argued in 2009 that the annual gay-pride boat parade should start from Slotervaart because it has a 
large population of Moroccans. According to Marcouch ‘imported traditions should not negate Dutch 
achievements’ (Het Parool, 31 March 2009). Marcouch’s proposal stranded on logistical problems. 
In sum, violence against homosexuals has centred prominently in the changing public and political 
discourse on multiculturalism. Incidents like the El-Moumni and El-Tahweed mosque strengthen the 
notion that after being freed from Christian conservatism, the Dutch are now threatened by Islamic 
fundamentalism (Mepschen et al. 2010: 966). Openly gay men have come to represent Dutch 
neoliberal modernity versus Muslim-ethnic minorities who represent traditionalism (Mepschen et al. 
2010: 970). Islam is often labelled as the cause for violence against homosexuals in political discourse. 
Especially Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) sees a direct connection between anti-homosexual 
violence and Islam (Buijs et al. 2009: 31). 
The incidents and discussions mentioned under this heading show an increasing awareness in Dutch 
society of the tensions between liberal values concerning sexual morality, gender equality and equality 
of sexual orientation and the values and opinions of conservative religious groups. In the case of 
religious organisations and faith-based organisations this often leads to debates on the limits of 
associational autonomy. In society in general tension may result in discrimination and even violence. 
In these debates the focus is often on distinguishing between what is tolerable and what is intolerable.  
The limits of free speech  
Over the past decade ‘free speech’ has become a key issue in debates on cultural diversity in the 
Netherlands. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the focus was on the need to prohibit discriminatory and 
racist speech, in recent years the main thrust of discussions is that freedom of speech should not be 
curtailed, especially not out of the will to protect the ‘sensibilities’ of religious or immigrant groups. 
These debates on free speech usually evolve around defining what is tolerable and what is intolerable.  
One of the most prominent figures in the debates on free speech is the late Pim Fortuyn who was 
assassinated in 2002. In that year he had remarked in an interview that Islam is a ‘backward culture’ 
and that there is no shame in showing pride and preference for ‘our Western culture’ (De Volkskrant, 9 
February 2002). With his motto ‘I say what I think and I do what I say’, Fortuyn claimed to say what 
many people, including politicians, thought, but did not dare to say. This fear for coming across racist 
is, according to the American/Dutch journalist Ian Buruma, in part informed by a feeling of guilt 
stemming from the horrors of the Holocaust, which ‘hangs over Dutch life like a toxic cloud’ and ‘the 
shame of it poisons national debates to this day’ (Buruma 2006: 19). For Fortuyn the only limit to 
what can be said is a call to violence (De Volkskrant, 9 February 2002).  
The polarisation accompanying the immigration and integration debates in the Netherlands since the 
Fortuyn revolt has been characterised by a libertarian attitude of being in your right to simply say 
‘what is on your mind’. In 2008 the vice-premier and leader of the Labour Party (PvdA) Wouter Bos 
feared his party was returning to the political correctness of before the Fortuyn revolt. Bos called for 
more polarisation in the debate on immigration. According to Bos, integration cannot be achieved 
without strong polarisation and simply ‘telling it like it is’ (De Volkskrant, 1 March 2008). This kind 
of arguments resemble the defence of a more ‘intolerant liberalism’ that is present in other European 
countries as well.  
Over the past years there have also been debates on the need to revise the Dutch rules and legislation 
that regulate free speech and its limits. Some have argued that religious sensibilities and vulnerable 
groups should be protected. However, the predominant view is that a more libertarian view on free 
speech is preferable. Illustrative is a debate in 2008 when the minister of justice, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, 
was asked by a parliamentary majority to revoke article 147 of Dutch criminal law which prohibits 
blasphemy. The majority of secular parties in Dutch parliament reasoned that religious citizens do not 
need more protection than non-religious citizens. Hirsch Ballin, prominent member of the Christian 
Democratic Appeal (CDA), initially opposed the parliament’s request. However Hirsch Ballin later 
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agreed to the request but at the same time proposed an alternative: he wanted to revoke article 147 but 
strengthen the anti-discrimination measures that protect a group as stated in article 137c. According to 
secular parliamentarians a strengthening of 137c would entail the same as leaving 147 in tact (De 
Pers, 31 October 2008). A consequence of strengthening 137c would be that indirectly insulting a 
group of people on the basis of their religion would be prohibited. Secular parliamentarians feared that 
freedom of speech would hereby be severely curtailed. However, an attorney-general of the High 
Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that criticising a religion is not at the same time also a critique directed to 
adherents (De Pers, 13 January 2009). Hirsch Ballin’s proposal was unsuccessful due to lack of 
parliamentary support. 
Another illustration of the way the issue of the limits of free speech figures prominently in Dutch 
debates on diversity is the trial of Geert Wilders. In 2008 Wilders made the anti-Quran movie Fitna 
and he has made numerous other controversial statements on Islam and Muslims. In January 2009 the 
court of Amsterdam demanded the National Prosecution follow up on charges made against Wilders 
by several anti-racist organisations. The court is of the opinion that Wilders is prosecutable because of 
the content of his utterances and his presentation style. The latter is characterised by one-sidedness, 
generalisations and increasing harshness which, according to the court, comes down to inciting hatred. 
The court believes Wilders does insult individual Muslims because he attacks their symbols and 
affects them in their religious dignity. The court believes Wilders’ comparisons of Islam to Nazism are 
especially insulting and that such utterances do not serve the general interest. The court believes its 
stance is in line with the norms of the European Convention on Human Rights which values freedom 
of speech but also rejects inciting hatred (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 21 January 2009). In September 
2009 the National Prosecution decided to prosecute Wilders for insulting a group of people and 
inciting discrimination and hatred. Wilders is now prosecuted for articles 137d for inciting hatred and 
discrimination and 137c for his comparisons of Islam to Nazism. The trial against Wilders took place 
in October 2010. According to Wilders the freedom of speech was on trial. Wilders’ lawyer has 
rebuked the judges for lack of objectivity twice, the last time being successful. The trial will be done 
again in 2011 with different judges. The National Prosecution is still not convinced of the case, during 
the trial it demanded no sentencing if Wilders was to be found guilty. This case illustrates how the 
regulation of (political) speech is a crucial arena in which cultural diversity challenges in the 
Netherlands are discussed.  
1.4. Conceptualisations of tolerance and practices of toleration in the Netherlands 
In this section we discuss definitions of tolerance that figure in the media, books and scholarly 
articles.
4
 We distinguish five conceptualisations that, so we argue, structure the discursive space in 
which ideas about toleration and acceptance are being articulated in the Netherlands. We discuss each 
by looking at what conceptualisation of tolerance and acceptance it consists of and what the historical 
contexts, social practices and institutional arrangements are that are primarily associated with it.  
1.4.1 Toleration of minorities 
A first approach speaks of toleration in the relations between a majority and minorities. The values, 
beliefs and norms of the majority are represented as normal, whereas those of minorities are seen as 
deviating and as inferior for moral, religious or cultural reasons. Diversity becomes an issue when 
minorities claim recognition for their position in society and demand a more equal say in affairs of the 
state. The reasons invoked for not actively suppressing or persecuting minorities or practices are 
                                                     
4 For this section we used a number of books by academics and journalists on the themes of tolerance and immigrant 
integration. Notably those by Ten Hooven (ed.) 2001, Scheffer 2007, Cliteur 2002, Buruma 2006, Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007. We also collected essays that appeared in the quality newspapers on the issue of tolerance. 
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primarily pragmatic: maintaining public order, upholding peaceful relations with other countries, or 
protecting the interests of commerce.  
Historically, ideas about toleration initially concerned relations between the dominant Calvinist group 
and religious minorities. In the Dutch Republic of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century, dissenting protestant 
groups, among which were the Anabaptists, Mennonites, and Lutherans, but also Catholics and Jews, 
were publicly tolerated (Aerts 2001: 63). An important social practice illustrative of toleration was the 
clandestine church (schuilkerk) which allowed dissenters to worship in spaces demarcated as private, 
thereby preserving the monopoly of the official church in the public sphere (Kaplan 2007: 176). Their 
existence was not a secret because many people openly visited them. However, there were no symbols 
on the exterior of the buildings marking them as churches, nor did they have towers or crosses or bells 
calling everyone to come to service. This symbolic invisibility sufficed for the civil authorities to look 
the other way (Kaplan 2007:172-197). Another characteristic was the fact that all groups, including 
Catholics, would choose a relatively reticent and introvert style of presenting themselves in the public 
realm. All would share in a puritan public order which disapproved extravagant behaviour (Aerts 
2001: 69). There was little open debate and criticism between the different groups. The governing 
elites of the cities were mainly concerned with maintaining peace and public order in a religiously 
divided country, motivated in part by the interests of commerce and industry. 
The practices and virtues associated with toleration are sometimes presented positively. For example, 
despite the fact that religious minorities were often discriminated against they were not violently 
persecuted in the Netherlands. In contemporary debates one comes across the notion that ‘deviating’ 
minorities have to be tolerated, but that this also entails obligations on the side of these minorities. For 
instance in discussions concerning the presence of Islam in Dutch society, some argue that Islam 
should not be too visible in the public realm and that Muslims should not cause ‘offense’. To that end 
Muslims should express their differences in a ‘more reticent’ or ‘modest’ style.5 
There are also more critical perspectives concerning toleration of minorities. These basically argue 
that toleration alone is not enough, and that minorities are entitled to full recognition and equal 
treatment in society. Here we find an illustration in the Dutch case of situations in which mere 
tolerance is not enough and some form of recognition is demanded. Illustrative is the case of Catholics 
who since the mid 19
th
 century demanded a more equal position in Dutch society and protested against 
rampant ‘anti-Papist’ sentiments. Their demands consisted of the right to hold processions, institute 
Catholic schools and build Catholic churches. Another illustrative case is that of homosexuals who 
since the 1960s demanded equal rights and recognition for their sexual orientation as equal to 
heterosexuality. Both these examples show how toleration of deviance from the perspective of the 
tolerated, can be unsatisfactory. The tolerated demand acceptance and equality from the majority, 
instead of being seen as merely a deviant group whose practices are to be ‘tolerated’.  
1.4.2. Principled acceptance 
A second conceptualisation sees tolerance as a matter of reciprocity between established minorities. 
This approach is more principled because it builds on the assumption that there are different religious 
and non-religious ‘philosophies of life’ (levensovertuigingen) that should respect one another. Also 
these philosophies of life should have equal positions in society and within the state. The aim is a 
society wherein these different views can be visible and institutionalised, whilst keeping sufficient 
distance between them to allow separate communities to develop themselves.  
This second conceptualisation developed in tandem with a changing social imagery of the Dutch 
nation as composed of people belonging to different groups. These groups could agree to give one 
                                                     
5  See for example the discussions on mosque architecture and Islamic dress (Maussen 2009). 
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another equal rights allowing everyone to live peacefully together (Van Rooden 2010).
6
 The various 
groups presented themselves as sovereign moral communities within the nation-state. One of the main 
theorists of this approach to difference was the neo-Calvinist Abraham Kuyper, founder of the 
Orthodox Reformed Party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, ARP) and the Free University of Amsterdam. 
Kuyper spoke in support of ‘parallelism’ by which he meant ‘the right and freedom of differing 
religious and philosophical perspectives and movements to develop freely on separate, parallel tracks, 
neither hindered or helped by the government’ (Monsma and Soper 2009: 59). This implied that all the 
different groups and communities were entitled to visibility and institutionalisation in the public realm. 
This can be seen as a form of group recognition. 
The ideas associated with principled acceptance have found a strong institutional base. General 
suffrage and proportional representation allowed each group to be represented in Parliament, leading 
to a situation in which coalition governments have to be formed and therefore demands must be 
moderated (Ten Hooven 2001: 291). In the domain of education these are equal funding of public and 
confessional schools and the freedom of education. One of the major institutional features of 
pillarisation was proportional public financing of institutions that allow a subculture to exist, e.g. in 
media or education. During the period of pillarisation toleration was primarily a tool used by the 
pillars’ elites to discourage their rank and file from intolerance against members of a different pillar. 
Each pillar formed a separate minority and toleration of other minorities guaranteed toleration of their 
own pillar. However, in practice this form of toleration resulted in a lack of contact with members of 
other pillars. As Aerts observes: ‘The communities recognised one another as national partners but 
rejected one another’s ideas and subculture. They combated one another continuously but without 
much passion. Tolerance came down to avoidance at best, but without positive recognition’ (Aerts 
2001: 77).  
The more positive perspectives on principled acceptance view it as a way of organising a deeply 
pluralistic society with profound differences. Communities should respect one another’s sovereign 
spheres and the state should aim to be equi-distant to all citizens. Thus the state needs to guarantee the 
associational freedoms which allow cultural and religious communities to live-out their respective 
conceptions of the good life. These conceptualisations are still important for ideas articulated by 
Christian Democrats and orthodox Christians.
7
 In the 1980s and 1990s this model of acceptance was 
also applied to notions concerning the cultural incorporation of immigrants. The now notorious phrase 
‘integration with retention of cultural identity’ and the notion that ethnic and religious subcultures 
should be accommodated and should be allowed to institutionalise in society, reflect the approach of 
principled acceptance (Maussen 2009). 
However, in the past decade or so these views have been criticised in the context of discussions on 
immigrant integration, Islam and Orthodox Christian demands. Critics argue that ‘parallel societies’ 
and ‘pockets of backwardness’ that have come into being should disappear. Furthermore, it is believed 
that too much respect for the ‘moral sovereignty’ of groups stands in the way of the need to protect 
individual rights and freedoms.
8
 It is also questioned what levels of ‘parallelism’ are viable in the 
context of societies that are highly individualised and obtain large numbers of immigrants. Social 
                                                     
6  It was not the case, as it was in the USA or in France, that there was an established majority which had to decide whether 
or not to tolerate a (new) minority. 
7  This position is articulated both by confessional political parties such as the broad Christian coalition party CDA, the 
orthodox reformed minority party SGP and minority party Christian Union, by prominent legal scholars who are Christian 
(including Hirsch Ballin, Van Bijsterveld, Vermeulen) and by theologians/scholars/opinion leaders affiliated with more 
orthodox institutions (Free University of Amsterdam, University of Kampen) and newspapers such as the Reformatisch 
Dagblad and Nederlands Dagblad. 
8  Already in 1996 a senator of the Christian Union (CU) argued that (orthodox) Christians, Hindus and Muslims in the 
Netherlands shared the experience of a growing intolerance because they lived as religious minorities in a majority culture, 
in which they felt more and more alienated (Ten Hooven 2001: 26). Especially the first Purple Coalition Government 
between 1994-1998, which was the first coalition government without a confessional party, is seen as intolerant towards 
religious factions (Ten Hooven 2001: 288). 
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goals such as economic participation and integration require a more firm socialisation into one 
dominant culture, so critics argue. 
1.4.3 Pragmatic toleration or condoning (gedogen) 
A third approach to acceptance is seen as illustrative, or even unique, for the Dutch situation, but is 
also more difficult to distinguish from what we have called toleration of minorities. These are the 
conceptualisations of tolerance around the concept ‘gedogen’, usually translated as ‘condoning’ or 
‘pragmatic toleration’. Gordijn describes acts of pragmatic toleration as consisting of a declaration in 
advance, that under certain specific conditions offenders against a particular norm do not need to fear 
punishment (Gordijn 2001: 230-231). Well known examples include the use and possession of 
(soft)drugs, prostitution, the existence of brothels, euthanasia and medically assisted suicide, squatting, 
or parents taking their children out of school for prolonged holidays. The motivations for such 
practices of condoning are multiple: for instance the material or social costs of upholding a legal norm 
are said to outweigh the societal damage when it is being violated. Or, an official ban on paper 
combined with toleration in practice, provides room to balance and respect the sensitivities of different 
social groups. 
Condoning is often seen as a continuation of the social practices associated with toleration of 
minorities, meaning that the state and dominant groups would seek to avoid sharp confrontations by 
‘looking the other way’ when minorities or individuals would engage in acts that were formally illegal. 
However, in post-war times the Netherlands’ model of pragmatic toleration smoothened the transition 
from a society dominated by Christian norms to a progressive and secular society. Formally legalising 
acts and practices that violated Christian norms, such as drug use, homosexuality or prostitution, 
would provoke fierce resistance by Christian groups. But the effective persecution of individuals and 
the active suppression of these practices would lead to strong protest from liberal factions. Pragmatic 
toleration serves as a tool to upset as few people as possible. Since the 1960s new life-styles of 
younger generations which were still seen as offensive to many in the Dutch petty bourgeois society, 
could nevertheless be accommodated through condoning. 
In recent years condoning is less and less seen as a virtuous style of governance. Some argue that legal 
norms should be upheld and that pragmatic toleration will only result in erosion of the legal system 
(Gordijn 2001: 239). The debate on pragmatic toleration took a new turn when it became associated 
with the debate on immigrant integration. The notion of ‘looking the other way’ was now represented 
as functioning as an escape route when immigrants were violating legal and cultural norms.
9
 The 
concept came to be linked with so-called strategies of social avoidance which were seen less as a 
virtue and more as a sign of a lack of social cohesion. Paul Scheffer attributes the failure of immigrant 
integration to pragmatic toleration because immigrants who were confronted with a Dutch state that 
was unwilling to uphold the law, began to believe that Dutch law does not need to be taken seriously 
at all (Scheffer 2007: 169).  
1.4.4 Multicultural recognition 
The guiding concepts in a fourth approach to the handling of diversity are recognition and equal 
respect for cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences in a society of immigration. This 
corresponds to a conceptualisation of acceptance that emphasises full recognition, respect, normality 
and equality as values. These concepts build on the notion that inter-group relations in a multicultural 
society require both virtuous citizens who are open-minded, free of prejudices and want to embrace 
difference, and institutional guarantees to protect vulnerable newcomers, both individually and 
collectively. Examples of the latter are anti-discriminatory and anti-racist legislation, subsidies to 
                                                     
9  This theme is articulated for example by Hirsi Ali in her autobiography Infidel (2007) 
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maintain and develop ethnic identities, and institutional guarantees allowing for cultural and religious 
practices and associational and collective autonomy. Dominant in multicultural recognition is the 
notion of ‘acceptance’ by the host society which should be willing to change its ethnocentric views, 
primarily on national identity and cultural norms. Also, the host society should make a principled 
choice to allow newcomers to participate on equal footing in society and affairs of the state.  
These notions of multicultural recognition have been developed in post-war the Netherlands and 
remained dominant throughout the first immigrant integration policies of the 1980s and early 1990s 
(see Buruma 2006). Horrors of the war were used to draw lessons from in terms of dealing with 
rightwing extremism, racism and vulnerable minorities like Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals. Also, the 
notion became dominant that the Netherlands should become a ‘guiding nation’ in the process of 
building a democratic Europe, advocating human rights and developing liberal legislation in domains 
such as medical ethics, gender and sexuality, and differing life-styles. The Netherlands also became 
one of the leading countries in creating institutions to monitor and combat racial discrimination in 
Europe.
10
 The Netherlands were among the first countries in Europe to pick up on ideas about 
multiculturalism and the need to develop policies of integration that were supportive of ethnic 
diversity (Penninx 2006).
11
 
These conceptualisations of acceptance have had several institutional counterparts. One concerns the 
legal arrangements to combat discriminatory and racist speech and the extreme right. The creation of 
the Equal Treatment Commission in 1994 served to demonstrate the importance of upholding article 1 
of the Dutch constitution, which prohibits discrimination and guarantees equal treatment. Other 
measures associated with multicultural recognition include the scrutinising of Dutch legislation in 
1983 to see whether it contained elements of discrimination on the basis of nationality, race or 
religion, the introduction of migrants’ native language in schools, and the creation of local and 
national representative councils for ethnic groups. Another set of social practices were the attempts to 
create more understanding between communities. To illustrate, attempts to teach children about other 
cultures, revisions of curricula to include more references to issues such as slavery and colonialism, 
and initiatives such as the ‘day of dialogue’.  
Despite the fact that in contemporary public debate the ideas associated with multicultural acceptance 
have come under heavy fire, there are still articulate defenders of it. First, there are those who argue 
that a principled choice in favour of equality and pluralism combined with the notion that immigration 
and the existence of culturally diverse societies are a fact of life, inevitably resulting in a manner of 
engaging with difference that goes beyond mere toleration and entails respect, recognition and equal 
opportunities. Second, some argue that multiculturalism provides a more sensible approach to deal 
with differences in societies that are highly individualised and in which migration has resulted in far 
deeper forms of cultural diversity than ever before. The notion of a unified, singular and stable ‘Dutch 
culture’ which will re-emerge is portrayed as unrealistic.  
However, the more critical voices towards multicultural recognition dominate the debate. One of the 
main critiques is that multicultural acceptance results from an unhappy marriage between excessive 
subjectivism and cultural relativism. Subjectivism has resulted in the notion that being tolerant or 
‘having an open mind’ means refraining from judging others. Here we see an example of the wider 
debate on value relativism in Europe. The argument is that cultural relativism has led to the notion that 
all cultures are of equal worth and that it is inappropriate to impose Dutch or European cultures on 
immigrants. Critics also point to the forms of intolerance that the strong norms of anti-racism and 
                                                     
10  Notably the European Monitoring Centre in Vienna that was chaired by the former Mayor of Amsterdam, Ed van Thijn. In 
the early 1990s Dutch radio stations organised a protest campaign when asylum seekers centres in Germany were attacked 
by extreme right wing activists and youths. Dutch listeners sent postcards to the German government with the text ‘I am 
furious’. In 2000, the Dutch were also frontrunners in demanding sanctions against Austria because of the accession of the 
extreme right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) to the Austrian coalition government. 
11  This kind of conceptualisations of multiculturalism became especially dominant in progressive parties in the 1990s, 
including the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberal Democrats (D66) and the Green Party (GroenLinks). 
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multiculturalism have introduced in the Netherlands. Forms of speech or behaviour that could be seen 
as offensive to minorities or hurting the feelings of immigrants were banned from the public sphere.  
1.4.5. The divide between the tolerable and the intolerable: Dutch liberal intolerance 
A fifth and final approach entails conceptualisations of acceptance arguing that true toleration can only 
be achieved when it is very clear where the boundaries are between the tolerable and the intolerable, 
and when different groups and individuals spell out very clearly where they stand and what their 
differences are. A distinction is made between toleration which requires engagement, disagreement 
and disapproval, and toleration as a form of ignorance, relativism or disinterest. In a part of his book 
entitled meaningfully ‘The Netherlands, country of avoidance’ Scheffer explains that toleration is 
undermined by a laisser-faire attitude. Scheffer pleads for a stronger adherence to core values, like the 
foundational principles and values that support the legal-democratic order. Otherwise the conditions 
for a peaceful and free society will be gravely undermined: ‘upholding the norms of an open society is 
one of the main tasks of the state’ (2007: 167). The dissatisfaction with multiculturalism focuses on 
the contradictions in the multicultural dogma ‘toleration of the intolerant’ by pointing to the position 
of vulnerable minorities, notably women. The critics motivate that one of the main reasons not to 
tolerate specific ideas or practices is to uphold progressive values, notably with regard to gender 
equality, gay rights, and liberal education and science (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). 
In terms of institutional arrangements these conceptualisations entail a firm protection of free speech. 
This includes the right to offend and to critique religious dogmas, religious practices, and cultural 
practices. It also entails an obligation for minorities to justify their acts and worldviews, entailing the 
risk that these will not be tolerated. Thus, certain moral or legal norms, such as non-discrimination and 
gender equality, can result in the limitation of associational autonomy, notably of religious institutions 
such as confessional schools and political parties, but also of social practices in communities and 
families. In Empty tolerance. On freedom and lack of commitment in the Netherlands, Ten Hooven 
argues that the notion of respecting the sovereignty of specific groups does no longer work and that in 
contemporary times toleration is an individual virtue and an element of good citizenship. In terms of 
social practice, interactions between groups should not be based on avoidance and ‘looking the other 
way’, but rather on identifying, if not amplifying, differences, and exposure and confrontation (Ten 
Hooven 2001).  
In a more positive evaluation this way of thinking about tolerance entails the opportunity of 
maintaining a free society in which liberal rights and individual opportunities are guaranteed. To some 
it also means that there should be a willingness to challenge conservative groups, especially if they 
violate the rights of vulnerable minorities. One issue that appears on the agenda repeatedly is the 
refusal by some Orthodox Christian groups, including Jehovah’s witnesses, to let their children be 
vaccinated against polio. Others frame the issue as concerning the need to maintain a threshold of 
cultural norms that are recognisably Dutch and argue, for example, that these should be taught in 
schools by creating a canon of Dutch history and civic orientation classes. 
More critical perspectives entail, first, that despite the fact that this is presented as a conceptualisation 
of tolerance, the main thrust of the discussion is to point out what is not to be tolerated and to ban 
specific practices or limit associational freedoms. Especially in the case of Islam and immigrants the 
category of intolerable practices and symbols becomes larger and larger and the ways in which 
disapproval is expressed becomes more and more violent. Thereby the notion of toleration as ‘putting 
up with what one disapproves of’ becomes an empty signifier. Secondly, the process of exposing 
differences in order to discuss them through a ‘healthy confrontation’ is usually dominated by gross 
stereotypes. The alarming tone of public outcries about, for instance, ritually prepared food, lawyers 
who do not stand up in court or imams who refuse to shake hands, results in far more social conflicts 
than strategies of avoidance do. Some argue, therefore, that this way of thinking about tolerance as 
requiring confrontation and open debate hinders rather than facilitates societal cohesion and peace. 
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1.5. Concluding Remarks 
In contrast to dominant notions, debates concerning cultural diversity and minority acceptance in the 
Netherlands do not exclusively focus on the position of Muslims and the role of Islam in society. 
There is also an ongoing discussion on the position of native religious minorities, notably Orthodox 
Calvinist groups. The history of the Netherlands is not the history of a distinct development of 
toleration. It is important to emphasise this point because portrayals of the tumultuous political 
developments in the first decade of the 21
st
 century are often contrasted to a supposed ‘Dutch tradition 
of tolerance’. It would be wrong to maintain the image that until recently the Netherlands was an 
exemplary tolerant country and that it recently has become ‘intolerant’ and has fallen victim to a 
‘backlash against multiculturalism’. In practice, however, as we have argued in this report, each time 
is confronted with its own specific challenges which are met with their own specific answers. From 
the above we want to extract some conclusions and major issues that require further examination and 
empirical research.  
First of all, it is clear that since about ten years, notably since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002 and the 
following stable presence of populist parties in Dutch politics, the discourses of ‘liberal intolerance’ 
have become particularly influential in the Netherlands. The main thrust of this shift in public debate 
is that there is a need to identify the core values that characterise ‘Dutch culture’, ‘liberalism’ and 
‘secularism’ and that these should become ‘non-negotiable’. As a result, so it is argued, there is a need 
to confront immigrant communities to enforce full respect for these values and principles. One effect 
of this shift in discourse has been a renewed interest in Dutch history, including attempts to identify 
the essence of ‘the Dutch canon’, the creation of a ‘national museum’ and efforts to instruct 
immigrants about ‘Dutch culture’ during compulsory ‘civic orientation lessons’. Citizenship, national 
solidarity and respect seem to require a renewed enthusiasm about ‘Dutch culture and Dutch values’. 
Politicians have also demanded that schools should teach tolerance and respect in the form of 
‘citizenship education’. Another aspect of this shift in the dominant discourse on diversity issues is a 
widely advocated need to strengthen the principles of the separation between church and state. In the 
Netherlands people who position themselves as modern, liberal and progressive speak out loudly to 
defend values such as equality, individualism and secularism. Often this is taken to mean that religious 
groups and organisations should no longer be allowed to use their collective and institutional 
autonomy to divert from core values and norms. According to these voices, liberal values are under 
siege, mainly from religious groups and immigrant communities. 
One striking feature of contemporary cultural diversity challenges and discussions in the Netherlands 
is the focus on religious minorities. Orthodox Calvinist groups, Catholic institutions and Muslims are 
publicly challenged with respect to their beliefs and practices, which are often perceived as crossing 
the boundaries of the ‘intolerable’. Especially around issues related to gender equality and equality of 
sexual orientation, many believe that principles such as non-discrimination, that have already been 
established legally, should also function as shared values across Dutch society. They reason that this 
means that exceptions to the rule should no longer be accepted. This provides opportunities for 
populist politicians to camouflage more general feelings of hostility towards Islam and Muslims as 
well-intentioned attempts to contribute to the emancipation of Muslim women. Nonetheless, in a 
society that secularised in rapid pace since the 1960s and that has come to define itself as ‘liberal and 
progressive’, there is a genuine concern about the ways conservative immigrant groups undermine 
norms that have become well established over the past decades. The focus on Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians also results in the fact that other minority groups, such as the Frisians or regional groups, 
are far less exposed and criticised. The same applies to many other immigrant minorities. For example, 
there is hardly any debate on the position of the Surinamese community in the Netherlands. 
A third aspect of diversity challenges and discussions on tolerance in the Netherlands that merits 
attention is that there appears to be a radical change in prevailing Dutch conceptualisations of 
tolerance. For a long time, ‘principled acceptance’ has been crucial to Dutch governing traditions. Its 
philosophical foundations were developed in the second half of the 19
th
 century, amongst others by 
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Abraham Kuyper. It was institutionalised in the course of the 20
th
 century, especially in the form of 
church-state traditions, in the model of consensus-democracy and in the educational system. However, 
at present, secular voices demand less room for religious schools, a ban on ritual slaughtering and less 
accommodation of religiously motivated demands with regard to dress. Other elements of Dutch 
traditions of tolerance are also criticised. The notion that a majority in society may well disapprove of 
the ideas and practices of a religious minority whilst still ‘tolerating’ them, has lost much of its appeal 
in public discourse. The same applies to the idea that ‘pragmatic toleration’ or ‘condoning’ is an 
adequate governing strategy in a deeply plural society. At present public discourse on toleration 
centres around the ideas that tolerance should not mean value relativism and avoidance, but 
confrontation, defining what is acceptable and combating that which is intolerable. Interestingly, the 
autochthonous majority often expresses its unwillingness to ‘put up with’ or ‘tolerate’ other cultures 
and religions. A recurring topic in the national elections throughout the last decade has been the call to 
severely curb flows of immigration to the Netherlands. Although instigated by populist parties, 
traditional parties too have advocated the need for a highly selective immigration policy. Overall, the 
notion of the Netherlands as an immigrant nation has become supplanted by the notion of the 
Netherlands as a nation rooted in a distinct European Judeo-Christian tradition. A tradition that needs 
to be ‘defended’ from external influences stemming from immigration. 
Finally, it is remarkable how the overall concern about ‘societal cohesion’ and ‘immigrant integration’ 
result in demands to restrict pluralism, for example in the form of ethnic subcultures, special 
institutions and the accommodation of religiously motivated demands. In public debates there are 
often outcries about ‘multiple loyalties’ of immigrants with dual nationality, about the existence of 
ethnic ‘parallel societies’ or about religious orthodox groups that isolate themselves from mainstream 
society. This is paradoxical, because at the level of individualised life-styles the embrace of ‘diversity’ 
is paramount. Also, according to popular culture everyone should be as ‘different’ and ‘unique’ as 
possible. It appears that the Netherlands is still trying to strike a balance in accommodating various 
forms of pluralism in a depillarised society of immigration.  
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Chapter 2 – Diversity challenges in education and school life  
Inge Versteegt and Marcel Maussen 
2.1. Introduction – Education and diversity in the Netherlands 
The Dutch education system is organized around three levels of education: primary education for 
pupils between the age of 4 and 12, which includes regular and special schools for children with 
learning or other disabilities. Secondary education is for children between the age of 12 to 16/18 
(depending on the school type) and includes tracks for vocational training (VMBO) and pre-university 
training (HAVO, VWO). Tertiary education includes both vocational training, universities of applied 
sciences (HBO) and universities.  
Since 1848 the Dutch constitution guarantees educational freedom, including the right to establish 
schools and to determine their religious or pedagogical orientation (Karsten 2006). The constitution of 
1917 established the principle of equal funding of all schools, which was elaborated in the 1920 
Primary School Act. The basic structure of the Dutch education system is now defined by article 23 of 
the Dutch constitution (Vermeulen 2004). 
 
 
Two key principles are underlying the Dutch educational system. First, there is the freedom of 
education, including the rights of groups of individuals to create and operate primary and secondary 
schools, within certain limits, and the freedom of parents to choose a school for their children 
Box 2.1: Article 23 Education 
1. Education shall be the constant concern of the Government. 
2. All persons shall be free to provide education, without prejudice to the authorities’ right of 
supervision and, with regard to forms of education designated by law, its right to examine the 
competence and moral integrity of teachers, to be regulated by Act of Parliament. 
3. Education provided by public authorities shall be regulated by Act of Parliament, paying due respect 
to everyone's religion or belief. 
4. The authorities shall ensure that primary education is provided in a sufficient number of public-
authority schools in every municipality. Deviations from this provision may be permitted under rules 
to be established by Act of Parliament on condition that there is opportunity to receive the said form 
of education. 
5. The standards required of schools financed either in part or in full from public funds shall be regulated 
by Act of Parliament, with due regard, in the case of private schools
1
, to the freedom to provide 
education according to religious or other belief. 
6. The requirements for primary education shall be such that the standards both of private schools fully 
financed from public funds and of public-authority schools are fully guaranteed. The relevant 
provisions shall respect in particular the freedom of private schools to choose their teaching aids and 
to appoint teachers as they see fit. 
7. Private primary schools that satisfy the conditions laid down by Act of Parliament shall be financed 
from public funds according to the same standards as public-authority schools. The conditions under 
which private secondary education and pre-university education shall receive contributions from 
public funds shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 
8. The Government shall submit annual reports on the state of education to the Parliament. 
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(Vermeulen 2004: 31). Second, there is “statutory equality” of governmental or public (openbaar) and 
non-governmental or denominational (bijzonder) schools (OECD 2005: 15) and both are funded 
according to identical and equivalent criteria (Vermeulen 2004: 34). Of all primary schools about 68% 
is non-governmental and of all secondary schools this percentage is 70%. 
Governmental schools (openbare scholen) are governed by the municipal council or by a public legal 
entity, whereas non-governmental schools (bijzondere scholen) are governed by the association that 
founded them. Governmental schools are open to all children regardless of religion or outlook, are 
subject to public law, and provide education based on guidelines by governmental institutions. 
Teachers employed by these schools are civil servants and they cannot be selected on the basis of 
denominational criteria. Governmental schools are free, however, to choose a specific pedagogical 
approach (Vermeulen 2004: 34). Non-governmental, denominational schools (bijzondere scholen) are 
subject to the same general education regulations and quality standards and they are state funded. If a 
group of parents wants to found a new school it has to make a request to the local authority, which 
once approved will be submitted for approval to the Minister (Rath et al. 2001: 72-73). A number of 
conditions have to be met, including that the school will have a minimum of pupils in attendance 
(going from 200 to more than 300 depending on the city/location) and that there is no similar school 
within three kilometers of the proposed area (idem). These schools are governed by the board of the 
association that set them up, base their teaching on religious and ideological beliefs or on specific 
pedagogical principles. They can refuse to admit pupils whose parents do not subscribe to the mission 
on which the school’s teaching is based (OECD 2005: 16). These schools should employ certified 
teachers, but they are allowed to select teachers on the basis of their religious and philosophical views. 
Besides religious schools, non-governmental schools include, for example, schools based on 
distinctive pedagogical principles, such as Montessori, Jenaplan or Dalton. In the Catholic, Protestant 
and Islamic school sector national umbrella organizations exist, which do not replace the autonomous 
school boards but function as lobbies (Dijkstra et al. 2004: 68).  
All schools have to respect qualitative standards set by the Ministry of Education, including for 
example the subjects to be studied, the attainment targets of examination syllabuses, the content of 
national examinations, the number of teaching periods per year, the qualifications that teachers are 
required to have, etcetera (OECD 2005: 17). This is different for religious non-governmental 
education, because in religious schools, everything concerned with expression of the school’s religious 
identity is decided by the school board. This includes the method and curriculum for religious 
education, the rituals which are performed at a school such as a daily prayer, and the choice for 
celebrating or not celebrating Christmas, Easter or Eid al Fitr.  
The Inspectorate of Education (Onderwijsinspectie) acts under the authority of the Ministry of 
Education and supervises primary and secondary public and denominational schools. The Education 
Council (Onderwijsraad) is the main advisory body of the Minister of Education. 
Over the past years there has been a lot of discussion about the decreasing quality of education in the 
Netherlands and especially about the ineffectiveness of the many large scale reforms carried through 
over the past decades. In February 2008 a Parliamentary Commission (Dijsselbloem Commissie), 
published a report about educational reforms in the 1990s. The commission concluded that the 
government had paid too little attention to its core task, namely seeing to the quality of education, and 
had mingled too much with the precise educational methods and approaches used inside the 
classroom. 
Religious, cultural and ethnic diversity in the Dutch education system 
The vast majority of Dutch schools is still organized on the basis of a religious identity and 57% of the 
primary schools are Christian (Dijkstra and Miedema 2003: 21). Partly as a result of secularization, the 
majority of Catholic and Protestant schools do not have a strongly distinctive character anymore 
(Vermeulen 2004: 35-36). Post-war migration has resulted in the establishment of Islamic and Hindu 
schools. Other religious developments have also left their imprint on the panorama of religious 
schools, illustrated for example, by the rise of Evangelical schools. 
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Table 2.1 Market share of public and denominational school 
Schools in 2009             Total 7,517 primary schools Total 657 secondary schools 
Public 32.1 % 29.6% 
Roman Catholic 29.9% 24% 
Protestant-Christian 3.4% 19.1% 
General denominational  
(Montessori, Jenaplan, Steiner) 
7.3% 14.4% 
Reformed 3.4% 2.0% 
Evangelical 0.1% 0.6% 
Muslim 0.5% 0.3% 
Hindu 0.1% -- 
Collaborative school  
(i.e Protestant/Catholic) 
0.8% 9.4% 
Jewish -- 0.2% 
 
The motivations of parents to choose a religious school, which in most of the cases will be a Christian 
school, vary and often the choice is not motivated exclusively or primarily by religious reasons. 
Parents select these schools because they generally have good educational performance, a good 
atmosphere, a good connection with secondary education and a good reputation in teaching social 
skills (Dijkstra and Miedema 2003). Socio-economic characteristics of parents also matter in this 
process of selection of schools, because parents with a lower level of education are over-represented in 
public schools (Versteegt 2010: 57).
12
  
 Whereas the accommodation of religious pluralism thus is an essential feature of the Dutch education 
system, this cannot be said with regard to the accommodation of ethnic diversity. There are no 
(official) ethnic schools in the Netherlands.
13
 All schools are obliged to teach in Dutch. Only in 
Friesland schools can teach both in Dutch and in Frisian (OECD 2005: 12).
14
 However, “ethnic 
segregation” is a major aspect of Dutch schools nowadays, and there is a clear concentration of 
“allochtonous” pupils in some schools, and sometimes schools may even have a majority of pupils of a 
specific ethnic group (e.g. Turks or Moroccans).  
In 2009 8,1 % of all pupils in primary education were “non-Western-allochtonous”, meaning that they 
are born abroad or that at least one of their parents is born abroad. This number is slightly decreasing, 
mostly because children born of parents who themselves were born in the Netherlands - the “third 
generation” – do no longer count as “allochtonous”. There are also 0,6 % children that are “Western-
allochtonous”.15 However, the percentage of allochtonous pupils in primary education is over 50% in 
the major Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and in these cities some 
schools have up to 80% allochtonous pupils. In 2009 14.8 % of all pupils in secondary education were 
non-Western allochtonous and 6.4 % were Western allochtonous. Furthermore, some vocational 
schools have much higher percentages. 
There is also room for the expression and recognition of ethno-cultural and religious diversity within 
the context of all schools (governmental and non-governmental). This includes, firstly, attention for 
                                                     
12  This picture looks dramatically different in the case of Islamic schools, however, because they tend to have a lower score 
on these socio-economic and educational performance variables. 
13  When an elite school opened in Rotterdam in 2006 that catered almost exclusively to Turkish students this led to critical 
reactions. See “Controverse rond nieuwe ‘Turkse’ eliteschool” in NRC-Handelsblad January 27 2007. 
14  The suggestion that Islamic school teach children in the “language of their country of origin” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2007: 18) is mistaken. 
15  We do not elaborate here further on the rationale behind Dutch statistics on ethnicity (see Maussen and Bogers 2011). See 
www.samos.nl for these statistics. 
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religion in the curriculum, not only in the form of “teaching about religion” but also in the form of 
religious instructions. The Primary Education Act of 1985 imposes “a duty on the competent 
authorities to help arrange religious instruction in accordance with the wishes of parents for their 
children” (Rath et al. 2001: 65). Governmental authorities do not bear any responsibility for the 
content of such instruction. Whereas this type of religious instruction in governmental schools exists 
for Christian children it is virtually absent for Muslim children. At various occasions there has been a 
debate on whether or not public schools should teach religion.
16
 Secondly, there is the issue of 
teaching about the cultural background of immigrants. Programs to teach immigrant languages and 
culture in schools have been ended.
17
 Emphasis has shifted away from Dutch schools stimulating 
teaching of immigrant cultures, to the school as an instrument for integration. Nonetheless, ethno-
cultural diversity still plays a role in the curriculum as something to be “learned about”, even though 
the precise way this should be handled has changed in the context of ever stricter integration policies 
and the focus on citizenship education (burgerschapsvorming) (see below). There is also more 
attention for the way in which education can play a role in teaching about cultural and religious 
diversity and how the school can function as an institute that fosters respect and tolerance (Versteegt 
2010: 67ff.) (see below). 
Immigration has not only resulted in attempts to cope with cultural and ethno-religious pluralism, it is 
also increasingly, and perhaps more urgently, related to social inequality and socio-economic 
segregation in Dutch society. Ethnic and social segregation in schools is now a general phenomenon in 
the Netherlands (Dijkstra et al. 2004: 82). In public and academic discourse the distinction between 
schools with a high concentration of immigrant children and those with a majority of autochtonous, 
Dutch pupils is commonly phrased as the distinction between “black” and “white” schools (e.g. 
Vedder 2006). Schools with a proportion of 50% enrollment of children from an immigrant 
background are considered black schools. In 2004 about 8 percent of all primary schools was “black”, 
but in the four largest cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague; this percentage was over 
50%.  
An important factor in the development of segregated schools is the so-called “white flight”; 
autochtonous parents avoid sending their children to schools that have a too high percentage of 
allochtonous children. They fear that “black schools” provide education of lesser quality, that the 
overall performance of pupils and mastery of the Dutch language will be lower (resulting in negative 
peer effects, Dronkers 2007: 19-23), that these schools have a bad reputation, and that there will be a 
“mismatch between home and school” (Karsten et al. 2003: 471). Ethnic concentration is strengthened 
by the academic selectivity of the school system. Immigrant students are generally academically less 
competent at the completion of primary education and, by consequence, they are “overrepresented in 
the lowest-level programs of junior vocational high schools and underrepresented in the pre-university 
schools” (Vedder 2006: 41). Most allochtonous children attend junior (age 12-16) vocational high 
schools (VMBO).  
In general terms the number of “white” schools is higher in the sector of non-governmental education: 
30% versus 18% in public schools. Yet, there is also variation as to the level of ethnic segregation 
between different types of denominational schools: 95% of the schools based on an Antrophosophic 
philosophy is considered “white” and the same goes for 87% of the reformed schools and 87% of non-
                                                     
16  In 2008 a Moroccan-Dutch city-district alderman in Amsterdam, Ahmed Marcouch, a prominent member of the Social 
Democrat Party (PvdA) suggested that it would be better if Islamic religious instruction was taught in public schools. See 
“Geen enkele belemmering voor islamles” in Trouw, 27 June 2008. 
17  In the era of guest workers policy (roughly from 1974-1981) mother tongue language and culture-classes were provided in 
Dutch schools for the children of immigrant workers, motivated by the idea that they should be enabled to learn about their 
country of origin and should be equipped for successful re-integration upon the day of return. In the period of multicultural 
Ethnic Minorities Policies (1983-1989) this was replaced by education in the mother tongue, first as Onderwijs is Eigen 
Taal en Cultuur (until 1995) and later as Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen (OALT) (from 1998-2004). In practical 
terms this meant there were optional, extra classes in Turkish or Arabic that were taught in Dutch schools, but outside the 
regular curriculum and school hours. 
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religious denominational (Montessori, Dalton etc.). Of Protestant-Christian schools 41% are classified 
as “white” and of the Roman Catholic schools 29%. 
Over the past decades policy measures have been developed to tackle ethnic and socio-economic 
segregation in education. Several municipalities have developed policies aiming to spread 
allochtonous and autochtonous (or more generally advantaged and disadvantaged) pupils more evenly 
across schools. However, the possibilities for developing these kinds of “spreading policies” are 
limited. Because of the freedom of education, most municipal policies rely on the voluntary 
collaboration of both school boards and parents. These Dutch experiences seem to confirm the picture 
that attempts to fight social segregation and “class flight” are massively resisted and that there are few 
opportunities to enforce desegregation of schools (Bader 2007: 272).  
Schools receive additional money when they have a certain percentage of disadvantaged students. 
Until recently a school would receive 1,9 factor contribution for pupils with (non-Western) immigrant 
parents, which could be used for example for remedial teaching and special attention for learning 
Dutch. This policy has recently been modified and a new “weight-regulation” [gewichtenregeling] will 
calculate additional funding based upon a variety of indicators of disadvantage, including notably the 
level of education of parents and whether or not they are of immigrant background. In addition, more 
and more emphasis is given to the need for immigrant children to learn Dutch at an early age. The so-
called “pre-school” (voorschool) for children aged 2 to 4 intends to provide opportunities for these 
children to learn Dutch more easily and adequately.  
Present day public and political debates in the Netherlands 
Against the background of the ongoing discussion about integration and the challenges posed by 
religious and ethnic diversity three mayor themes emerge in Dutch public debate with respect to the 
domain of education.   
Firstly, there is a mayor debate that starts off from the idea that the Dutch education system 
contributes to ideological and cultural “segregation”, because it allows (or even encourages) that 
children of a different religious or cultural backgrounds receive education separately, in parallel 
primary and secondary schools. Another argument is that given the strong secularization trend in the 
Netherlands
18
, a school system that is still strongly shaped by religion has become anachronistic 
(Dijkstra et al. 2001: 2). In addition, the value-systems and basic beliefs of religious newcomers, 
especially Islam, are seen as strongly deviating from mainstream cultural norms, which makes it even 
more regrettable that children can be educated in this type of religious schools. Some people argue that 
societal cohesion and “integration” require that all children in the Netherlands attend schools together, 
without distinctions of religion or ideological background.  
Secondly, there is another set of critical voices that question the legitimacy of the education system by 
focusing on the issue of segregation and social inequality. They argue that in the existing system 
children from advantaged, Dutch families intentionally go to the same schools, and the same goes for 
disadvantaged, allochtonous children who go to the same schools mostly unintentionally. School 
segregation is a result of residential and geographical segregation, but, so the argument goes, in the 
Netherlands non-governmental schools can more easily control the influx of pupils. They can for 
example refuse disadvantaged students by arguing that they do not share the religious identity of the 
school. In this way the “profiling” of religious schools does contribute to the emergence of “black” 
and “white” schools, alongside demographic factors, housing segregation and the choice-behaviour of 
parents (Karsten et al. 2002, Versteegt 2010).
19
  
                                                     
18  In 2007 42 percent of the Dutch reported no religious affiliation and 71 reported that they hardly ever or never attend 
worship services (Monsma and Soper 2009: 53). 
19  One should add that non-governmental schools with a particular educational approach are more successful in selecting 
pupils from advantaged families, because they demand higher fees of parents and because their often freer teaching 
methods (Montessori, Jenaplan) seem attractive to higher-educated parents (Dijkstra 2004: 82; Vedder 2006: 39). 
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Thirdly, there is the idea that, especially in a multicultural society, the school should fulfill a major 
role in socialization of “new citizens”. It should socialize “newcomers” (read: immigrant children), 
teach liberal values with respect to issues such as secularism, gender equality and equality of sexual 
orientation. The government should more strictly see to it that schools effectively contribute to the 
forming of “democratic citizens”. One expert summarized the debate about the education system in 
relation to “immigrant integration” as a plea to use the school as an instrument for integration: “which 
can (1) teach children of different ethnic, religious, social, and cultural backgrounds to live peacefully 
together and to respect each other; (2) instill in them the basic values of democracy and the rule of 
law; (3) create equal opportunities for all. This argument proposes moving the Dutch system in the 
direction of the French system of the école laïque (public school) or the American system of common 
(public) schooling” (Karsten 2006: 29). One line of argument is that religious schools, and especially 
Orthodox and Islamic schools, will have a poor record in “teaching tolerance”.20 Another line of 
argument makes a plea for more involvement of the government in developing, promoting and 
implementing the teaching of “good citizenship”. Others are more skeptical and argue that given the 
freedom of education in the Netherlands there is reluctance to see the state act as a “moral educator” 
(Vermeulen 2004: 49).  
Against the background of these current developments and diversity challenges we have decided to 
focus our case studies around two major debates in the Netherlands. On the one hand, there is the 
debate on how the education system as a whole should cope with religious diversity, especially with 
regard to those religious schools that (are perceived to) exist on the boundaries of what is tolerable in a 
liberal society. These are Reformed schools and Islamic schools. The debates focus both on the 
existence of these schools and on the nature and boundaries of their associational autonomy. Even 
though issues related to interactions in the school context and presentation of self will inevitably play a 
role in these debates, our focus is on the way this is a debate about some essential features of the 
Dutch education system as a whole. On the other hand, there is a wide debate on how the school 
should fulfill a role in socializing new citizens, and notably in educating pupils in such a way that they 
are equipped to live in an ethnically, culturally and religiously plural society. This issue primarily 
concerns the curriculum and different approaches to teaching tolerance (Vogt 1997) and democratic 
citizenship (Bader 2007). 
2.2. Methods and Data 
2.2.1. Research problem and questions for the two case studies 
This report draws on desk research and fieldwork. We have collected statistical data, policy 
documents, statements by government officials, media and examined the relevant scholarly literature. 
Our first Case Study focuses on the debate on the limits of toleration for orthodox religious schools. 
The research question in this case study is: How does tolerance and intolerance for Islamic and 
Reformed schools manifest itself in the Dutch debate about Freedom of Education in general, and in 
the opinions of practitioners of such schools in particular?   
The second Case study explores whether tolerance as pedagogical aim is included in the Dutch 
approach to Citizenship Education. Our research aims to compare the intended to the implemented 
curriculum, by focusing on one example of good practice. The following research question is 
explored: Which ideals are expressed in Dutch Citizenship Education intentions and implementations, 
and how do these ideals on policy and practical level relate to intolerance, tolerance and acceptance?  
In order to address a large scope of Dutch education, the first Case Study mainly describes primary 
education, and the second Case Study mainly addresses secondary education. 
                                                     
20 Whether this is actually the case is another matter (see Bader 2007: 269-272). See also the case studies in this report. 
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2.2.2. Respondent selection and approach  
The selected respondents for Case Study 1 had to be school principal of a Reformed or Islamic school 
(or school association). They were selected through internet search as well as through contacts with 
the organization for Islamic schools, ISBO. 
For Case Study 2, we selected several experts in Citizenship Education and some teachers. As a 
selection criterion for experts we looked for people who had published official documents on the 
policy and implementation. We aimed at comparing two types of schools: those that wish to influence 
behavioural and attitude change, and those which address cognitive development in political and 
democratic knowledge. For the first type, we searched for a school which had participated in a project 
to decrease stereotypes and stigmatization. From the selected material we found several possible 
projects. We chose a school that had attained quite some media attention for its apparent success. They 
previously had a large population of extreme right-wing students, but after taking some of the students 
to Auschwitz in Poland to receive special training, the attitude of the students had changed. As a 
comparison to this school, another school type was selected. Through internet search we found several 
schools which had taken their class to the Parliament on an excursion.  
The interview guide and a list of interviewees can be found in the appendix of this report.  
In June 2011 we organized a public event and discussion group to present our preliminary findings and 
exchange ideas with experts, practitioners, politicians and scholars. The transcripts of this meeting 
were used as additional data.  
2.2.3. Transcription and analysis  
After the interviews were conducted (all Case Study 1 interviews and the Case Study 2 interviews with 
teachers took place in the school facility; expert interviews for Case Study 2 took place in a public 
space) they were fully transcribed. Initial analysis took place in the transcription phase of the 
interviews. More extensive labeling occurred when the theoretical framework had become more 
evident. In Case Study 1, several key issues have been selected for citation, largely those relating to 
associational freedom. In Case Study 2 analysis, different ideals and practical difficulties connected 
with citizenship education could be discerned. In the analysis and presentation of the findings we have 
generally be concerned to faithfully report positions and to reconstruct argumentations in relation to 
different discourses on citizenship, pluralism and tolerance. 
2.3. Case Study 1: Christian-Orthodox and Islamic schools  
2.3.1. Introduction  
Freedom of education and the equal recognition of non-governmental religious schools are commonly 
seen as foundational to the Dutch approach to cultural and religious pluralism. However, over the past 
decade there is a widespread debate on whether or not Orthodox religious schools should still be 
tolerated.  
In this case study we analyze the ongoing debate on the room for religious schools in the Netherlands, 
focusing on Reformed schools and Islamic schools. We argue that there is both a debate about the very 
right to exist of this type of government funded religious schools and on the scope of associational 
freedoms of these schools. By asking school directors about their school policies and practices and by 
allowing them to clarify the way they justify these, we hope to shed light on an important debate in the 
Netherlands about the value and outer limits of tolerance.  
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2.3.2. Reformed and Islamic schools in the Netherlands 
Reformed Schools 
Dutch-Reformed schools are associated with orthodox Protestant communities that mainly live on the 
diagonal line from the South West province of Zeeland to the North East part of the country 
(see picture). This area is referred to as the “Bible belt”, similar to the one in the United States. Their 
population size is estimated around 460,000 (Bernts et al. 2006: 91).  
 
Map 2.1: The Dutch “Bible Belt”  
Map shows the vote percentage for the Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2006 
 
Theologically, the Reformed are Calvinists with a dogmatic but highly personalized belief. The Dutch 
Reformed do not exclude modern life entirely, but they deviate from mainstream Dutch society in a 
number of ways. They typically object to cinema, popular music and the use of television, and, to 
some extent, internet. Sundays are intended for resting at home and for Church attendance twice a day. 
Dancing, card playing or gambling, vaccinations and insurances are all considered problematic.  
Other rules relate to purity, sexuality and gender roles. Women must wear a hat in Church service, but 
they do not sit separately from men. They cannot have leading positions in Church or politics. Women 
are also expected to grow their hair long and wear skirts or dresses, whereas men are expected to keep 
their hair short. Birth control, as well as sexual conduct outside of heterosexual marriage, is considered 
unacceptable. As a result, large families are common among the Dutch Reformed and their population 
is relatively young.  
The number of Reformed schools in the Netherlands gradually grew since 1920. Currently, there are 
over 200 schools for primary and seven schools for secondary education, as well as two schools for 
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tertiary education (Oevermans 2011). They represent 3.4 % (primary) and 2.0 % (secondary) of the 
total number of schools.
21
  
Islamic schools 
Only a minority (10%) of the total population of children of Muslim backgrounds visit Islamic 
schools.
22
 There are 44 Islamic primary schools and 2 schools for secondary education. According to 
surveys among Muslim parents, there would potentially be a need for 100 more Islamic schools.
23
 
Islamic schools now exist for about 25 years in the Netherlands. Unlike the Reformed schools, the 
Islamic schools do not adhere to one single type of religious orthodoxy and the majority of teachers in 
these schools are native Dutch, non-Muslims (75%).  
Ever since plans were made to found Islamic schools they have often been regarded as undesirable and 
potentially dangerous (Rath et al. 2001; Shadid 2003). In reaction to public concerns about educational 
performance, mismanagement and possible “anti-integration tendencies” the Inspectorate of Education 
has in the past decade conducted three large scale investigations into Islamic schools (see Maussen 
2006: 46-47).: “The most important conclusion was that the Inspectorate did not find anything that 
should lead to suspicion or alarm” (Driessen and Merry 2006: 213).24 
Still, Islamic schools remain under close scrutiny, both from media and politics and from the 
Inspectorate of Education, the latter being primarily concerned about the quality of education in some 
schools. Islamic schools have nearly 100% immigrant population with a concentration of pupils with 
parents from non-Western, and usually uneducated backgrounds. There are also organizational and 
financial issues related to unprofessional board members (Driessen 2008). Compared with schools 
with similar classroom populations from non-Western backgrounds, the Islamic schools are doing 
slightly better. Yet, compared to the average Dutch school, Islamic schools generally lag behind in 
school achievements.
25
 
2.3.3. Public debate on the freedom of education and religious schools 
The dual system, Islam and the freedom of education 
In 2002 the Minister of Big Cities and Integration Policy, Roger van Boxtel (Liberal Democrats, D66) 
suggested in an interview that article 23 on the freedom of education could be rescinded. He believed 
there should only be public schools that would provide good education. In a secular society religious 
schools were no longer appropriate and he added: “If you want to you can teach about religion in Bible 
school or in Koranic schools”.26 At the time this statement led to a row and representatives of all 
political parties, including D66 but with the exception of the Socialist Party (SP), said they supported 
the dual system and freedom of education. In the same year the most important advisory body on 
education, the Education Council (Onderwijsraad) concluded in a report on the significance of article 
23 that there was virtually no political support to actually do away with the dual system (2002: 94).  
However, in more recent years there are some prominent politicians who defend an ending of the dual 
system. Jasper van Dijk, an MP of the Socialist Party (SP), has said that he ideally would be in favor 
                                                     
21  Source: www.stamos.nl 
22  The reason immigrant parents have wanted to establish Islamic schools was because of discontent with the school system, 
in which little attention was given to Islam. Another reason was the unsatisfactory school results of many of their children, 
which some parents blamed on the un-disciplinary, autonomy-centered style of education in the Netherlands (Driessen 
2008). Furthermore, some parents felt their children were being discriminated against or otherwise not judged fairly. 
23  See “Nog zeker 100 islamitische scholen nodig” in Telegraaf March 20 2006. 
24  Some Islamic schools have continued to be in the news in a negative way, notably the As Siddieq school in Amsterdam. 
Former teachers spoke of a climate that was “anti-Jewish, anti-Western and hostile to women” (in Maussen 2006: 87). 
25  See “Islamschool minder vaak zwak” in Trouw March 24 2011. 
26  See “Van Boxtel: geen bijzonder onderwijs” in Reformatorisch Dagblad April 8 2002. 
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of “a French style system” in which “there would be no room for non-governmental (bijzondere) 
schools. According to this MP schools that are financed with “taxpayers’ money” should not 
discriminate on the basis of religion. In his view Islamic schools and Orthodox Christian schools can 
perhaps be “tolerated” as private schools, but they should not be positively recognized within the 
educational system and they should not receive public funding.
27
 Other politicians have demanded that 
the dual system be maintained, but that Islam be excluded from this constitutional freedom. In 
November 2003 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, former MP of the Liberal Party (VVD), drafted a parliamentary 
motion that would (indirectly) limit the possibility to found Islamic schools by suggesting that 
religious schools could only be set up if they were not mono-ethnic and if the native tongue of the 
majority of pupils was Dutch.
28
 No follow up was given to this proposal (Vermeulen 2004: 41). More 
recently, Geert Wilders (PVV) has declared that “there can be Jewish and Christian schools in the 
Netherlands, but no Islamic schools” because Islam is a dangerous “ideology”.29 The political program 
of the Freedom Party (PVV) for the 2010 national elections mentioned that the party intends to close 
Islamic schools.
30
  
There continues to be very little political support for these more drastic ideas about abolishing the dual 
system or excluding Islam from educational freedom. The Education Council, which is preparing a 
new advice on the future of article 23, has repeatedly stressed that: “Given liberal-constitutional 
principles of our system it should remain possible for religious minorities (that as a matter of fact have 
to counter majoritarian trends of secularism and individualism) to opt in their education for a strong 
orthodox profile, and to select teachers and pupils in view thereof” (Onderwijsraad 2010: 22). 
Most of the time, then, the public debate is not about abolishing or maintaining the dual system, but on 
defining the scope (reikwijdte) of the freedom of education, especially with regard to religious schools. 
An important aspect of the debate concerns the ways associational freedoms of schools should be 
balanced with other constitutional principles (such as non-discrimination) or worthwhile collective 
goals (such as good education or social cohesion).
31
 Islamic and Reformed schools are at the centre of 
this debate. To clarify four different aspects of the associational freedoms of religious schools can be 
distinguished: the freedom to admit pupils, the freedom to select staff, decisions with regard to 
curriculum, teaching methods and pedagogy and, finally, the way diversity is handled within the 
school context.
32
  
In the first place, religious schools have the right to select and admit pupils based on the school’s 
religious identity. Schools can demand that pupils and their parents support the mission of the school. 
                                                     
27  Idem. Van Dijk made a similar observation during the focus group discussion, Amsterdam June 27 2011. 
28  Ayaan Hirsi Ali has been important in popularizing a critical view of Islamic schools. In her autobiography Infidel she 
writes: “The Dutch government urgently needed to stop funding Quran-based schools, I thought. Muslim schools reject the 
values of universal human rights. All humans are not equal in a Muslim school. Moreover, there can be no freedom of 
expression or conscience. These schools fail to develop creativity – art, drama, music – and they suppress the critical 
faculties that can lead children to question their beliefs. They neglect subjects that conflict with Islamic teachings, such as 
evolution and sexuality. They teach by rote, not question, and they instill subservience in girls. They also fail to socialize 
children to the wider community.” (2007: 279-80). 
29  See HP/De Tijd May 1 2007. 
30  Election program PVV 2010-2015, page 29. 
31  The debate on the existence and functioning of religious schools in the Netherlands is illustrative of the many tensions and 
trade-offs in thinking about educational systems in democratic and pluralistic societies. Veit Bader (2007: 266-267) has 
distinguished between four such tensions: (1) the tension between freedoms of parents and proto-freedoms of children, (2) 
the tension between educational freedoms of schools and liberal non-discrimination (e.g. of teachers or pupils), (3) the 
tension between educational freedoms and educational opportunities for all, and (4) the tensions between educational 
freedoms and more demanding requirements of democratic citizenship and democratic virtues. Besides these various 
tensions there is also a variety of actors who have a legitimate interest and are concerned about decisions that are taken by 
the boards of religious schools. The interests and concerns of parents, citizens, governmental authorities, teachers, schools 
and the respective associations of public and communal providers of education all need to be taken into account (Bader 
2007: 268-269). 
32  The aspects of associational freedoms of non-governmental, denominational schools we distinguish roughly overlap with 
those of Vermeulen (2004: 42-51) who focuses on: “recruitment of personnel”, “admission of pupils”, “content and quality 
of education or pedagogical autonomy” and “organization”. 
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At present there is a political debate ongoing about a proposal to introduce a so-called “duty to accept” 
(acceptatieplicht) on non-governmental schools.
33
 Whereas at present schools may demand that 
parents subscribe (onderschrijven) to the foundations of the school, in the future the school may only 
demand that parents agree to “respect” (respecteren) the foundations of the school. Whereas in the 
former situation a school could justify not accepting a pupil by arguing that by their behavior or 
statements parents demonstrated they did not (truly) subscribe to the foundation of the school (e.g. by 
being member of another church, or by being divorced), in the new situation parents would only have 
to agree to respect the foundations, for example by agreeing to follow the rules set by the school. One 
of the motives behind this proposal was to strengthen the freedom of parents to have their child 
accepted in a particular school. Another motive is to prevent that denominational schools make 
strategic use of their admission rules to refuse weaker pupils. Some religious schools with good 
educational performance are said to refuse pupils with an immigrant background in order to remain 
“white” schools.34  
 In the second place, there is the freedom to select and recruit personnel. Religious affiliation can be a 
reason for selecting (or refusing to select) a specific teacher. Other selection criteria, which are 
severely contested in public debate, are related to gender norms or sexual orientation. Some religious 
schools do not want to hire teachers that are divorced or who are homosexual and some schools 
demand that teachers are not explicit about their homosexuality. An important legal-political debate in 
this respect is on the so-called “the sole grounds construction” (enkele feit constructie), a special 
provision in the Equal Treatment Act (Algemene wet gelijke behandeling, AWGB) of 1994.
35
 This 
provision says that it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of “the sole grounds” of gender, sexual 
orientation or civil status, but that religious organizations and religious schools may nevertheless 
refuse to employ people if they have “additional reasons” justifying why the lifestyle of a person 
prevents him or her to subscribe to the identity of the school.  
Thirdly, there is the freedom of religious schools to shape their own curriculum and to select teaching 
aids in accordance with religious principles. Schools have to follow general guidelines (e.g. minimum 
number of lessons or hours), meet specific educational standards and examination guidelines, and they 
are not allowed to practice indoctrination that serves commercial, political, or religious agendas 
(Vedder 2006: 45). Yet, religious schools can make choices, with regard to teaching evolution theory 
or teaching about sexuality or gender norms. Reformed schools usually have special text books for 
history, biology or literature, and at present their own teaching method for music.
36
 Associational 
freedoms with respect to curriculum may become an issue when governments (or civil society 
associations) want schools to teach certain messages that religious schools object to. One issue in this 
regard are programs to enhance tolerance of homosexuals and teaching material related to sexual 
identity that are being developed with support of the Ministry of Education and that some religious 
schools may refused to use. 
A fourth aspect of associational freedoms of schools entails the freedom to govern diversity in the 
school context by setting particular rules. These are often related to dress codes (for women). For 
example, some Christian schools do not allow girls to wear the headscarf because it is seen as an 
infraction on the religious identity of the school.
37
 Reformed schools may oblige female teachers and 
pupils to wear skirts. Some Islamic schools may oblige female teachers or pupils to wear the 
                                                     
33  This is an initiative bill by the MP’s Hamer (PvdA), Van Dijk (SP), Dibi (GroenLinks), Van der Ham (D66) and 
Kraneveldt-van der Veen (PvdA). 
34  See more extensively Onderwijsraad 2010: 11-15. 
35  AWGB article 2, section c reads “the freedom of an educational establishment founded on religious or ideological 
principles to impose requirements on the occupancy of a post which, in view of the institution's purpose, are necessary for 
it to live up to its founding principles; such requirements may not lead to discrimination on the sole grounds of political 
opinion, race, sex, nationality, heterosexual or homosexual orientation or civil status.” 
36  See “Eigen methoden” (Own Methods) on http://www.golv-info.nl/methoden.html downloaded on July 27 2011. 
37  A recent case in this respect involved the Don Bosco College, a catholic secondary school in Volendam that refused a 
pupil because she was wearing a headscarf. 
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headscarf. Other forms of regulation include the composition of classes (for example gender 
segregation) or whether Islamic prayer is allowed in the school building. This freedom also entails the 
right to set specific rules for other types of activities, such as swimming lessons, outings and school 
camps, or festivities organized by the school.  
Because there is little support to do away with the dual system, most of public and political debate 
focuses on the ways religious schools make use of their associational freedoms. Especially those 
schools with a strong religious identity (Reformed schools) or schools whose religious identity 
deviates from mainstream culture (Islamic schools) are being challenged in this regard. These schools 
are accused of using their associational freedoms (especially those related to selection of pupils, 
recruitment of staff and governance of diversity within the school), in such a way that they violate 
crucial liberal-democratic norms, especially with regard to equal treatment and non-discrimination.  
A widely debated court-case in this respect was related to a teacher of a Reformed school, who was no 
longer allowed to teach at his school after he told the school principal in the year 2009 that he was in a 
homosexual relationship (Oomen et al. 2009). Despite the fact that the teacher did not press charges 
against the school and came to a personal agreement about the situation, there was an appeal at the 
Commission for Equal Treatment, which was initiated by the COC, the Dutch organisation for 
homosexual emancipation.
38
 The outcome of this case is yet unknown, but it does not stand on its 
own.
39
 The Council of Europe and the European Commission have argued that the Netherlands have 
not adequately implemented European guidelines regarding the protection of rights of homosexual 
employees within religious schools into national laws (Oomen et al 2009: 26). In the context of 
increasing political pressure some Reformed schools are trying to redefine their practice in this regard, 
something which also became clear in our interviews (see below). The Union for Reformed Education, 
(VGS, Vereniging voor Gereformeerd Schoolonderwijs), which represents the majority of Reformed 
schools, wrote a document on homosexuality in 2008. They suggested that homosexuals should not be 
banned from Reformed schools (there should be “a place for staff or students with a homosexual 
orientation”) and said that schools should help pupils and staff who are “struggling” with homosexual 
feelings “through the mercy of Lord fight against all sinful desires” and with Gods help choose for a 
life without homosexual praxis and relationships (Oomen et al 2009: 66). Other spokesmen of the 
Reformed communities have said that Gay teachers cannot work at Reformed schools because “the 
behaviour and choices of teachers should not violate what they communicate to the youth”.40 More 
recently the Minister of Education, Van Bijsterveld, said the Reformed schools no longer obliged 
teacher to sign a document saying they would subscribe to Biblical principles with regard to 
marriage”.41  
The second part of this chapter explores what Reformed Schools and Islamic school do in practice. 
Why are these forms of associational freedom important to them and how to they argue about their 
existence, about their positions and practices in the light of conceptions of tolerance?  
                                                     
38  Nederlands Dagblad May 15, 2009 “School schorst docent om homorelatie” COC May 21 2009 ”CGB-oordeel homo-
kwestie Emst zaak van algemeen belang”   
39  A similar debate involved the earlier mentioned Islamic primary school As Siddieq in Amsterdam when the new head of 
the school announced in an interview that the school would not hire a gay teacher and that pupils were taught that 
homosexuality was not allowed in Islam. See response to question of three members of parliament of the VVD (liberal), 
Tweede Kamer June 16 2010. 
40  See for example an article by two policy makers affiliated with the VGS in Trouw entitled “Homosexuality is 
irreconcilable with the identity of the Reformed school”, November 12 2010. 
41  See “Refoschool werkt niet langer met verklaring tegen homoseksualiteit” in Reformatorisch Dagblad April 13 2011. 
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2.3.4. Views of principals of Reformed and Islamic schools 
2.3.4.1. Stereotypes, prejudices and freedom of education 
In April 2011 the employers organization of Protestant Christian schools observed that the “societal 
and political climate is less and less tolerant with respect to diversity and pluralism in morals, culture, 
life conviction (levensovertuiging) and religion”.42 In our interviews we often heard that principals of 
Reformed and Islamic schools felt they were operating in a climate of decreasing tolerance for their 
communities and institutions. With respect to Reformed schools one often comes across the image that 
these schools are “deliberately isolating themselves from society”.43 The suggestion that the Reformed 
were trying to segregate from mainstream society was challenged: “we are not in an isolated position, 
but we refuse to do certain things”. In this context the importance of having denominational schools 
was to be able to develop the own identity and then “make contacts with our environment coming 
from our own position”.44 Principals spoke of the prejudices the schools encountered. Some people 
believe “we all walk around in black suits and wear black socks”.45 Sometimes children of the school 
were being harassed or yelled at when they were identified as (Orthodox) Christians, for example on 
the bicycle or in the train.
46
  
In the interviews with Islamic school principals we repeatedly heard that they were confronted with 
prejudice, negative images and stereotypes based on ignorance and misconceptions about these 
schools. An important theme is the idea that these schools are not really Dutch. A principal told about 
a group of teachers in training that visited the schools, asking questions such as “Do you have any 
chairs in the school? Do you speak Dutch in the school?”47 One of the principals half-jokily told about 
the ways he would ridicule stereotypes in his conversations with local politicians, showing them 
around in the school so they could see “we do not keep camels in the school court!”.48 Another 
principal felt she constantly had to “defend her choice” as a non-Muslim to work at the Islamic school. 
Repeatedly she would have to engage in debates like “I don’t understand why you want to work there. 
(…) The children live in the Netherlands and they should go to Dutch school.”49 The difference in 
religion is strongly connected to foreignness and by consequence Islamic schools are seen as non-
Dutch by definition. Principals of Islamic schools express the feeling they have to defend themselves 
all the time: “we have a constitutional right to exist but we have to justify ourselves constantly”.50 
Sometimes this hostility is being linked to the fact that Muslims are not accepted by Dutch society, but 
at other times principals observed how stereotypes were being actively produced by the media. An 
example was a journalist who wanted to take two pictures “one of a typical Islamic class and one of a 
Dutch class”.51 We also observed that a discourse of “stereotype debunking” was very common 
amongst the school directors of Islamic schools. In the following fragment a school principal, asked to 
describe her school, manages to address seven common stereotypes about Islamic schools in three 
minutes. The debunked stereotypes are marked in italic. 
I:  In general, how would you describe the school of which you are a principal?  
R:  Well we are a Muslim primary school of which the board, er.. has always been a bit at 
distance. (1: No influence from incompetent or fundamentalist board members) 
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I:  Hm-hm.  
R:  That is different at some other primary schools.  
I:  Yes. 
R:  En, the school exists since 1993, which is quite some time.  
I:  yes. 
R:  And those who founded the school have started from the viewpoint of school where they 
could go with their children but connected to the (name city) community. 2. No 
isolationist position) 
I:  Yes. 
R:  So, the football tournament of which I just told you, we participate in that.  
I:  Yes.  
R:  Er, just as well as other activities, so we are a Muslim primary school, but we don’t differ 
so much from the other schools besides our identity and foundations. (3. No extreme 
deviation from the average) 
I:  Yes, yes. What kind of pupils do you get? 
R:  Mainly Moroccan backgrounds. 
I:  Yes.  
R:  And a small portion of Turkish, and lately, fortunately, we see an increase of other 
nationalities, Somali, Uganda, we also have children of Egyptian father and Dutch 
mother.  
I:  Yes.  
R:  And Dutch mother, Iraqi father, so that. Yes.  
I:  Yes.  
R:  We see that fortunately, we see a bit more diversity emerge (4. Positive outlook on 
diversity, no discrimination).  
 
Other stereotypes this school principal addressed were: the mothers of the school children are 
increasingly employed (5. no anti-modernity), the school is harbouring more children from the 
neighbourhood (6. no segregation) and children increasingly end up on higher levels of secondary 
education (7. no inferior education). 
Finally, we asked principals about the coping strategies they developed to address a climate of 
hostility and prejudice. Directors of both schools are aware that incidents (such as school children 
misbehaving) may have repercussions and will immediately be linked to the identity of the school. 
One of the Reformed principals observed that small forms of annoyance (“when students cycle off the 
school campus and they ignore the traffic rules”) are being blamed on the community of believers and 
“if we misbehave a little it will invoke a lot of annoyance”.52 A principal of an Islamic school 
mentioned a similar coping strategy. When a child misbehaved on a school trip the school director 
pointed to the image of the school: “this is not the image we want to present, we want to present the 
image that we are just an ordinary primary school, with normal children and that nothing weird is 
going on with us”.53 In order to challenge the image that Reformed schools are weird and isolationist, 
these schools often invite people and participate in inter-school events. However, it appears that 
Reformed school principals more explicitly defend the right to exist and to be different, and use 
toleration as a frame of reference, whereas the Muslim schools we visited mainly strive to be accepted 
                                                     
52  Interview 1, p.7 
53  Interview 4, p.8 
Tolerance and cultural diversity discourses in the Netherlands 
53 
as “normal primary schools”. We need to underline that this may well be a part of the strategy of the 
management, and perhaps not always shared by the board members or some parents who may favor a 
more isolationist or strict interpretation of Islamic rules (see below).  
Given the general climate of hostility and intolerance that principals referred to we asked them 
whether they feared that their continued existence was at risk and what kind of forms of opposition 
they encountered. Generally speaking directors believed that the law and the stance taken by the 
national government still offered sufficient protection. However, one Reformed principal observed 
that the intolerance for Islam was being extended towards Reformed schools: “if it is about tolerance 
from the outside towards us, I think it has decreased … And this has a strong connection to the fact 
that we (…) are put in one category with the Muslims.”54 He continued to explain that because of the 
link with Islam, religious Orthodoxy was more and more seen in a negative way as being linked to 
violence and terrorism. He considered himself to be “a Reformed Fundamentalist” but felt he was not 
allowed to say this any longer.
55
 Another director observed that he had the feeling the school 
encountered resistance from local actors, for example when a neighbourhood committee mobilized 
against a new building.
56
 At a more general level directors did perceive threats to the continued 
existence of Reformed schools. On the one hand, they referred to the negative view of religion and 
religious Orthodoxy among some politicians of liberal and Left parties
57
, on the other hand, to more 
structural trends threatening the freedom of education and exceptional position of Reformed schools, 
for example the ideas that in a region all schools should collaborate or the decreasing support for 
government financing of bussing of children. In this context, so one principal observed, it remained to 
be seen whether the Reformed pillar could be continued or “whether all these forms of collaboration 
that we have built up among Reformed organizations will have to be demolished, and we will be 
obliged to merge in general (i.e. non-denominational, IV/MM) organizational platforms.”58  
Among directors of Islamic schools the discussion about their right to continue to exist was being 
related to them not being accepted as “normal Dutch schools” and the almost continuous anti-Islam 
rhetoric in public debate. Islamic principals more often mentioned that the schools had been subject to 
vandalism, neighbourhood bullying and hateful anonymous phone-calls. Especially after incidents 
such as 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh in 2004 Islamic schools and mosques were targets of 
vandalism and hateful graffiti in the Netherlands.
59
 One of our interviewees also mentioned that the 
windows of the school had been smashed repeatedly and one night the school bus had been set to fire. 
Another aspect of a more general climate of hostility was the fact that Islamic schools feel they are 
under extreme scrutiny, especially with respect to their educational performance. One director 
observed that it had been quite a challenge to have been subject to inspections by the Inspectorate of 
Education. School boards have to talk to Inspection about three times a year, school-plans are 
scrutinized and there are regular visits to the schools that this director described as “viewing 
operations” (inkijkoperaties) in which the inspection was not only interested in the educational 
performance but also in “other things”, for example contacts with mosques or interest organizations.60 
This director felt that sometimes the bar was being put too high for Islamic schools, which as a matter 
of fact have a great number of disadvantaged pupils struggling with language deficiencies. Another 
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director had the impression that Islamic schools were being judged more strictly than others, for 
example with respect to their financial administration. Another director pointed to the more positive 
side: it had allowed the school management to “get things on track again”.61  
In view of the declining societal and political support for both types of schools we were interested in 
learning about the ways school principals discursively framed their right to exist, their more positive 
characteristics and how these ideas were embedded in discourses on tolerance and recognition. The 
principals of Reformed schools said that the existence of religious schools allowed a “unity between 
church, school and family resulting in a harmonious education of children.”62 They also underlined 
that the dual system and the right of parents to choose a school led to a dynamic of supply and 
demand. For Reformed schools this means they not only try to be attractive in terms of educational 
performance, but also that they seek to maintain their distinctive profile to be attractive for parents 
with a Pietistic Calvinist background and not to become seen as a more general Christian school. The 
“identity plan” (identiteitsplan) of the school thereby plays a role in defining the precise foundations 
and rules in dialogue with school board, school management, churches and parents. Once defined the 
identity plan becomes something parents have to agree to accept when they enroll their children in a 
Reformed school. 
Islamic school principals argued that Islamic schools have an important “cushioning function”. One 
director said “at this school children will grow up in a protected environment”. But the school also 
tried to prepare them for secondary school where they will meet more people who “look different” and 
“who have a different religion”.63 She also said that the added value of Islamic schools is that children 
can “feel safe there” and that children that leave this school tend to be self-confident because “they 
have had the opportunity to express themselves and to be as they want to be”.64 Pupils also tended to 
be judged more fairly, this director said, whereas in schools that are predominantly “white” teachers 
will “from the outset have lower expectations of an allochtonous child”. This kind of cushioning 
function was thus seen as all the more important given the general hostility vis-à-vis Islam and the 
negative views of the abilities of immigrant children.  
When asked about tolerance we discovered interesting differences between the directors of Reformed 
schools and those of Islamic schools. It was clear that for Reformed principals “tolerance” and 
“toleration” are important concepts to phrase the ways they want to engage with differences. 
Tolerance should not mean “relativism” or a shallow form of “respect” so that anyone can do has he or 
she likes. If this is what is meant by tolerance Reformed principals speak of “an excess of tolerance in 
the Netherlands”.65 Directors made it clear that as Reformed they had strong opinions on certain 
issues, such as euthanasia and homosexuality. They want to be able, to judge it as morally wrong, to 
say this and to have the freedom not to want certain things. In the school context this entails the right 
to teach that these things are wrong and not to accommodate them within the school. According to 
these directors what it means to be tolerant is not to act upon these judgments and feelings and not to 
give active expression of rejection to members of other groups. One principal gave the example of 
meeting a gay couple at a wedding. He said that from a Biblical point of view they were morally 
wrong and he could not “appreciate” what they were doing, but being tolerant or respectful meant that 
he would not “approach them to tell them that what they were doing was wrong”.66 Another aspect of 
tolerance that Reformed principals mentioned was some willingness to engage with others and to be in 
contact. For example, the school would pay a visit to a mosque, even though some of the more 
Orthodox parents objected to this. According to one of the principals some parents would more 
actively express disapproval and reject certain practices, but the school policy was to teach that having 
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strong opinions and judgments should never lead to active rejection or violence, and that one should 
always be willing to learn about other religions. Such an approach is also appropriate, so he said, 
because younger generations know that as Reformed they are now also “a minority”.67 
Whereas tolerance and toleration, in their more strict definitions (see WP2) are important for 
Reformed principals, directors of Islamic schools associated the term “tolerance” with the more 
general idea of not being violent or “refraining from being judgmental about others”.68 A principal of 
an Islamic school associated tolerance with a kind of “openness” to others.69 We could not really 
detect a clearly articulated idea about tolerance (as opposed to recognition and respect) in the 
discourses of the directors of Islamic schools that we interviewed. Generally it appeared that Islamic 
schools are more after recognition and acceptance as part of Dutch society. 
2.3.4.2. Associational freedoms: practices and justifications 
As we have said there are major concerns in public debate about the ways Reformed and Islamic 
schools use their associational freedoms. In the media and political debate the tone is often set by a 
small number of controversial legal cases. In this context our goal was to explore more concretely how 
these associational freedoms play a role in the school and what possible differences there are between 
Reformed and Islamic schools. 
Admission of pupils 
An important associational freedom of religious schools is the right not to admit certain children. A 
principal of a Reformed school explained why the school doesn’t have any Muslim pupils for 
example: “the crucial difference between Muslims and Christians is of course the work of the Lord 
Jesus Christ, I will not ignore that or change that because of a number of Muslim children that I should 
respect … So, that won't work. And so in reality, those Muslim parents, they simply don't enrol their 
children here”.70 The Reformed schools are directly concerned with the political debate on the “duty to 
accept” (acceptatieplicht), because it would mean they would have to accept children if parents say 
they “respect” the identity of the school, whilst they may have different religious views and may not 
follow the strict rules of Reformed religion in their personal life. 
Interestingly we discovered that an important motive for Reformed schools to maintain the freedom to 
refuse pupils was a fear of a growing influence of evangelicals. Parents and children with an 
evangelical interpretation of Protestantism tend to divert from the strict rules of the Reformed and 
there is a fear that they will undermine the Reformed community “from within”.71 The need to uphold 
the orthodox norms in the school may also arise when a child’s family is less strict. A Reformed 
principal gave an interesting example: “I was in class one day, and after Bible reading a child told the 
teacher that his family had been to the beach two days before….but that was on a Sunday! (…) Well it 
doesn’t immediately lead to issues, like, ‘your way of life is different from what we strife for, so let’s 
address this’. Because the teacher will try, if this occurs, to stress in the group, as a counter- example, 
what we believe, let’s say, the Sunday with its church attendance. (…) And we are confronted with 
what this kid says, if we don't deal with it, some will think we don't because we find this normal”.72 
The role of the teacher hence was to point out that Sunday is meant for Church attendance, because if 
the remark is left unattended, it might send out the wrong signal to the other children. The role of the 
school is to be clear about what kind of behaviour is intolerable for Orthodox Christians, but still a 
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strategy of explaining and dialogue is pursued and children are not simply “expelled from the school” 
for this reason. 
For Islamic schools the issue of refusing certain students does hardly arise. Most directors we 
interviewed emphasized that all pupils are welcome.
73
 When asked about whether the school would 
refuse students on the basis of religion, one of the Islamic principals said that pupils “should not be 
refused on the basis of religion”. At this school a catholic child would be admitted, but, so the 
principal added, it should “abide with the rules of the school.”74 However, it became clear that the 
issue of refusing pupils because they do not respect the identity of the school remained basically 
hypothetical for these schools. There were interesting exceptions though. One Islamic school has been 
able to improve its performance in such a way that it is doing better than other governmental schools 
in the areas with similar numbers of allochtonous children. This school may be confronted with non-
Muslim parents wanting to enrol their children there. Another school principal mentioned the example 
of Salafi parents who wanted the school to be stricter in its religious teachings and dress rules. The 
school would not accept that these parents would take their children out of the religious classes and 
suggested that they could better look for another school.
75
  
Selection of staff 
When it comes to religious schools using their associational freedoms with regard to the recruitment 
and selection of staff (mainly teachers) two main issues arise: staff members having a different 
religion (or for Reformed schools belonging to another religious denomination) and issues related to 
gender or sexual norms (for example being gay, being divorced, living together unmarried). From our 
interviews the impression arose that the rules in Islamic schools were less strict than those in 
Reformed schools.
76
  
Teachers at Reformed schools must be a member of one of the Orthodox Protestant churches, and 
usually they are member of the same ultra-Orthodox churches. However, sometimes teachers who are 
already working at the school may change their perspective on religion somewhat, for example 
because they become evangelicals. This is regarded as problematic, because, as one school principal 
explained, there is a fear that the teacher may communicate his changed views on religion to the pupils 
and then “the school could be used as some sort of institute for evangelization”. Teachers should not 
actively talk about their alternative religious views: “there can be all sorts of minor differences but 
when there is a difference of opinion on such a major issue, then you will find this more or less played 
out across the heads of children, and that is not right.”77 Actually, it seems that the fear of a growing 
influence of Evangelicals motivates Reformed schools to use their associational freedoms to try and 
refuse non-Reformed staff and pupils. According to this principal a general obligation of schools to 
accept pupils and staff risked to undermine the identity of the school. Another issue would be whether 
staff should abide to strict prescription in their private life (rules within the school context are 
discussed below). For example, one Reformed principal mentioned that a female school teacher might 
not be dressed in skirts in their leisure time. During the school camp this might become an issue, 
because it was ambiguous whether the teacher was there in a private or professional capacity. Another 
issue was that personnel in a Reformed school should not live together unmarried or be divorced.
78
 At 
Reformed schools the most sensitive issue with regard to the freedom to select staff were related to 
homosexuality. One principal explained that he believed that schools were justified in discriminating 
against homosexuals when selecting teachers, as long as they would follow the right procedure. In his 
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view, the issue did not arise so often, but the media always created a hype and therefore schools had to 
choose their words in an extremely careful manner. When speaking of a case of another Reformed 
school that had fired a teacher because of his homosexual lifestyle he observed that the school board 
had been “acting very decently”, but the media and the Minister had “created a situation”.79 
As we mentioned before the issue of recruitment policy of Islamic schools looks rather different. 
Islamic schools have problems to find enough certified teachers, and many Islamic schools have a 
majority of non-Muslim teachers. As one principal observed, he had difficulty in finding a 
replacement and one of the candidates had said “I don’t like the identity of this school”.80 The staff in 
Islamic schools can have another religion, or no religion, but they are asked not “to express this”, 
meaning they should not (actively) try to communicate their own views to the pupils. Actually only a 
minority of the teachers in Islamic schools is Muslim and in this particular school only 9 out of 28 of 
the staff members had a Muslim background. When asked whether the school would tolerate that a 
staff member was homosexual, one of the principals gave a more ambiguous answer. During the 
application procedure the rules of the schools would be mentioned and candidates should understand 
this meant they could not “propagate” that they were gay.81 This school seemed to follow a kind of 
“don’t ask don’t tell” policy, but again the issue was essentially a hypothetical one, because the case 
had not presented itself yet. 
Curriculum 
In religious schools decisions on the curriculum will be decided, on the one hand, by concerns about 
educational goals and obligations and, on the other hand, by concerns related to the religious identity 
of the school.  
From our interviews the image arose that for Reformed schools two main issues arise with regard to 
decisions on the curriculum, namely teaching about sexuality and teachings about evolution. One 
principal of a Reformed school mentioned the teaching of evolution theory as a domain in which 
associational autonomy increasingly was threatened and he spoke of it as one of the things some 
people want to “force upon us”. According to him “evolution is in fact a belief as well … because of a 
lot of things are not clear and not proven”.82 Generally speaking it seems that Reformed schools have 
no great difficulty in deciding on their policies with regard to curriculum, also because they make use 
of specifically designed curricula. For sensitive subjects, such as biology or religion, these teaching 
methods are already adapted to the main concerns of Orthodox Calvinists, and special methods are 
also available in subjects such as music, history or literature. These schools thereby make sure they 
attain educational goals set by the Ministry of Education but via the choice of specific textbooks and 
methods they give different accents, for example with regard to the kind of books that are discussed in 
Dutch literature classes or the emphasis given to particular aspects of Dutch history. Throughout the 
curriculum of Reformed school a lot of attention is paid to religion. 
Islamic schools, on the other hand, make use of more generally used methods and only have special 
textbooks for religious instruction. One school principal mentioned sexual education as a “sensitive 
issue”. Teachers would teach about sexuality and procreation in the biology lessons using a general 
textbook; “we just follow the method, what is in there we simply must present, one way or the 
other”.83 During religious classes these issues would also be discussed and more emphasis was put on 
Islamic norms with regard to sexuality. Decisions on issues related to curriculum and activities are 
negotiated between school boards, school management and parents, within the constraints set by the 
Ministry of Education. It appeared that at Islamic schools the school-management (director and 
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teacher), who are often non-Muslims, believe that considerations concerning educational goals should 
take priority. The boundaries on what can be tolerated are shifting and it appears that the school 
management often defends a more liberal course than some of the school board members or parents 
would like. One director spoke of a shift in the school’s policy upon his arrival as manager. The more 
conservative members of the school board had been removed and the new policy was that the focus 
should no longer be to focus on everything that should, for religious reasons, potentially be seen as 
forbidden (haram) but on what should be allowed (halal).
84
 An example was music lessons that used 
to be forbidden but were now allowed. Music was also being used in other classes, for example in 
teaching language. According to this director the more conservative parents simply had to accept this. 
Another example was dancing. To avoid further discussion the school management had called this 
activity “rhythmic moving”. According to the principal, who was a Muslim himself of native Dutch 
(autochtonous) background, the school policy reflected a more liberal approach in which worthwhile 
goals, such as having contact with children of another school (the dancing or “rhythmic moving” was 
related to an activity with another school) and preparing children for society, should take priority over 
religious dogma. This director also explicitly argued that the school wanted to be attractive for the 
large group of “middle of the road Muslims who are not extremists”. When confronted with 
conservative parents who wanted to take their children out of religious instruction lessons because 
they deemed these “too liberal”, this director said they were “free to look for another school”. A group 
of Pakistani parents had effectively tried to convince the school to implement a more strict policy, but 
eventually some parents chose to migrate to the United Kingdom and enroll their children in a more 
strict Islamic school in Birmingham.
85
 Another director gave the example of school swimming. Even 
though the school had initially gender-segregated swimming lessons for children between 4 and 7, but 
this could not be maintained because the budget costs and there could only be swimming once every 
two weeks. One parent objected and took his daughter out of the swimming lessons.
86
 Still another 
example was crafts because of the tension between religiously motivated objections to figurative art 
and the educational value of learning children to make “three dimensional puppets”. The school had 
chosen a pragmatic solution, meaning “we just do it and then when we are finished we will make a 
ball of clay again … we will not display it or anything”.  
Handling of diversity 
Under this heading we discuss the ways these school deal with issues such as language, dress and 
behaviour in the school context and how they define what is (in)tolerable. In media the more extreme 
case are often mentioned, for example when rules with regard to dress become a motive to refuse 
pupils, as was the case in the earlier mentioned example of the headscarf in a Catholic school. From 
the interviews it became clear that for Reformed schools rules with regard to dress and specific 
language (cursing) are seen as important in view of the identity of the school. These schools have a 
dress code for female teachers and pupils. As one principal explained: “At all our schools the female 
teachers are dressed in skirts when they are at work in the classroom” even though when they are in 
their leisure time they “may dress differently”.87 Another principal mentioned that there are also 
ongoing discussions within the Reformed community about appropriate dress and he laughingly 
explained they were having a debate on whether a “legging is a pair of trousers or not” and whether it 
should be allowed.
88
  
For Islamic schools the dress codes were described by most principals as “very basic”. One principal 
spoke of schools banning “shameful clothing” (schaamteverwekkende kledij) and “tattoos and 
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piercings in the face”.89 Another principal explained that some practices were not allowed such as a 
“naked belly” or “t-shirts without sleeves” and that female staff was expected not to dress in a way 
showing a “cleavage”.90 Of course, this kind of rules also exists in other Dutch schools. Another 
school principal explained that non-Muslim female staff was not obliged to wear a headscarf. Another 
rule was that during prayer girls must wear a headscarf and be properly covered. Yet this principal 
observed that dress codes were primarily seen as something parents should discuss with their children.  
2.3.5. Conclusions 
Although there is little political support in the Netherlands to drastically reduce the freedom of 
education and do away with a dual system in which governmental and non-governmental schools are 
equally funded, the schools that have been discussed in this case study are under scrutiny. According 
to politicians of the Socialist Party (SP) more Orthodox religious schools and their discriminatory 
selection of pupils and staff are beyond what a liberal democratic state can “tolerate”. According to the 
Freedom Party (PVV) Islamic school are also intolerable. Other political parties of the Left (PvdA, 
GroenLinks) and liberal parties (VVD and D66) are willing to tolerate these religious schools, but 
around issues such as non-discrimination of gay teachers or selection of pupils, they articulate a 
discourse of “liberal intolerance”. This means they consistently tend to give priority to non-negotiable 
liberal values (notably of non-discrimination and individual rights) over collective and associational 
freedoms of religious and faith-based institutions. Finally, Christian parties (CDA, CU and SGP) in a 
more principled manner favor “tolerance” of this type of religious schools and argue that these schools 
are worthy of public recognition, as they should be positively accommodated in a plural society. 
From our interviews it has become clear that Reformed and Islamic schools in the Netherlands feel the 
public debate about them is too much influence by stereotypes and misconceptions. They believe at 
present there are still enough constitutional guarantees that protect their educational freedom, but 
principals often made reference to a lack of political support and of indirect forms of resistance or 
rejection by the surrounding society. Interestingly we found that principals of these two types of 
schools articulate slightly different discourses on tolerance and recognition. Principals of Islamic 
schools primarily expressed a need to be accepted as “normal schools” and for them to be positively 
recognised as genuinely Dutch. For directors of Reformed schools tolerance was an important frame 
of reference, because to them it meant the right to exist as a minority is a secularizing society. 
Principals of Reformed school stressed there should be room for opinions and life convictions that 
strongly deviate from the “liberal norm” and that orthodox religious community are entitled to have 
schools based on their own views. 
Two main conclusions can be derived from our interviews with respect to the ways Islamic and 
Reformed schools make use of their associational freedoms. First, the identity of the school, the 
interpretation of associational freedoms and the school’s policy is negotiated between school 
management (principal and teachers), school board and parents. Sometimes parents want the school to 
be stricter in implementing religious dogma, and at other times parents are unwilling to accept 
religiously motivated rules imposed by the school. Important contextual factors influencing these 
negotiations are: the need for the school to have sufficient pupils, the image of the school, the 
interpretation of educational goals, the media debate, and the criteria set by the Ministry of education 
as well as the scrutiny exercised by the Inspectorate of Education. Second, from our interviews it 
seems that Reformed schools are stricter in the sense that their religious identity informs the schools’ 
policy with regard to admission of pupils, selection of staff, curriculum and handling of diversity 
(dress codes etc.). Islamic schools are less strict. Aside from the choices made by school management 
with regard to the school’s policy, there are also more structural reasons why Islamic schools are less 
strict than Reformed schools. They have predominantly non-Muslim teachers and management, there 
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are no special text books for Islamic schools on general subjects (history, biology etc.) and, overall, 
there is les support in Dutch society for a strict application of Islamic religious rules in the school 
context. In a sense it is misleading to speak of Islamic schools as orthodox religious schools. The main 
reasons why they are so fiercely criticized are, first, that they are seen culturally more different than 
Christian schools and as “un-Dutch”, second, because of organizational weakness and recurrent 
problems with incompetent and corrupt boards and management, and, third, their relatively poor 
educational performance and the fact that these schools have almost one hundred percent allochtonous 
pupils. 
2.4. Case Study 2: Citizenship Education and tolerance 
2.4.1. Introduction  
2.4.1.1. Paradox of Dutch citizenship education  
Both on an international and national level, there is a growing sense of urgency to teach children 
‘citizenship’ or ‘civic education’ (see also the September 2011 volume of Ethnicities). The school can 
in this respect be regarded as a main institution to teach tolerance (Bader 2007; Vogt 1997). However, 
there are many conflicting aims associated with citizenship education (Veugelers 2010; Netjes et al 
2011; Maslowski et al 2010; Nieuwelink 2008). Citizenship Education may, among many other 
objectives, include teaching tolerance as an educational aim. Several ways in which Citizenship 
Education can contribute to developing tolerant attitudes in students are known, such as through 
learning about democracy and human rights, but also critically addressing prejudice (see also Vogt 
1997). 
Despite the recent implementation of Citizenship Education in the Netherlands, developments seem to 
have stagnated. Ever since Citizenship Education became part of the official requirements, the 
knowledge, attitudes and skills associated with citizenship seem to have decreased among Dutch 
students. In international comparison, Dutch students have slightly less democratic attitudes and are 
less willing to agree with equal rights for migrants (45.8%) than their European counterparts (50%) 
(Maslowski et al. 2010). Especially autochtonous Dutch students perform poorly compared to students 
of migrant parents (Netjes et al 2011: 50-51).  
In order to clarify this paradox, in the following case study, we investigate which ideals are inspiring 
Dutch policy and implementation for Citizenship Education, and how these ideals relate to tolerance 
and acceptance as educational aims. The lack of practical guidelines from the government is assessed 
in its effect on increasing tolerance through education, as well as the tension between ‘education for 
democratic citizenship' and 'education for tolerance'. We therefore aim to further examine which ideals 
have influenced the educational policy and implementation regarding to Citizenship Education.  
2.4.1.2. General account of the introduction of Citizenship Education (CE) 
The call for Citizenship Education (CE) in the Netherlands was a result of two simultaneous 
developments: the first was the gradual implementation of CE in curricula throughout Europe as a 
result of EU agreements (Eurydice 2005), the second was the growing national concern with 
integration and national identity, in particular the shift from a multiculturalist paradigm to an 
assimilationalist one (Vasta 2006).  
As the debate on integration and national identity continued, an official Advice from the Educational 
Council (Onderwijsraad) suggested that the creation of some type of CE should be pursued, followed 
by similar suggestions from the WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy). In June 2005, the 
Parliament passed a law to include obligatory CE. Although the cross-curricular CE is legally 
required, it does not have a distinct method or book, nor hours prescribed for it in the weekly schedule. 
A document was created by SLO (National Foundation for Curriculum Development) to help schools 
choose their way of implementing CE. Tolerance was mentioned as one of the necessary aims of CE 
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(Bron 2006: 34-38). Three domains were proposed which constitute active citizenship and social 
participation: democracy, participation and identity. 
The introduction of CE occurred at a time when policies for identity and cultural diversity were 
changing. In 2003 the subject ‘Culture and language of origin’ for migrant children was abolished 
(Hendriks and Scheerens 2009). Another development involved Intercultural education, which had 
been introduced in 1985 (Hanson 2002). The status of this cross-curricular subject is now unclear. 
Intercultural Education has either become replaced by or incorporated by the obligatory CE 
(NICI/Bakker: 2010). Whereas Intercultural Education was aiming at appreciating cultural diversity, 
CE - although acknowledging the plurality of Dutch society - aims at social coherence and willingness 
to participate in the community (note the singular). However, some schools still teach Intercultural 
Education.
91
 
The obligatory status of CE coincided also with increased investigations into the much scrutinized 
Islamic schools (see Case study 1 in this report). “One of the government’s motives in introducing a 
legal obligation for citizenship education was to hold schools more accountable in the way they 
promote social cohesion and democratic values” (Bron and Thijs 2011: 124). Thus, Citizenship 
Education became a means to control schools, besides educating children. An Islamic school in 
Amsterdam, As Siddieq, was partly cut from its funding in 2009 due to an apparent lack in CE. This 
was later refuted by the Council of State and funding was restored. 
92
 
 Yet, the integrationist discourse and the focus on Dutch national identity is one of many ideals which 
inspire CE. In fact, the exact requirements or goals remain unclear, due to disagreements about its 
necessary aims between politicians, school representative organizations, social scientists and 
education-supporting NGOs. In this study, we explore CE and its possible effects on acceptance, 
tolerance and intolerance - taking into account this variety of views.  
2.4.1.3 Case study: Overcoming racism through CE. The success of ‘Respect2All’ 
After literature research and interviews with experts, it was clear that many schools do not have a 
structured approach to CE. One school stood out as an exception, an example of “good practice”. 
While struggling with a growing population of right-extremist youth, it approached an external partner 
to execute a project on the school called “Respect2all”. According to those involved the project 
resulted in decreased racism and stigmatization among the students, to the extent that the school 
received an award for its tolerant and respectful climate.  
In our empirical research, we examine which experiences and ideals about CE were expressed by 
teachers involved with the project, and we compare their ideals to that of a teacher whose school had 
similar problems of intolerant views in the student population, but chose a different approach. Taken 
together this sheds light on different ideas about teaching tolerance in Dutch schools. 
2.4.2. Citizenship education in the Netherlands  
2.4.2.1. Ideas and approaches to citizenship education in the NL  
Dutch law prescribes an obligation of all schools to develop “active citizenship and social integration” 
since 2006, but how this should be done is not specified. One reason for the unspecified program is the 
freedom of schools to decide on curriculum (see introduction). Another is that there is no consensus 
amongst politicians, educational experts and school organizations about the aim of citizenship 
education (Veugelers 2010) and whether there is a need for governmental prescriptions of its content 
(Peschar et al 2010: 323).  
                                                     
91  Expert interview 2 
92  "Korten islamitische school As Siddieq mocht niet" in De Volkskrant, March 30 2010. 
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Ideals for Citizenship Education are related to different views on the nature of citizenship. Several 
typologies of citizenship are possible. A typology of citizenship which can be directly connected to the 
views of politicians and practitioners on citizenship education is one developed by Veugelers (2006) 
(Nieuwelink 2008). It is roughly based on Durkheim’s principles of moral behaviour: discipline, 
attachment to the group and autonomy (Veugelers 2007: 106) and offers a threefold distinction of 
citizenship ideals: 
1. The community-oriented, adapting citizen. In this perspective, norms and values are 
created within a group, community or society. The internalisation of these norms is the 
core objective of citizenship education. Discipline and social awareness are core values.  
2. The individualist, autonomous citizen. The objective for citizenship education in this 
perspective is to create autonomous citizens who have developed an independent attitude 
and an individual identity, through cognitive development. 
Discipline and autonomy are core values.   
3. The critical-democratic, socially oriented citizen. Citizenship education must teach 
children critical reflection on society's structures, and stimulate the development of 
attitudes which will increase emancipation and equal rights. 
Autonomy and social awareness are core values. 
 
The different perspectives are of various interest for the actors in citizenship education. The 
documents from the Ministry of Education for example in which the Law is explained, are framed to 
assume that CE must be adaptive and community-oriented. We refer to this style of framing as 
Identity-Adaptive. The words “active citizenship” and “social integration” are regarded by the 
Minister as 
“the willingness and the ability to be a part of the community and to contribute to it actively” 
(MOCW: 2005)  
 
Social integration is defined as: 
“part-taking of citizens into society, by means of social participation, taking part in society 
and its institutions and familiarity with and involvement in expressions of Dutch culture” 
(MOCW: 2005).  
 
The Minister added she wishes to increase social cohesion as well as give “the Dutch culture” a central 
position (SLO/ Bron: 2006). In this example the 'identity' which is important is that of “the Dutch 
culture”. The choice of words suggests that there is only one culture in the Netherlands.  
Denominational school stakeholders frame their statements in a slightly different, but also community-
oriented approach. In their view, there are several communities with several norms and values; the 
view tends towards pillarization (verzuiling). A lector from a Reformed institution for Higher 
Education, states that  
“it is important that the motivation for things such as democracy, tolerance, justice, decency 
and such are drawn from one's own personal life stance” (Vos 2006) 
 
In this view, the state should not wish to install moral values, as (religious) communities can provide 
these better. This relates to the views of the Dutch politician, statesman and theologian Kuyper (1837-
1920) who argued in favor of “sovereignty in one's own circle” (see also Vermeulen 2004: 48). 
The second perspective is associated with conservative, liberal, or libertarian views, but also social 
scientists may favor this view. Pedagogue Van der Ploeg expresses his views on citizenship education, 
with autonomy and individualism as its core objective, and its tension with orthodox-religious schools 
in the following way: 
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“The democracy must guarantee that principles as freedom, equality and tolerance do not become self-
destructive, and therefore cannot heed too much to life views and life practices which express illiberty, 
inequality and intolerance [ …] To condition children in such a way that they are no longer able or 
willing to participate in society, and thus retreat, is the same as exclusion, and therefore unacceptable.” 
(Van der Ploeg, 1999)  
The third approach is being expressed by many social scientists who are involved with education. 
Veugelers, who provided the threefold distinction, explicitly states he believes the third approach is 
the one which should be implemented in citizenship education. He also stresses that this educational 
aim is in tension with the dominant (political) discourse on citizenship education:  
“[…] (T)he public and political discourse is full of worry about the moral, political and social 
development of many youngsters […]. Integration instead of emancipation is the dominant 
discourse […]. We favor a critical-democratic kind of citizenship.” (Veugelers 2007: 116) 
 
Students should therefore learn to “position themselves with respect to important ideological, social 
and cultural traditions”, and “acquire an understanding of the development of norms and be able to try 
out the development of norms in the school and in out-of-school learning activities” (Veugelers 2007: 
117).  
In the following paragraph, we explore whether these values can be found in the intended, 
implemented, and attained curriculum, and how they relate to tolerance. Different visions about CE 
are likely to be connected with different views on what tolerance is, and how students may acquire this 
attitude.  
2.4.2.2. Policy makers and the intended curriculum 
In 2006, the SLO (National Foundation for Curriculum Development) was commissioned to explore 
the implementation of CE. The SLO created a panel of educational experts, scientists and school 
representatives from different denominations and school types, to further reflect on possibilities for 
implementation. Their findings and recommendations were presented in the SLO-document “A 
foundation for citizenship. An exploration of content for foundational education” (Een basis voor 
burgerschap)’(SLO/Bron: 2006). In this document, the key objectives of Dutch CE were explored. CE 
could, for example, be incorporated in the existing curricula of Study of Society, History, Geography, 
Dutch Language and Religious Education. The implementation was “left to the schools” (Bron and 
Thijs: 2011).  
The Inspectorate created a frame of reference for their control, called “Toezichtkader”, in which the 
requirements were specified that they would judge schools by. The main target of inspection is 
whether or not “the school has a vision on CE and integration, and has a plan-wise approach to 
implement this in the curriculum” (Dijkstra et al: 2010: 32).  
The SLO document offers a separate chapter with recommendations from their expert panel. It reflects 
the difference of opinions by several stake-holders of education roughly across the lines of Veugelers. 
The fact that the government has not created detailed prescriptions for a citizenship education is 
considered positive, but there are also some remarks which can be summarized as follows (Bron 2006: 
54): 
- researchers: there is a lack in the development of critical attitudes and independent views 
regarding society 
- representatives of school organizations felt that the schools should be left completely in 
control over their choice of citizenship education 
- teachers and school principals argued that the time and expenses needed for implementation, 
especially within the (overburdened) curriculum was not accounted for. 
In the remarks and recommendations, researchers typically express their wishes from a Critical-
Democratic perspective, whereas school representatives tend to frame their concerns from the Identity-
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Adaptive perspective. The teachers simply seem to request a workable situation without referring to 
any moral or ideological perspective. Yet, the position-taking of teachers may be crucial, when moral 
education is concerned. Precisely because the implementation is “left to the schools” (Bron and Thijs 
2011) and the schools themselves often fail to create a coherent approach (Peschar et al 2010: 290) 
teachers effectively shape the actual curriculum (Veugelers et al. 2008). Therefore, we will now take a 
closer look at the implementation of CE and possible attitudes of teachers towards acceptance, 
tolerance, and intolerance. 
2.4.2.3. Schools, teachers and practice of the curriculum  
A survey amongst secondary school teachers revealed that 55% percent of the teachers of courses 
which would cater for CE were not involved with CE. Of these teachers, 45 % understood little to 
nothing about what the government demanded with regard to CE (Hansma et al 2008). Moreover, 
students complained of not knowing what they were supposed to learn (SCO Kohnstamm). 
The implemented curriculum of CE can be regarded as an unsystematic combination of approaches. 
(Bron and Thijs: 2010; 127). A statement from the Inspectorate reveals that this situation makes it hard 
to judge whether or not the students have been successful in attaining the desired competencies. “A 
risk is that schools fill their requirements with coincidental, more or less relevant activities which are 
now being presented as ‘citizenship education’. In such a patchwork-approach schools don’t offer a 
coherent curriculum and they don’t work towards explicitly established goals” (Inspectorate of 
Education: 2010; Bron and Thijs: 2010: 109). At the level of implemented curriculum we thus notice 
that the three perspectives of Veugelers cannot be identified clearly, because schools offer an 
inconsistent set of programs and lessons. This inconsistency means that several of the perspectives, 
and perhaps others, influence the implementation simultaneously. The conflicting aims lead to the 
seeming absence of any perspective.  
Vocational schools more often teach from a social adaptive perspective with little room for political 
reflection, whereas higher education offers more opportunity for debate and critical-democratic 
learning (Maslowski 2010). Some researchers argue that this division between school types recreates 
current social class differences in which the higher educated are taught to influence and rule society, 
and lower educated are taught to be good obedient citizens (Maslowski 2010: 16; Nieuwelink 2008). 
Thus, the first perspective of Veugelers is more common in vocational schools, and the third is more 
common in higher education.  
Because a lack of cohesion at the school level, values of teachers may be most influential on the 
practice of citizenship education and teaching tolerance. Teachers may take different values into 
account and these may have different consequences for (teaching) tolerance (Versteegt 2010).  
In our empirical research, the teachers were in general more positive about CE than the experts. One 
expert, who is associated with the Inspectorate, refused to give his opinion on CE and indicated that it 
was simply “assigned by the law” and must therefore be executed by schools. The other expert who 
also works as a school advisor, said that his impression is that not all school inspectors take CE into 
account when they visit the school. “So when you go into a school, one may say: the Inspectorate has 
recently said that CE is going well in our school, and the other school says, they didn't ask about it.” 
Both experts wished to remain (professionally) ‘neutral’ on the (negative or positive) influence that the 
associational freedom of schools, notably Article 23, has on the implementation of CE. Both experts 
however described problems with the implementation. The problems were outlined as a combination 
of “lack of expertise, lack of teaching materials, complexity of the subject, overburdened teaching 
programs
93”, as well as “different views about what should be taught, especially between parents and 
teachers”.94 The latter problem was by the expert linked to different views about “xenophobia and 
prejudice”. Teachers too expressed ideological difference across the lines of prejudiced views of 
                                                     
93  Expert interview, page 10-11 
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parents, versus a Critical-Democratic approach by teachers and schools. If their students used 
xenophobic language, which the teachers wanted to correct, they felt “as if you can hear the parents 
speak”95. 
In general, teachers felt CE should prepare students for living in a multicultural society. One expert 
said CE must provide experiences in order to change attitudes. Good practice is, according to this 
expert: “anything where students may have dialogue and debate in the classroom”96  
All respondents agreed that teaching tolerance is an intrinsic part of CE. When asked what they feel 
tolerance is, they answered “recognizing and accepting diversity from a principle of equality97”, 
“openness and willingness to understand98”, “respect and refraining from prejudice99”, “non-
discrimination and understanding
100”. One teacher was critical of teaching tolerance, as she associated 
it with justifying bad behaviour, and she instead preferred “combating negative stereotypes and 
prejudice
101”.   
Teachers and also experts express their wish to go against popular discourse in Dutch politics. One 
expert, who has been involved with the Key Document from SLO, states that they have tried to 
include a more Critical-Democratic approach: “On one hand you have the element of integration and 
adaptation within the civic domain, but you also have the critical, the democratic. We have tried to put 
that aspect into it as well, even though the law doesn't mention it so explicitly
102”. He also felt that 
“…the focus on democracy, critical opinion-development, human rights, should be added more and 
get more emphasis
103”. A teacher said: “Especially NOW with this political climate, I feel it is very 
important that these children learn they should not immediately reject what they don’t know104”.  
2.4.2.4. Possibilities for (in)tolerance in Citizenship Education 
Taking the threefold typology of citizenship from Veugelers as our starting point, the three 
perspectives may provide different justifications to teach tolerance. From an Identity-adaptive 
approach, the group norm may be to be tolerant and respectful. The Individual-autonomy approach 
may look at self-interest and the Golden Rule as a justification for tolerance, as mutual tolerance 
increases freedom for the individual and creates opportunities for autonomous choices. In the third 
perspective, that of Critical-Democratic values, tolerance is required to achieve equality and 
emancipation.   
However, the three perspectives also imply different boundaries for tolerance. In the first perspective, 
Identity-adaptive, the strain on tolerance increases when the ‘social cohesion’ which citizenship 
education must facilitate, is no longer regarded as referring to plural (cultural, religious, political) 
identities, but to a singular (national, Dutch) identity. The intolerance associated with deviation from 
in-group norms, which is common in subcultures, will now apply to all citizens - with the consequence 
that “if you don't like it, you can leave (the country)”. A second aspect is that tolerance used to be a 
value linked to Dutch identity. If tolerance itself ceases to be part of perceived national norms and 
national identity, and this perceived normative identity is instead replaced with secular values, 
orthodox groups are scrutinized for their “lack of integration”. If citizenship education is interpreted as 
                                                     
95  Teacher interview 5 
96  Expert interview 1, page 8 
97  Expert interview 1, page 3 
98  Teacher interview 2, page 9 
99  Teacher interview 3, page 3 
100  Expert interview 4, page 8 
101  Teacher interview 2, page 9 
102  Expert interview 1, page 3 
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104  Teacher interview, page 3 
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integrating pupils and students into a community of values, whether on the level of the school or the 
level of the nation, this may reduce tolerance for ‘un-Christian’ or ‘un-Dutch’ values and practices.  
The possibility for intolerance in the second perspective (individual-autonomy) lies in its contempt for 
collective or religiously motivated moral reasoning. If students are requested to become autonomous, 
liberal thinkers, those students who wish to conform themselves to religious teachings will feel left 
out. In the third perspective too, the modern bias can prove to undermine tolerance, as it refutes 
dogmatic thinking and it sees equal treatment as a core moral principle. However, its attention for 
power structures and its aim for critical thinking may reduce prejudice and thus offer possibilities for 
increased tolerance, perhaps more so than the other two perspectives (Vogt 1997).  
Our research of policy documents and educational recommendations suggests that the Identity-
adaptive perspective is mostly expressed in the political debate, and it was found less common in the 
debate among educational experts. Individual-autonomy and Critical-democratic principles were more 
prevalent there. This may indicate that there is a discrepancy between the level of policy and that of 
practice, not only due to the difficulties of implementation, but also because there are different 
ideologies at work.  
2.4.3. Respect2All: the success of an anti-racist program 
2.4.3.1. Introduction 
Schools and individual teachers in the Netherlands decide from which perspective they teach CE, and 
which values are important. In this section, we look more closely at possibilities to increase tolerance 
through CE. In educational practice, we encountered several concepts of citizenship education and 
their related interpretations of tolerance. The dominant Identity-Adaptive perspective from a 
monocultural, nationalistic point of view, seems to be prevalent in politics but less so in educational 
research and advice. Yet, this view does prevail in denominational school policy, in which the school 
identity is a means to socialize children. We also expect the Identity-Autonomy and Critical-
Democratic perspectives to be used as a frame of reference by teachers and experts. In order to find 
out more about the ways in which students may learn to be more tolerant, we provide a short overview 
of empirical research of this topic, mainly based on the findings of sociologist of education Paul W. 
Vogt (1997).  
Vogt states that it is more important to increase tolerance (end eliminate discrimination) as an 
educational goal, than it is to reduce prejudice. Tolerance he describes as: “putting up with something 
you fear, do not like, or otherwise have a negative attitude toward; it involves support for the rights 
and liberties of others and not discriminating against those toward whom you have negative attitudes” 
(Vogt: 1997: 200; see also the WP2 theoretical report of ACCEPT-Pluralism). According to Vogt, 
therefore, the opposite of tolerance is not prejudice, but discrimination.  
The tendency to discriminate against others, who one dislikes, is common. In-group solidarity can 
grow quickly and it often coincides with a tendency to discriminate against the out-group. Even 
though there may sometimes be good reasons to be intolerant (towards violence, for example), there is 
always an option to tolerate - not discriminate or take action against - the person, group, behaviour or 
opinion one dislikes. However, the elimination of prejudice also increases the likelihood of tolerance 
(Vogt 1997: 200) 
Among others, cognitive and personality development are means to increase the tendency to tolerate 
(Vogt: 1997: 204). As religious developmental research shows, the ability to take a relativist position 
and being able to change perspective (also referred to as “religious plural self”) is associated with 
tolerant views - regardless whether one is religious or not (Sterkens 2001; Duriez and Hutsebaut 2000; 
Streib 2001; Versteegt 2010).   
The ways in which education, under certain conditions, may improve tolerance, are: increased 
intergroup contact, personality development, cognitive development and various types of citizenship 
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education (Vogt 1997: 202; Sleeter and Grant 2007). Some conditions will increase the effectiveness 
of teaching tolerance, such as a school climate in which bullying is addressed and which “[…] 
encourages open discussion and inquiry”, (Vogt: 1997: 209). It is also important that the teacher 
makes the value explicit, and also salient by his or her behaviour. This might include praising those 
students who apply the value and punishing those who act against it (Pluymert 2010: 15).  
Tolerance can be taught through the regular curriculum or through intervention programs (Vogt 1997: 
105). Schools in the Netherlands may use both to implement CE. We now look more closely into an 
example of an intervention program aimed at increasing tolerance by reducing stigmatization. We 
chose this intervention program as our topic of interest, because a school which had implemented it, 
had received much media attention due to a successful turn from an intolerant to a tolerant and even 
accepting school climate. 
2.4.3.2. The ICA peer training program  
Two lobby groups in the Netherlands created an almost unlikely collaboration in order to reduce 
discrimination and prejudice through education. Alongside, several school organizations and anti-
discrimination foundations joined in. This so-called Intercultural Alliance (ICA) consists of:  
 CIDI (Centre for Information and Documentation Israel) which combats anti-semitism  
 COC (Centre for Leisure and Culture) which combats homophobia and supports homosexual, 
bisexual, lesbian, transsexual and transgender people in their emancipation 
 Several anti-discrimination organizations 
 The ISBO, the school organization for Islamic schools 
 De Besturenraad, an organization for Protestant-Christian schools 
 
The ICA develops trainings and projects in which several types of Vogt’s ways to increase tolerance 
are being used. One of the projects is a secondary school intervention program which uses peer 
training to educate an entire classroom or school. This peer training program receives funding from the 
Ministry of VWS (National Health, Wellbeing and Sports).  
In the peer training program, behavioural change is more important than attitude change (De Vlas, 
2010). After the intervention, students may still dislike homosexuals, Jews and/or Muslims, but they 
must become aware of their negative attitudes so they can prevent themselves from acting upon them. 
The aim of the project is to reduce stigmatization and discrimination by linking this social process to 
the Nazi concentration camps. 
The intervention consists of three phases. In the first phase, a selected group of approximately forty 
students takes a week trip to Poland. They visit the former Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz. In the 
proximity of the camp, they are trained to reflect upon processes of stigmatization, social exclusion 
and discrimination. In the second phase, the students return home and teach their fellow students what 
they have learned in five days training sessions. The third phase is a symposium on freedom and 
democracy, organized in association with the National Committee 4th and 5th of May (for the national 
Second World War commemoration).  
The ICA project, alongside other Dutch intervention programs, has shown to be effective in increasing 
tolerance (De Vlas, 2010) and acceptance. After taking part in the program, students of a Reformed 
secondary school said that they have learned to:  
- recognize intolerant thoughts 
- think before acting or talking 
- find information about, or approach and talk with a disliked person. 
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Through the training, students had changed their behaviour, but not necessarily their intolerant 
thoughts (De Vlas 2010: 53). In some cases, their beliefs had changed somewhat, leading to increased 
acceptance (ACCEPT II). If intolerance was related to faith, such as in ideas about homosexuality, 
there had been little increased acceptance, but there was increased minimal tolerance (ACCEPT I). For 
example, a student recalled when the preacher in her church mentioned “there are no faggots here”, 
she had objected to his choice of words in public and also questioned the absence of homosexual 
church members (De Vlas 2010: 50). 
2.4.3.3. Respect2All and teacher’s experiences 
In our description of the teachers' accounts, we also compare two schools. The first school we refer to 
as 'R2A', which is an abbreviation of Respect2All, the name of the intervention project of ICA which 
was implemented at the school. Two teachers (interview 2 and 3) are staff members of the R2A 
secondary school, which received some media attention. Initially, the school was in the news 
negatively, because of riots and violence between its students and groups of Turkish and Morroccan 
youth
105
. In a TV program
106
, some students of the schools were interviewed. They adhered to right-
wing extremist positions. One of the students showed a neo-nazi outfit, posters of Adolf Hitler in his 
bedroom and several books on Nazi warfare. He expressed himself as anti-Muslim and his political 
preference was PVV (although he stated that his exact preference was not represented in the 
Netherlands). The father of this young boy said he did not approve of his son's political views. The 
school director expressed his worries about the school climate. Later, the school received media 
coverage after the Respect2All project resulted in higher scores in anti-discrimination support among 
the school youth
107
. 
The second school is labelled ‘CTRL’ for ‘control’. The school serves as a comparison to the R2A 
school, as it has some similar features. These are: an open, Christian school identity, and a 
predominantly white school population of rural background, with intolerant views towards Muslims. 
The chosen policy for citizenship education at ‘CTRL’ is quite different. The teacher indicated with 
interview 5 is a staff member at the CTRL school.     
School population and identity 
The R2A school describes itself on its website as “wishing to offer youth from the age of 12 - with 
various life convictions and cultural backgrounds - a general and vocational personality development 
so they can find their place in society”. The website also states that the school “actively fights 
discrimination” and it has achieved the official status of ‘One’ school - a school where more than 70% 
of students and teachers are supportive of article One of the Dutch Constitution which addresses 
discrimination and equality. With this firm anti-discrimination statement and focus on personality 
development, the R2A school positions itself between an Identity-Autonomy and Critical-Democratic 
perspective.  
The CTRL school is referring to an Identity-Adaptive approach with traces of Critical-Democratic: 
they wish to let students become aware of who they are and what they can mean to others. “[CTRL] is 
a Christian school […]. Openness and respect for everyone' s convictions are central. We approach 
each other peacefully and fairly. Our education is shaped from a Biblical perspective. We see our 
school as a community in which there is room for everybody, regardless culture, religion or 
nationality”.  
                                                     
105  De Gelderlander January 18, 2008: “(Name school) schrikt van radicalisering” 
106  Premtime December 17, 2008 
107  De Gelderlander December 04, 2009 “Fraai eerherstel voor (name school)” and Trouw April 22, 2010: Students learn how 
to handle diversity” 
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The Inspectorate online reports of these schools do not mention CE in any way and simply state that 
both the school R2A and school CTRL have good results which justify a low-profile inspection.  
In descriptions from both R2A teachers and the CTRL teacher, their school was described as ‘white’. 
Teacher 2 (R2A) says that “the problem originates from the fact that we are not a multicultural school 
[…]. The students can develop these ideas in a certain direction because they do not get corrections 
from within their peer group. […]. [The school, IV/MM] is not representative for the current society 
anyway”. The school population's intolerant and prejudiced attitudes are described as having changed 
thoroughly due to several implemented intervention programs, of which the ICA program may have 
been crucial. Teacher 3 relates dealing with cultural diversity to CE: “we are a white school and if we 
don't do anything about it, I feel we don't prepare our students well to the society as it is right now.” 
Teacher 5 refers to his school as “open Christian”. There are some “specific problems”, because “you 
see very little allochtonous [students, IV/MM] in the school” and “parents are rather racist”. The 
reasons for a lack of allochtonous students is “we are a Christian school, it scares hem off” and the fact 
that “it is forbidden to wear headscarves in this school”. The “intolerance towards foreigners” he 
considers important issue which he should address in CE, although he also thinks that “its fighting 
against all odds”.  
There is considerable difference in the described severity of the problem with right-wing extremist 
youth between teachers of R2A and CTRL. Where teachers 2 and 3 of R2A stated the problem was 
very big and had to be addressed, the teacher 5 of CTRL says there is “quite a lot of intolerance, but 
not in an extreme way”. It is unclear whether this is related to teacher’s perceptions and evaluations, or 
actual differences between the two schools' populations. The R2A school however did have some 
problems with fights and riots, whereas similar reports have not been found about the CTRL school. 
When asked if there are any right-wing extremists in his school, teacher 5 indicates this is not the case. 
However, he reports very intolerant views of his students towards Muslims. The class was taken to the 
Parliament. Afterwards, “of course we voted here, but then every time PVV came out [as the biggest 
party, IV/MM] for classes 2, 3 and 4”. 
The school’s experiences with the ICA program  
The project of ICA called Respect 2 All was initiated because of the growing right-wing extremists in 
the R2A school. A teacher of Religious Education and Study of Society was the first one to notice: 
“When they have very right-wing ideas, and they are not at all open to the multicultural society […] 
well in Study of Society and Religious Education, this becomes very apparent in the classroom”[…]. 
The teacher thus initiated her own project to address these issues, but “it was not solved with a little 
film and classroom debate”. Soon “my colleagues became startled, they said: “this is so big […] we 
need help”. The teacher (2) went through lengths to find a project and appropriate funding to 
implement an intervention project aimed at reducing prejudice by awareness. “Students who come 
along are trained to become peer-trainer, so they can teach what they have learned to their fellow 
students”108. 
The developments in the R2A intervention project are told by teacher 2 in a very dramatic narrative. 
The impact of the project “completely reversed the situation here”, she says. First there were neo-nazi 
students with a large peer group of students who were attracted to their “coolness”, and intolerant 
views were part of the group’s identity. “It was ‘cool’ to have a bomber coat, flags, army boots, rolled 
up trousers, the whole shebang of signals that stated: I don't tolerate it, and they […] should all get 
out”. It was difficult to influence the students’ beliefs: “but Miss, we can discuss this, but this is my 
opinion, and my dad thinks so too and so does our neighbor and my uncle, I am not changing my view 
because you have some opinion.” Moreover, living in bad neighborhoods reinforced their negative 
stereotypes: “you see one Moroccan steal your bike in front of you, and another Moroccan breaks your 
neighbor’s windows […] it just gets into your system”.  
                                                     
108  Teacher 3, page 2 
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According to the teacher, “it was necessary that something was done to the terrible stereotypes and 
prejudice. And what we did was, provide the students with an intensive training of two weeks […]. As 
part of the training we took them to Auschwitz to show what happens if you systematically exclude 
people […] to such extent that you don't allow them to live anymore”. Students on the trip became 
“aware of the process of stigmatization and prejudice”. A girl who wore a bomber coat and who had a 
neo-nazi boyfriend, was “crying for days, and she said: ‘How could I be so wrong? How could I 
possibly think like that?’ […] She really turned 180 degrees.”  
As a result, “those students who had come along simply would not tolerate it anymore. The twenty we 
took with us, they would address these army boots simply!” The peer trainers  
“…showed films about Auschwitz and how terrible it was what they saw there, and 
everyone agreed, because what happened to the Jews is terrible.” The peer-educators then 
linked the Holocaust to stigmatization and prejudice in general: “But did the little Jewish 
boy do anything wrong? No, no of course not! And then they can slowly make the step 
towards “and Mohammed, is it his fault that Ishmael smashed your neighbor’s windows? 
[…] So they can understand that process, that not every Moroccan is a bike-stealer, or a 
window-smasher.”  
 
As a model of explanation, students introduced the “Pyramid of hatred” versus the “Pyramid of love 
and peace”. At the bottom of the Pyramid of hatred is placed ‘exclusion’, at the second level there is 
‘violence’ and the top level is ‘genocide’. Debates started in the classroom between the neo nazi 
students and their peer trainers: “You can't say: we must shoot all the Turks through their heads! Do 
you realize what you are saying?” 
Because the “most severe cases” left the school, and the intervention changed the style of debate in the 
classroom, “it was suddenly cool to have been there”. Many students had never travelled abroad and 
“it was very special to make the trip and Auschwitz is really an intriguing place for them.”  
Teacher 2 was “shocked with the large amount of influence you have” when you “take [students, IV] 
away from their natural environment and you start drilling them“. She noticed that “you bring them 
home completely changed”. 
Teacher 3 expresses this change with the fact that the school became a ‘One’ school, by signing they 
agreed with Article One of the Dutch constitution. Of students and teachers, 85% signed this 
document in the first year. The past year, however “One class didn’t want to sign because it was 
somehow cool not to participate”, but teachers managed to change some student’s minds, by relating 
the topic to bullying and whether they wanted protection from that or not.   
Contrarily, teacher 5 of the CTRL school tells a different story, in which possibilities for change of his 
students’ attitudes are scrutinized, due to the complexity of the problem and due to respect for the 
students' autonomy. Many of his comments express this: “We tried, but it did not catch on” and “what 
you notice is that it is very difficult to tackle” or “it is fighting against the odds”. He recalls talking 
with an expert on the topic of prejudice, and the expert confirmed these views: “it is basically 
impossible […] you can barely address it”. Teacher 5 frames the students' attitudes more in terms of 
what they are then in how they behave: “they are white, average farmers […] and what they don’t 
know, they will not accept”.  
Also, he believes the situation is “rather complex” and it is difficult to find a solution. One of the 
difficulties is that the views students express the opinions they have heard from their parents: “you just 
hear the parents speak […] they take it all from home”. He finds some space to “break through that” 
and “expand their life view” by debates. He thinks that he should not oppose the views of the students 
too much, because “they are allowed to have their own views […] are allowed to think for themselves 
and have any opinion actually”. The only thing he can do is “provide them with knowledge so they 
have a better foundation for their opinions” and “know there are other parties besides PVV”. However, 
when he is informed throughout the interview about the R2A project at the other school, he is 
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interested to find out more. He asks for more information, he says he will look into websites and also 
expresses his enthusiasm: “this sounds nice”, and “this rather helps me”.  
Practical issues related to implementation of CE 
At R2A, both teachers are very committed to changing prejudice and increasing tolerance. But for 
them, the ICA project was related to CE only afterwards. “I do things which may be categorized as CE 
but more because of the issues, because we needed it here“, said teacher 2. “As a school you say, okay, 
what do we do, and how can we assign it, and then we simply put it in that box and you say: we are 
doing well [with CE, IV/MM]”.  
At CTRL, the teacher is more blunt. When asked about CE, he says: “We actually don't do that“. He 
“wondered why” he “never heard anything about what he should do”. The only thing he heard was that 
there “is a leaflet about it somewhere, I believe. It was thrown in a box, but…” When asked if the 
Inspectorate has already checked them for CE, he says he does not know. Yet, the school partakes in 
several projects which could be “labeled under CE if you like”. He summarizes this and says, “I would 
say we are inclined not to do it, but when the Inspectorate comes, we do have some story to tell, you 
understand?” The projects he mentions are: visiting Mosques and Hindu temples, debate, student 
parliament, student elections, and a European exchange program with three other schools. The reasons 
why CE at the CTRL-school has not been implemented at a structural level can thus be summarized 
as: a lack of information and knowledge about CE by the teacher, a lack of urgency expressed from 
the school leaders and no known Inspectorate checks of the school on this issue.  
The continuation of projects such as Respect 2 All is not safeguarded, according to teachers 2 and 3. 
One problem was that “you only have a limited amount of money and a limited amount of hours to 
divide, and limited amount of teachers, so somewhere something has to be taken off”. Teacher 2 also 
added that her teaching hours are currently being cut, due to “a lot of emphasis on language and 
math”. Moreover, it had been very difficult to find the ICA project. “I had to move heaven and earth to 
find the place to go to”. She turned to contacts of her previous job at the government and her contact 
person said, “Í believe most of these projects are no longer funded”. Despite the official governmental 
concern for extremist developments in schools, she had to “search like a maniac for funding”. She 
feels that there should be easier access to information and funding if schools have a serious problem. 
2.4.4. Conclusion 
Despite the Dutch Government’s attempt to install assimilationist values in CE, the experiences from 
teachers and experts in our research suggest that these values barely influence the actual curriculum 
and classroom practice. The reasons are both ideological and practical.  
Ideologically, the Identity-Adaptive approach which is dominant in the political discourse related to 
the law for CE is not carried out at the lower levels of implementation. Educational experts involved 
with creating practical frame-works for schools, as well as NGOs who create programs, often work 
from a Critical-Democratic perspective and are opposing the Identity-Adaptive ideals. Thus, while the 
government may envision CE to increase integration of ill-adapted Muslim youth into “Dutch norms 
and values“, school programs may instead try to reduce the negative stereotype regarding Islam and 
reduce prejudice among the 'white' youth. Researchers and experts involved with implementation are 
actively bending the policy in this direction. 
On the practical side, another reason for the assimilationist approach not setting foot in the classroom 
is that CE gets little priority. There is no money or time available, it has no book or method, and most 
of it is left to the schools. Schools develop incoherent, patch-work curricula that suffice for 
Inspectorate checks and then leave it to the individual teacher. The Inspectorate's checks are sporadic 
and only focus on paper work, not on practices or results. The individual teacher may thus approach 
Citizenship from his or her own ideological perspective, awareness and creativity.   
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Due to teachers’ lack of knowledge about the possibilities of CE, and financial and agenda-related 
constraints, the implementation still is stagnating. However, the framework of CE does provide 
possibilities to address problems which may occur in the school population, regarding intolerance or 
lack of accepting diversity. The project Respect2All which we described was carried out as a part of 
the school’s obligation to offer CE. It increased social awareness and reduced prejudice and the 
tendency to discriminate, among a predominantly lower-class, white school population. The freedom 
of education thus creates opportunities to teach tolerance, because it allows for deviation from the 
dominant political ideology.  
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this conclusion we first return to the conceptual framework of our project. Tolerance is usually 
defined as “putting up with something one disagrees with” (Forst 2000). It requires the ability (power) 
to do something against it, but deciding not to act upon it in order to avoid conflict or other negative 
outcomes (Vogt 1997). Current research suggests there is a decline of tolerance in Europe. The main 
target of this growing intolerance are (migrant) communities categorized as Muslims. It is being 
argued that in European societies “there has been too much leniency, too much accommodation and 
too little insistence on shared values.” (Dobbernack and Modood 2011: 8). However, as the Dutch case 
studies demonstrate, the search for shared liberal-secular values makes it more difficult for all 
orthodox religious groups (Christian ones amongst them) to live their lives and operate their 
institutions and organizations according to their interpretation of the Scriptures. 
Decreasing tolerance for orthodox Christian and Islamic groups 
Despite the fact that both Muslim schools and Reformed schools are a very small minority in the 
Dutch educational system, they continue to draw negative attention in the media and politics. Even 
though there is little political support to abolish the dual system in which governmental and non-
governmental schools are funded equally, there is wider support for the idea that religious schools 
should be controlled more intensely by creating laws to ensure liberal norms in all schools, for 
example by compulsory acceptance of all teachers and students who wish to be part of the school - 
regardless their religious background or sexual orientation.  
The principals of Reformed and Islamic schools that we interviewed expressed a concern about 
existing stereotypes and misconceptions about their schools. On a local level, principals of Islamic 
schools and to a lesser extent, principals of Reformed schools say they experience indirect forms of 
obstruction as well as threats. Nevertheless, there are also important differences with respect to the 
negative views of these schools. Islamic schools are more often perceived as outsiders and they are 
often not seen as Dutch schools, whereas Reformed schools are associated with the Dutch “in-group”. 
The Dutch Reformed are seen as a small group which has an established, though exceptional, position 
in Dutch society. Incidents at Reformed schools are often framed as a result of conservatism and are 
met with shrugging of shoulders, such as when Reformed school girls were turning to the municipality 
because they were not allowed to wear trousers on their bicycle ride to school in the freezing cold.
109
 
Muslims, by contrast, are perceived as an out-group in terms of ethnicity, nationality and religion and 
are continually scrutinized regarding their level of integration. Islamic schools are called upon to do 
their best to prepare children for “Dutch society” and in the case of Muslim immigrants orthodoxy is 
commonly seen as a sign of non-integration. 
In the light of these diverging views of both schools we found interesting differences between 
conceptions of tolerance and recognition among Reformed and Islamic school principals. Principals of 
Reformed schools wanted their schools to be positively recognized as a part of Dutch society and 
                                                     
109 “Verplicht koude benen” NOS Headlines January 9 2009,. 
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objected to the image of their schools as “abnormal” or “isolationist”. However, the concept of 
tolerance also plays an important role for the way the Reformed view their position in Dutch society. 
Even though the majority may disapprove of the ideas and ways of living of the Reformed, they feel 
they have a right to exist and not to be discriminated against. To them tolerance means they should 
have the opportunity to live according to their convictions and rules, also in the domain of education. 
For Islamic schools this appears to be different. Muslims are not (yet) an established religious minority 
and are still fighting for the right to be seen as normal and Dutch (i.e. not “foreign”). At Islamic 
schools the management seems to be primarily concerned with improving the performance of the 
school, both in terms of teaching and in terms of management. 
 The debate about Reformed and Islamic schools deals with defining whether some of their practices 
and regulations are beyond what is tolerable in a liberal-democratic society. The most sensitive issue 
in this respect is when these schools select pupils or staff in such a way that they violate norms of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination. Some Reformed schools want to be able to refuse teachers 
because of their sexual orientation, because of their civil status (e.g. being divorced) or because of 
their religion. There is less and less understanding for religious schools discriminating in this way, 
first, because they are faith-based organizations that employ regular personnel (i.e. teachers) and not 
core religious organizations (such as churches) that employ religious personnel, second, because they 
are publicly financed, and, third, because as educational institutions they should exemplify, not 
violate, key legal norms, such as non-discrimination. More complex is the discussion about whether a 
religious school can demand that teachers “subscribe” to the religious identity of the school, agree to 
execute the school’s teaching program (also if it goes against their own views) and refrain from 
expressing aspects of their own identity or ideas (e.g. with regard to sexuality or religion) and 
discussing these with the students. The principals of Reformed schools we interviewed often expressed 
the fear that this imposition of secular-liberal norms runs the risk of reducing the associational 
freedoms of schools. For them, a school has a fundamental right not to accept certain people and 
practices in its midst, if they violate norms and values that are in their view constitutive of their 
religious community. “Tolerance” remains an important trope for these groups because they argue that 
the fact they deviate strongly from some of the mainstream norms still obliges that majority to tolerate 
them, even if it is with “gritted teeth” (Bader 2007). 
Teaching citizenship and conceptions of tolerance 
In the Netherlands the general and increasing insistence on defending “shared values” has been 
associated strongly with a call for citizenship education. Citizenship education should help install 
liberal-democratic values in children and teach them about the norms enshrined in the Dutch 
constitution and in mainstream, so-called liberal-secular society. To analyze different perspective on 
citizenship and citizenship education we made use of a typology distinguishing between  
1. an adaptive approach (that focuses on teaching “the” shared values of a society),  
2. an approach emphasizing the development of autonomous citizens (that focuses on 
teaching independent judgement and autonomy) and  
3. a critical democratic approach (that focuses on teaching critical reflection and social 
awareness).  
 
Building on this typology the case study showed that whereas the “adaptive approach” and the 
presumed need to teach about Dutch cultural values and Dutch history, was important in putting 
citizenship education on the political agenda, it was quickly diverted in the policy process. 
Researchers and experts involved with the implementation actively are bending citizenship education 
in the direction of trying to increase debate, critical thinking and reducing prejudice, far more than 
aiming to teach “Dutch norms and values”. The experts we interviewed underlined that in order for 
citizenship education to be successful in increasing social coherence, schools should not just teach 
tolerance but they should practice tolerance and clearly focus on non-discrimination. They also 
stressed that the implementation of European curriculum requirements with regard to Human Rights 
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Education as well as Anti-Racist Education must become effective as soon as possible. This most 
urgently is needed for the lower-class “white” pupils, as international and national research shows a 
decline in civic competencies and knowledge among this Dutch group in particular.  
Another main finding from our study into the implementation of citizenship education in the 
Netherlands in relation to efforts to teach tolerance, is that citizenship education gets little priority and 
that there is a lack of money and time available. Schools develop patch-work curricula that suffice for 
Inspectorate checks and the individual teacher may approach citizenship teaching from his or her own 
perspective and creativity. On the more positive side, the framework of citizenship education and the 
obligation to “do something” provides opportunities to address problems that may occur in schools 
regarding intolerance or a lack of acceptance of diversity. The project Respect2All that we analyzed 
was an example of good practice and helped to increase awareness and reduce prejudice. Finally, we 
have observed that the freedom of education and the autonomy of schools to decide on their 
curriculum hinder a stricter top-down implementation of a curriculum for citizenship education. 
Educational goals and requirements remain vague also in order to allow schools to decide themselves 
on what exactly they want to teach. 
Embodiment of tolerance in everyday school practice 
Our case studies have shown that in order to present everyday forms of embodiment of tolerance in 
discourses and practices in Dutch schools we need to go beyond the sometimes alarmist tone of public 
debate. In our interviews, we found school principals who are able to negotiate between educational 
goals, religious dogma and more pragmatic concerns. In a context of increased public scrutiny 
religious schools navigate between more strict and more liberal interpretations of religious identity and 
its relationship with school policy. Examples are discussions between school management, school 
boards, teachers and parents about the content of religious education, about dress codes, acceptance of 
homosexual teachers and pupils and teaching about sexuality. 
The same can be said of citizenship education. The call in the political debate for more morality, more 
respect in schools and better integration into Dutch norms is not met with necessary funding or 
educational demands, and thus seems to be mere lip service. Educational reformers and researchers 
who criticize the lack of governmental guidelines fail to see how it enables them to implement a 
different, more critical-democratic type of citizenship education.  
In both cases, the Dutch Freedom of Education and notably Article 23 create a considerable amount of 
autonomy for schools to create and redefine boundaries of tolerance. On a school level, associational 
autonomy becomes contested when it leads to discriminatory practices. On the level of the classroom, 
the autonomy of students is taken into account and some teachers doubt to what extent they are 
allowed to scrutinize the political views of their students, or influence their attitudes. 
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Chapter 3  – Contested Policies of exclusion in the Netherlands.  
The lamentable asylum cases of Sahar and Mauro 
Inge Versteegt and Marcel Maussen 
3.1. Introduction 
3.1.1. Policies of exclusion, asylum and tolerance in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands is among the European countries where the decrease of tolerance for immigrant 
communities and the so-called “backlash against multiculturalism” has been most dramatic. A major 
component of declining support for cultural diversity is the demand to restrict immigration. Most EU 
countries are trying to make their immigration policies more severe and immigration and asylum are 
increasingly dealt with at the EU level.
110
  
A large percentage of Dutch voters believe that immigration should be curbed to a minimum and that 
asylum policy should be very strict.
111
 But there is also protest. There is critique of the unjust and 
unfair treatment of asylum seekers at any stage of their asylum application and against the treatment of 
rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Some protest is primarily focussed around the 
dramatic case of individuals who are at risk to be expelled or who’s asylum request is rejected. This 
type of protest usually receives a lot of media attention and it involves emotional outcry in which 
friends and family of the person in question appear on national television. Two of such “lamentable 
cases” (schrijnende gevallen) resulted in major public debates in 2010 and 2011: the Afghan girl Sahar 
and a boy from Angola, Mauro. Whereas Sahar got a residence permit along with 400 other Afghan 
girls, because she had become too “westernized”, Mauro’s claim to remain with his Dutch foster 
family was rejected, but he was allowed to request a student visa.  
This report presents the outcomes of a research that was aimed at finding the arguments and ideas 
behind socio-political mobilization against Dutch asylum policy, and whether and how these forms of 
mobilization affect the execution of policies of exclusion and citizenship in the Netherlands.  
3.1.2.  Contesting asylum policy in the Netherlands:  
national discourses on (in)tolerance and its limits 
Historically the Dutch have often imagined themselves as a nation that offered a safe haven for 
religious and political refugees. There was a clear linkage between narratives about Dutch tolerance 
for religious differences inside the Netherlands and an openness towards foreigners who were 
persecuted for their faith and beliefs or who were fleeing violence. The Dutch branch of Amnesty 
International speaks of the role of the Netherlands as a “guiding nation” (gidsland) in this respect. 
However, as one can read on Amnesty’s website, over the past two decades this image has changed. 
The fact that the Netherlands has been accused of violating human rights in the treatment of refugees 
has damaged the self-image as one of the most tolerant nations in Europe.
112
 Secondly, ideas on 
tolerance and immigration and asylum policies are linked to the concept of “pragmatic toleration”. 
Pragmatic toleration or “condoning” (gedogen) refers to the declaration in advance that under specific 
                                                     
110  Notably of course since the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008). See the yearly reports of the European 
Migration Network (EMN). 
111 See opinion polls in SCP 2009: 257-258. 
112 See “Is Nederlands gidsland in de mensenrechten?” Amnesty International, Dowloaded February 20 2012. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.nl/mensenrechten/encyclopedie/nederland-mensenrechtenbeleid. 
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circumstances offenders against a particular legal norm do not need to fear punishment.
113
 In the 
context of the governance of immigration the critique of condoning has focused on leniency with 
regard to legal requirements for immigration and asylum, and with the way undocumented migrants 
were allowed to stay and work in the Netherlands. An opinion poll held in 2005 showed that the most 
vigorously condemned form of condoning was when “illegal stay in the Netherlands” was allowed 
(Mascini and Houtman 2011: 15).
114
  
Changes in Dutch asylum policy over the past ten years are thus directly related to debates on 
tolerance. Now that the effects and outcomes of stricter asylum policy are becoming visible, old and 
new voices of protest develop.
 115
 Eviction of rejected asylum seekers remains difficult and a growing 
number of rejected asylum seekers become undocumented residents. Local authorities find ways to 
divert or obstruct national policy-guidelines and civic associations support asylum seekers who are 
confronted with situations that violate basic rights, notably of children.  
3.1.3. Political challenges and tolerance: 
relevance for the framework of ACCEPT-pluralism
116
  
The fourth work package of ACCEPT-pluralism investigates the importance of tolerance in relation to 
political participation and representation of minorities. In the case of asylum seekers, the difference 
and boundaries between minorities and the receiving society primarily concern residence status and 
not cultural, religious or ethnic practices. Yet, a racial, religious and ethnic dimension is obviously 
present around this issue, since asylum seekers generally originate from Asia and Africa, and because 
the asylum procedure has become one of the few options for migrants outside the EU to enter the 
Netherlands. One of the main aims of the asylum procedure is to distinguish between those migrants 
who may enter (and who should be accepted) and those who may not. The Dutch case is illustrative of 
two seemingly contradictory emotions with regard to foreigners: there is an increased “intolerance” by 
the Dutch state and society for illegal residence, but there is also increased concern about individual 
stalled asylum cases, and a plea for acceptance and granting residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds. This may well be illustrative of the way tolerance can involve a “perceptual shift” when the 
reasons for not tolerating a person are overridden by his or her humanity (Dobbernack and Modood 
2011: 13). The formal non-toleration of those who have no legal rights to live in the country, becomes 
toleration or even acceptance, when the humanity of individuals becomes the ground for judgement.  
The recent contestations around the eviction of rejected asylum seekers have also taken up new 
dimensions related to cultural differences. The so-called argument of “rootedness”, meaning that it is 
wrong to evict a person who is well integrated in Dutch society, has affinity with ideas about cultural 
citizenship, i.e. the idea that cultural assimilation is a requirement for full inclusion in a liberal state 
(Duyvendak 2011). In addition, debates on asylum policy bring to light a hidden tension in the 
discourses of liberalism. According to many protesters, human rights experts and NGOs, Dutch 
authorities and Dutch asylum practice are violating basic norms of decency and international human 
rights standards. It appears that in this context the politics of “liberal intolerance” are backfiring, 
because now the state itself stands accused as responsible for ways of doing that are “intolerable” in a 
liberal-democratic society.  
                                                     
113 The concept “condoning” is not unique to the Dutch situation, it also exists as a legal concept or guideline in Germany 
(“behördliche Duldung”), England (“cautioning and forbearance”) and France (“sans suite” and “main courante”). 
However, as Mascini and Houtman observe, the Netherlands is unique in that “condoning” has acquired a formal standing 
in policy guidelines (2011: 7). 
114 Significantly, a press release of the Ministry of Immigration and Asylum on a proposal to make illegal stay in the 
Netherlands a crime was entitled “The government ends the condoning of illegality”. July 8 2011. 
115  In 2003 Human Rights Watch condemned the Netherlands for violating the basic human rights of asylum seekers and 
immigrants. Recently, Amnesty International has raised concern about aspects of Dutch asylum policy (2010, 2011). 
116 We decided not to include a section on the political participation of migrants, as this is unrelated to our topic. 
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There are important political dimensions to this case study. Asylum policy is among the most intensely 
debated issues in Dutch politics. Organized political mobilization by (rejected) asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants themselves is rare, for the obvious reason that they have little opportunities.
117
 
Still, there is indirect political representation of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants via 
NGOs, individual citizens, individual MPs and political parties.  
Many studies report on the practical and legal obstacles in implementing strict policies of border 
control, expulsion and exclusion from facilities. Less well studied are the ways social and political 
mobilization, active resistance and protest shape policy execution and trigger policy change in this 
domain (e.g . Alink 2006, Gibney 2008, Tazreiter 2010). We can think of acts of civil and 
administrative “disobedience” by citizens, individual civil servants and local administrations.118 In 
view of identifying the ways in which contestation around the eviction of rejected asylum seekers is of 
direct relevance for debates on tolerance in the political domain we have decided to focus on two 
aspects. On the one hand, we will analyse the different actors, organizations and action repertoires that 
constitute public protest and contestation against the (execution of) Dutch asylum policy. On the other 
hand, we are interested in the discursive framing of individual “lamentable cases” and the 
consequences of Dutch asylum and expulsion policy, especially in relation to the type of arguments 
and justifications that are being developed to contest existing policy practices. The way this issue is 
debated will clarify “tolerance” and “respect” claims, as well as the claim of a decline of tolerance in 
the Netherlands.  
We will analyse the way the “lamentable cases” of Sahar and Mauro were framed in the media and 
how they were used to problematize Dutch asylum policy (cf. also Van Gorp 2005). The sometimes 
contradictory nature of the argumentations is interesting in itself because it may reveal diverging 
policy goals, contrasting moral intuitions and conflicts among moral, prudential and realistic 
considerations (Bader and Engelen 2003). Another theoretical viewpoint that is relevant for our 
research is that developed by Loic Wacquant (2009). He describes two possible ways in which states 
may deal with the poor and marginalized (throughout history often migrants). These are: poor relief or 
social welfare and penalization. These strategies are continuously balanced in state policy, for which 
Wacquant refers to Bourdieu’s “two hands of the state”. The left hand is dealing with marginalization 
from a poor relief point of view, using education, medical treatment and better opportunities as 
solutions. The right hand uses disciplinary measures, prisons and fines to control and confine the poor. 
The strategy of penalization assumes that the poor are a threat to society, whereas social welfare 
strategy assumes the poor are themselves in need of protection. We take his two opposing ways to 
handle marginalization as a starting point for our analysis of the Dutch asylum debates.  
3.1.4. Research question 
 We wish to examine the general procedures and policies for rejected asylum seekers, and investigate 
what happens when protest against this policy is being mobilized, becomes mediatized and politicized. 
Our main research question is:  
How do different actors resist (aspects of) the execution of asylum policy, what argumentations do 
they articulate in relation to concepts such as tolerance and respect? 
                                                     
117 However, while we are writing this report, a protest of rejected Iraqi and Somali asylum seekers in Ter Apel, Groningen, 
who refuse to disappear into illegality and request continued shelter, is taking place. 
118 See Doomernik 2008: 135. 
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3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Discourse analysis and case studies 
Our research question leads us to search for information about actors, procedures (policy) and about 
moral reasoning. Since we wished to approach the issue of contesting the policy for rejected asylum 
seekers from a combination of social and political studies, the choice for discourse analysis became 
obvious. Through discourse analysis, it is possible to analyse and connect the way people think, speak, 
and act regarding asylum policy, thus deconstructing the (political) debate, as well as the policy.  
As we embarked upon the study, the headlines of Dutch newspapers frequently mentioned the name 
Sahar, and as we proceeded, that of Mauro (starting September 2011). These were two young end-of-
line asylum seekers who were to be expelled, and whose lamentable situation became the centre of a 
public and political debate. Through discourse analysis of the debate surrounding their cases, as well 
as the different steps which led to the outcome of their procedure, we hope to give insight not just into 
reasons to contest Dutch asylum policy, but more importantly, the effects of such contestation on 
policy. 
3.2.2. Range of information recourses 
For this study, we used deskwork as well as qualitative interviews. The statistics on admission, 
rejection and effective expulsion of asylum seekers between the year 2000 and 2011 were gathered. 
We then analysed the relevant political debates. In the written media, we analysed main national 
newspapers (de Telegraaf, de Volkskrant, NRC-Handelsblad and Trouw) and opinion magazines 
(notably Elsevier). The search topics were: (rejected) asylum seekers, lamentable case, expulsion, 
detention, emergency shelter, Sahar, and Mauro. In order to describe contestation, we searched 
websites of NGOs, their online published reports, citizens’ online petitions and social media protests, 
and local newspapers.  
3.2.3. Interviews 
For our group of respondents we selected people who could inform us about the practicalities and 
dilemmas in the policies for end-of-line asylum seekers, as well as possibilities to protest or obstruct 
the policies. We thus approached experts on asylum, policy makers and local politicians, 
representatives of NGOs and people who had supported Mauro or Sahar. While we conducted the 
interviews, we found that several respondents had more than one function. One of the politicians is 
also an expert on migration and holds a job at a university. Many respondents had been previously 
working as a volunteer for Vluchtelingenwerk (Refugee Council). Our sample included experts on 
migration, an official of the Dutch Immigration Service (IND), as well as politicians. Most 
respondents reported to have participated in signing petitions for individual cases or having joined 
protests. 
The variety of respondents led us to create different topic lists for every respondent. A combined list 
of all possible topics can be found in the annex.  
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3.3. Analysis of the political challenge 
3.3.1. Dutch asylum policy: reception, exclusion and expulsion 
The following section analyses policies for (rejected) asylum seekers from 2000 to 2011. In this 
chronological depiction, three main themes emerge: (1) restrictions on immigration, (2) reduced 
facilities for irregular migrants, and (3) increased attempts to expulse unwanted migrants.
119
  
1990-2000  
Prior to the 1990s the number of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants was relatively small, 
(Doomernik 2008: 129). A rising number of asylum requests from former Yugoslavia resulted in 
processing delays between 1991 and 1995.  In 1996 two new national institutions were 
created to coordinate asylum reception centrally: the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers (COA, Centrale Opvang Asielzoekers) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND, 
Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst). The number of illegal residents in the Netherlands in those years 
was estimated between 50,000- 100,000 persons (CBS, 1999). In 1998 the so-called 
Linkage Act (Koppelingswet) came into effect. Its aim was to discourage illegal work and residence. 
Illegal migrants were excluded from social services and work, by linking residence status to a social-
fiscal number required for work, housing and taxes. An exception was made for medical emergencies 
and schooling for children.  
2000-2006: New Aliens Act  
In 2000 a new law was created to shorten the procedure and reduce the costs of repatriation. The New 
Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) had important consequences for rejected asylum seekers. 
Governmental support and shelter were ended for all refused asylum seekers. An exception was 
possible only if the asylum seeker could prove that he or she could not return. If an asylum seeker 
failed to report to the Alien Service during the procedure, or went missing, the migrant would become 
“persona non grata”. This became punishable with six months in prison. Preventive detention was 
introduced, meaning that immigrants who could be sent back to the country of origin (i.e. when a 
“laissez passer” was given120) could be detained for a maximum of four weeks. 
 In 2001, the Netherlands reached the lowest figure of all European states in acceptance of asylum 
seekers.
121
 The influx of asylum seekers decreased from 44.000 in the year 2000 to 9,900 in 2004 
(Donkerlo 2007). In 2002, 2,200 asylum seekers were granted a “pardon” and the numbers of refused 
asylum seekers residing illegally in the Netherlands were estimated between 10,000 and 40,000 (CBS 
2002).  
However, on the local level the effects of this policy of exclusion were cushioned. As Pluymen (2008: 
326) argues: “The local level felt the need to compensate for (…) [the] “void” which was created by 
excluding destitute migrants who were unable to return to their country of origin from housing and 
public services. Municipalities thus financially supported or even created foundations which would in 
turn offer shelter or support” (our translation IV/MM). In 2002, 40 municipalities wrote a letter to 
Secretary of State Van Kalsbeek (PvdA) that they would no longer execute the policy which stipulated 
that rejected asylum seekers must be evicted by the police from the COA facilities and left without 
accommodation. The letter was an example of increased collisions between government and 
municipalities. The National Board of Municipalities for Shelter (LOGO, Landelijk Overleg 
                                                     
119 The policies directed at (rejected) asylum seekers thus relate to several policy fields: immigration, justice, public health, 
safety, social welfare, education, medical care, and foreign policy. 
120 Laissez-passer (literally: “let go”) is a document that allows passage into another country, for example when a passport is 
missing. 
121 For tables, we refer to the annex. 
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Gemeentebesturen Opvang en Terugkeerbeleid) also sent a report in 2005 to alert the Minister 
regarding the situation of approximately 4,000 unaccompanied minors.
122
  
According to the new government, that came into power in 2003, the answer to these issues was to be 
found in more perseverance in attempts to expulse rejected asylum seekers. Minister Verdonk (“Iron 
Rita” from the liberal party VVD) announced a new policy aiming to remove 26,000 rejected asylum 
seekers. The so-called project “Return” should increase the return migration of undocumented 
migrants.  
In June 2006, the results of Verdonks attempts to clear 26,000 old files were made public. A large 
percentage of the formerly rejected asylum seekers (44%) had been entitled to asylum while their file 
was re-evaluated. Only 714 persons received a permit due to “lamentability” (schrijnendheid). 3000 
people had left the country independently, 1000 were forcefully expulsed and 6400 disappeared into 
illegality, where they could no longer apply for government assistance and risked detention. 
Meanwhile, more measures to fight illegal residence became effective. In 2005, it became compulsory 
for all persons over age thirteen to carry identification at all times. Together with the Linkage Act of 
1998, this new obligation became a powerful tool of the (Aliens) police to detect undocumented 
migrants, and also to detain them, either to keep them off the street or to ensure their expulsion. 
While the policy became stricter, two incidents related to the asylum issue sparked public debate, and 
these debates created opportunities for opponents to criticize and question the policy. The first case 
involved rejected asylum seekers who were sent back to Congo in 2005, along with documents in 
which personal information about their asylum request was made available to the Congolese secret 
service (which was in charge of border control). This caused political and media uproar, in which 
Verdonk was accused of “endangering the lives of rejected asylum seekers”.123 The second case was 
more dramatic, because in October 2005 a fire at the Return Centre of Schiphol airport in Amsterdam 
killed eleven undocumented migrants awaiting expulsion and injured many more. When information 
became known about the lack of safety in the building and the unwillingness of guards to open the cell 
doors, thus leaving the inmates trapped, this led to political and public protest. After an investigation 
by the Onderzoeksraad voor de Veiligheid, both the Minister of Justice (Donner, CDA) and the 
Minister of Housing (Dekker, VVD) resigned from office.  
Following the growing public concern about the situation and treatment of asylum seekers, local 
aldermen and mayors of the Green Left party (GroenLinks) published a manifesto in September 2006 
entitled “Don’t make refugees homeless”.124 The 40 signatories expressed the intention to continue 
offering shelter and support for undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. In 2006, on the 
4th of November, 5000 people joined in a manifestation for refugees and in favour of a national 
pardon. In November that year, the liberal VVD, the party of Minister Verdonk, lost a great number of 
votes during the parliamentary elections and the social-democrat PvdA would enter the new 
government. 
2007-2010: General Pardon and Administrative Agreement 
The newly formed Centre-Left Government
125
 announced a “one-off pardon” for aliens who had 
arrived in the Netherlands before the new Aliens Act (before 1st Of April 2001) and who had not 
received citizenship status. Illegal residents could also apply (Donkerlo 2007). Eventually, 28,000 
people received a residence permit. However, there was also a “quid pro quo” attached to the pardon. 
A so-called “Administrative Agreement” (Bestuursakkoord) was signed between the Secretary of 
                                                     
122 Regiostat on behalf of LOGO-Gemeenten (2005). 
123 A special commission that investigated the matter concluded that mistakes had been made (Rapport Havermans, December 
2005). NOS: Verdonk erkent slordigheden Congo. [Verdonk admits administrative errors Congo], December 9 2005. 
124 “Maak van Vluchtellingen geen daklozen” Manifest GroenLinks burgemeesters en wethouders, September 6 2006. 
125 A coalition of two Christian Parties and the Social Democrats: CDA-PvdA-ChristenUnie. 
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State, Mrs. Albayrak (PvdA), and the municipalities.
126
 The Government agreed to grant the Pardon on 
the condition that municipalities no longer offer shelter or social services to rejected asylum seekers 
and undocumented migrants (Donkerlo 2007). The government in turn would ensure an ”adequate” 
return policy. In order to improve the return policy, a new organisation was established: the Return 
and Departure Service, (DT&V, Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek) that combined expertise from COA, 
IND, alien police and the IOM (Doomernik 2008: 3). Rejected aliens would reside in a removal centre 
until expulsion. The established budget for removal centres in 2008 was over 53 million euro. In the 
years after the Pardon, attempts to curb influx of migrants into the Netherlands continued.  
The current asylum policy debate focuses on admission and what to do with illegal residents, some of 
whom are rejected asylum seekers. The latter debate involves measures such as legalization, shelter, 
detention and expulsion. There is debate about whether or not to create special measures for 
children.
127
 Protests continue to be voiced and sometimes they result in policy adaptations. For 
example, after objections by Human Rights Watch, the Refugee Council and the UNHCR
128
, a change 
of the asylum procedure became effective on the 1st of July 2010. The infamous 48-hour procedure 
(5-6 days) was changed into 8 days, including a period of rest previous to the start of the procedure 
(two weeks).
129
  
Meanwhile, detention has become one of the more commonly used measures to keep undocumented 
migrants off the streets (Amnesty International 2010). In total, six alien detention centres hold 
approximately 10,000 irregular migrants per year (Van Kalmthout 2007). On average, less than 40% 
of the detained migrants is effectively expulsed annually (Doomernik 2008; see also DT&V 2010). 
Special attention is currently drawn to the situation of children. In 2009, the European Committee of 
Social Rights ruled that the Netherlands should offer housing to all (illegally residing) children 
including their parents. This was the result of a complaint lodged on 14 January 2008 by Defence for 
Children International against the Netherlands. The Minister however did not consider himself bound 
by this decision, but in 2010 a Court in The Hague came to the same recommendation.
130
 Two astute 
family locations were opened
131, but the Minister appealed the court’s decision. In 2011 the Dutch 
Central Council of Appeal
132
 rejected the Minister’s appeal by referring to the European Convention 
on the Exercise of Children’s Rights as well as the European Return Notice.133  
In April 2010, two members of Parliament Spekman (PvdA) and Anker (CU) filed a motion which 
became known as the “motion of rootedness” (wortelingsmotie). The motion refers to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) that obliges states to guarantee children’s right to 
education, housing, and medical care. It demands that a residence permit will be granted to rejected 
asylum seekers’ children who have lived in the Netherlands over eight years, if the government is 
partly to blame for their prolonged stay and if for at least two years of their residence in the 
Netherlands the migrants had been staying legally (with some kind of -temporary- residence permit). 
The motion was accepted by Parliament, but Minister at the time, Mr. Hirsch Ballin (CDA) refused to 
execute it. According to him, the motion was very similar to an amendment to the Aliens law which 
                                                     
126 Represented by the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, VNG. 
127 Spekman Initiative Law “Always Shelter for Children” 32566. 
128 Human Rights Watch (2003) Vluchtelingen Werk Nederland (2010). Letter to members of sedentary chamber commission 
of Justice of the Senate about change of Alien Act. VW2000 Schriftelijk onderzoek d.d. 9 februari 2010 inzake Wijziging 
Vreemdelingenwet 31 994. Amsterdam, februari 4 2010;  
UNHCR (2003). Implementation of the Aliens Act 2000: UNHCR's Observations and Recommendations. July 2003. 
129  Letter of Minister of immigration and asylum, to the chair of the Senate, October 17 2011. 
130  Gerechtshof Den Haag, 200.063.511/01, January 11 2011. Verboden een uitgeprocedeerd gezin op straat te zetten. 
131  In Katwijk and Gilze-Rijen 
132  Centrale Raad van Beroep, May 30 2011 
133  European Return Notice, 2008: 115 EG 
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had been rejected earlier by the parliament. One reason to reject the amendment was that parents 
would be tempted to live in illegality in order to get a residence permit through their child.
134
  
The new government’s agreement of 2010 of the minority cabinet of VVD and CDA (that was 
condoned by the populist PVV), made plans to abolish all “categorical protection” in asylum 
admission policy.
135
 A strict stance on asylum policy became a litmus test to see whether the 
government was willing to do the maximum to reduce immigration. A new law passed the Senate that 
made illegal residence a criminal offense, which implies that illegal residence itself - not just the 
possibility of eviction- may lead to fines and, if these cannot be paid, to detention. The latest 
development in asylum policy debate is the possibility to create a Pardon for Children, with ideas 
similar to the previously, not effectuated, wortelingsmotie. The Council of State published an advice 
against the motion, because for individual cases, the Minister’s discretionary ability should suffice.136 
In the last week of April 2012 the government of the Right, condoned by the PVV, came to an end. 
Especially in the Christian Democrat party (CDA), the party of the Minister of Asylum and Migration 
(Leers), there is dissatisfaction among some leading members about the way the party has become 
responsible for an increasingly strict and sometimes inhumane asylum policy. Obviously we have not 
been able to include the new developments in this report, but it appears that politically, opportunities 
for successful protest have improved.  
3.3.2. Contesting Dutch asylum policy: actors, discursive strategies and main issues  
In the following paragraphs we describe the different groups and organizations involved in contesting 
asylum policy and their main discursive strategies. We wish to state beforehand that an important 
source of policy contestation was deliberately omitted from our research. Much of the protesting 
against asylum policy occurs in the designated places of legal contestation (i.e. the courts), for 
example through appeals on a rejection of an individual asylum request. It involves legal experts and 
lawyers. Our theoretical focus is socio-political, however, and we describe non-legal contestation of 
policy by citizens and professionals. A second type of protest that we have deliberately excluded are 
acts of violence and other illegal means, such as death threats used by (extremist, left wing) activists to 
achieve their aims. They are beyond the scope of what we consider legitimate “protest” in a 
democratic context.
137
  
3.3.2.1. Groups and organizations 
For the sake of clarity, the people and organizations involved with protesting against the asylum policy 
can be divided into six groups: 
1. Political organisations and actors, and bureaucrats, including notably individual MP’s 
of GroenLinks (Green Left), SP (Socialist Party) and PvdA (Labour Party). At the local 
level representatives of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and VVD (Conservatives) also at 
times support initiatives.  
                                                     
134  Letter by Hirsch Ballin, Minister of Justice, June 1 2010. 
135  Annual Policy Report EMN / European Migration Network 2010: 20, Migratie en asiel in Nederland. 
136  Advice Council of State, 33068, 22nd December 2011. Voorstel van wet van de leden Samsom en Voordewind tot 
wijziging van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 houdende versterking van de positie van in Nederland gewortelde minderjarige 
vreemdelingen. 
137 These actions include threats to airlines who expulse irregular migrants, illegal demonstrations and bombing of 
corporations who are involved with building alien detention centres, and writing death threats to people who work in the 
“asylum industry”. In 1991, the house of Minister of Justice Aad Kosto was destroyed by a bomb by the group RaRa, in 
protest against his asylum policy. Also the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 was, according to the assassin (Volkert 
van der G.), an attempt to protect asylum seekers from harmful policies. See an overview (in Dutch) of illegal protests 
made by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD: 2009): https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen-
0/extremisme/links-extremisme/verzet-asielbeleid/overzicht-acties/ 
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2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) acting on behalf of (rejected) asylum 
seekers, refugees and/or undocumented migrants, nationally or locally, such as 
Vluchtelingenwerk, VON (Refugee Organisations Netherlands), LOS (National Support 
for the Undocumented), and ASKV (Amsterdam Solidarity Committee Refugees) 
138
. 
These organizations may consist largely of volunteers (in the case of ASKV) or largely of 
professionals (such as Vluchtelingenwerk).  
3. NGOs involved with human rights or asylum law, such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Defence for Children, and the Association of Asylum Lawyers.  
4. Churches and religious or humanistic NGOs involved with charity and care for the 
needy, such as Kerk in Actie, INLIA, and the Humanistic Alliance. Their aim is helping 
vulnerable people, homeless people, and those in special needs.  
5. Academics specialized in human rights, migration and/or asylum law who contribute to 
debate and protest through research, reports and public statements.  
6. Media and journalists may address asylum policy in comments from the chief editor, 
and choose certain perspectives from which to describe the issues.  
3.3.2.2. Discursive strategies 
Some activities of protesters consist of helping (rejected) asylum seekers cope with their situation, by 
assisting them for a renewed application, or help them get emergency shelter. But organizations can 
also lobby for a change of policy through media, political lobbying, and by providing information to 
the public. When they voice their opinion, in either way, the protesters are trying to change the 
perception of asylum seekers through debate. 
In this section we present the main discursive positions and discourses that we have identified in our 
analysis of public protests around Dutch asylum policy over the past ten years. Following the theories 
of Van Gorp (2005) and Wacquant (2009), we have constructed a discursive space allowing us to 
analyse debates on asylum policy. Seen in this light two questions are central to the asylum debate, 
and their answers are continuously contested:  
1. Is this person a victim? 
2. Is the government responsible for providing assistance? 
 
The two questions can be used to map out the discursive space of the asylum debate along two axes 
(see table). We found that the answers to the two relevant questions correlate with different possible 
policy recommendations. The policy of social welfare is associated with the status of victim, whereas 
the policy of penalization can be associated with the status of intruder. These are presented in rows in 
the table below. Note that penalization efforts are strongest in the fourth quadrant, where the person is 
assessed as an intruder, and the Dutch government is not responsible for social assistance. The first 
quadrant, by contrast, shows the highest level of governmental assistance: the person is a victim, and 
the government should assist. The government is thus less likely to help intruders than victims, and 
more likely to punish intruders if the government is felt to be less responsible.  
The ACCEPT-framework turned out to be particularly helpful in further clarifying these four 
positions: when in the context of asylum debates the person is seen as a victim and there is agreement 
that the government is responsible in providing assistance, for example by granting a residence permit, 
there is acceptance. The position that holds that the asylum seeker is not a victim, but still has a 
legitimate claim for assistance, for example help with repatriation or emergency shelter, is qualified as 
tolerance. The punitive and forced expulsion policies we associate with intolerance, whereas the 
                                                     
138  See the extended version of this report for a list of organizations: Versteegt and Maussen (2012). Contested policies of 
expulsion: Resistance and protest against asylum policy in the Netherlands. 
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withdrawal of the government care from victims in the third quadrant is qualified not as tolerance or 
intolerance, but as indifference (see table 3.2.1).  
Table 3.1. Discursive space of Dutch asylum debate  
  Should the Dutch government take responsibility in assistance? 
  Yes, responsibility No, responsibility 
Is
 t
h
is
 p
er
so
n
 a
 v
ic
ti
m
? 
 
Yes, 
he/she is a 
victim 
 
 
What should be done?  
 Offer (modest) accommodation 
 Grant residence status through asylum 
procedures, humanitarian or discretionary 
individual measure  
 Legalize status through regularization 
 Other forms of help (medical, 
psychological, housing, integration)  
ACCEPTANCE 
What should be done?  
 Allow NGOs to help 
 Leave person to own devices 
 Leave person to other country's 
responsibility (Dublin claimants) 
  
 
 
 
INDIFFERENCE 
No,  
he/she is 
not a 
victim.  
(He/she is 
an 
intruder) 
What should be done?  
 Help person leave through assistance 
 Provide help in country of origin 
 Provide with emergency shelter until 
expulsion 
 Offer aid to country of origin 
 
TOLERANCE 
What should be done? 
 Make person leave through pressure and 
penalization: 
a) Reduction of facilities and no aid 
b) Retention 
c) Criminalization of illegality 
d) Isolation from local communities 
e) Forced expulsion 
INTOLERANCE 
 
This theoretical perspective and the construction of a discursive space that maps out different positions 
in the asylum debate was extremely helpful in guiding the analysis of the argumentations and 
discussions. A second step was to identify, in an empirical and inductive way, the main discourses 
through which Dutch asylum policy is being contested. To find these discourses, we used Van Gorp’s 
distinction of “Victim or intruder?” as a guiding tool for labelling. We then searched our data (media, 
policy documents, political debate, interviews, reports and websites) for reasoning towards a 
categorization as victim or intruder, and the different arguments that were used to establish such 
categorization. In our analysis of various sources, we found four different discourses through which 
the distinction between victims and intruders is being constructed. These four discourses are:  
1. Asylum authenticity discourse. In this discourse the leading question is how to know 
whether or not the asylum demand has been genuine or authentic. Contestation 
concentrates on cases in which protesters argue that an asylum seeker has been wrongfully 
rejected because the procedure is flawed (“false rejections”) or because the boundaries for 
granting asylum are drawn too narrowly. Authentic asylum applicants are “victims”, fake 
ones are “intruders”. 
2. Global injustice discourse. In this discourse decisions on whether or not people 
legitimately seek to enter the Netherlands through the gates of the “asylum procedure” are 
framed in a wider perspective, namely whether they are genuinely economic refugees and 
should be recognized as victims of poverty. Those who make use of this discourse 
challenge the notion that those who are no “real refugees” are ipse facto “intruders”. They 
represent them as “victims” as well and demand more solidarity and more open borders. 
In this discourse “intruders” are those who have good opportunities and life prospects in 
their country of origin. 
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3. The duty of care discourse. In this discourse the leading question is whether or not an 
undocumented migrant (which many rejected asylum seekers become after being expelled 
from accommodation) is suffering, i.e. is a “victim”. The (local) government is said to 
have a duty to prevent homelessness and destitution, especially for vulnerable groups like 
children, ill people and the elderly. “Intruders” would be those who are not in need of 
assistance and who take advantage of the available facilities. 
4. Accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. In this discourse the terms of the asylum 
debate are shifted towards a debate on whether or not rejected asylum seekers who are 
well integrated and have lived in the Netherlands for a long period of time, have obtained 
a right to stay. Expelling them to a country they hardly know (e.g. in the case of children) 
would make them “uprooted”. This discourse draws on ideas about “cultural citizenship” 
to present the asylum seeker who has become connected to the (people in the) Netherlands 
as a victim of the length of Dutch procedures. “Intruders” are those who are insufficiently 
assimilated or who have connections to their country of origin.  
 
The table below presents the four discourses and how they establish distinctions between victims and 
intruders.  
Table 3.2. Four discourses used to frame asylum seekers as victims or intruders 
3.3. 2. 3. Main issues 
The discursive strategies and discourses presented above may not all be used at the same time. In the 
process of asylum application, rejection, and expulsion, there are many issues which give rise to 
protest, and actors will use different arguments and representations, drawing on the available 
discourses.  
The main issues that emerged from our analysis of the protests, more or less follow a chronological 
line from the moment the asylum application is handed in, until (attempts at) expulsion of the rejected 
asylum seeker. It all starts with the admission procedure, which is contested as biased, not aimed at 
admitting refugees, but directed towards a maximum amount of rejections. As the procedure has 
ended, the rejected asylum seeker is officially obliged to leave, but may not do so for different reasons. 
Illegal life brings difficulties because the irregular migrants are excluded from the welfare system 
excluded from legal work and because, officially, municipalities may not offer them accommodation 
as they do to the homeless who do have residence permits. A large amount of protest concerns this 
treatment of end-of line asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Other problems are related to the 
risk of detention and the way detention is executed. Expulsion itself, when it does happen, is also 
contested because of its brutal execution and intimidating treatment of children. Sometimes, the last 
resort before expulsion, is the approach of media, in order to bring the individual case to the public 
and political arena. 
 
The protests can thus be divided into the following five issues: 
1. False rejection and unfair procedures 
2. Homelessness and refusal of housing/ social security  
3. Detention, circumstances of detention and criminalization 
  1. Asylum authenticity 
discourse 
2. Global injustice 
discourse 
3. Duty of care 
discourse 
4.Accomplished cultural 
inclusion discourse 
Victim Real refugee 
 
Economic refugee Vulnerable person, 
sufferer/ homeless 
Integrated, rooted, 
connected 
Intruder Fake/imposter/ 
Economic refugee 
Exploiter/Fortune 
seeker 
Entrepreneur, 
(detained) criminal 
Stranger, outsider, 
expulsable 
Marcel Maussen with Thijs Bogers and Inge Versteegt 
86 
4. Expulsion (both related to 1 (refoulement) and 2 (physical force, sedation, handcuffs) 
5. The uprooting of children, and (too) limited use of discretionary abilities for individual 
cases 
 
In this report, we focus on the last issue. In a more extended version of this report, all five issues are 
elaborated.
139
 Here we limit ourselves to the mediatisation of individual rejected asylum seekers, 
exemplified by an argumentation analysis of the cases of Sahar and Mauro.  
3.3.3. The lamentable cases of Mauro and Sahar 
In the past years, several individual asylum cases have become the centre of a media debate. Usually, 
the cases had arrived at the end of the line of a long asylum procedure.
140
 The option of continued 
illegal life in the Netherlands, as well as the risk of detention, are in general absent from the debate. 
The reasons to make an exception for this particular individual are defended, besides by the asylum 
seekers themselves, by individual citizens, schools, churches, media, individual politicians, sometimes 
celebrities, and sometimes NGOs.  
Two things are remarkable about these cases: first, the way individualized and mediatized asylum 
cases, elicit so much more public compassion than anonymous ones. Second, the emergence of a new, 
and influential discourse to re-categorize the rejected asylum seeker as a victim. The accomplished 
cultural inclusion discourse provides a new set of concepts, images and ideas to argue that a person 
should stay after all: he or she belongs in the Netherlands. The notions of “belonging” and 
“integration” are thus important, and they are related to the duration of stay and responsibility of the 
receiving society and state.  
The so-called Sahar case in 2010 was about an Afghan girl aged 14 whose family had unsuccessfully 
applied for asylum since 2000 and was requested to return to Afghanistan. The case of Mauro became 
known to the wider public in late 2010. It involved an 18- year old boy from Angola who had arrived 
alone in the Netherlands at the age of eight (in 2002) and requested asylum. After the repeated 
rejection of his asylum request, he had lived in an AMA-centre and later in a Dutch foster family 
because unaccompanied minors cannot be expelled. Upon reaching the age of eighteen Mauro was to 
be sent back to Angola. Both youngsters had dominated the Dutch media for several months as their 
upcoming expulsion became publicly contested.  
In our own newspaper and magazines sample we found over 3000 “hits” for Mauro and over 2000 hits 
for Sahar. Between 26
th
 October and 3
rd
 November there were over 200 newspaper articles written 
about Mauro (Nederlandse nieuwsmonitor, 2011). In our analysis we specifically looked at reasons 
which were provided to view the young asylum seekers as victims or intruders. We now present both 
cases, provide for each case some quotes to illustrate the debate, and offer tables in which the 
discursive strategies for framing are outlined and compared. 
                                                     
139  Versteegt and Maussen (2012). Contested policies of expulsion: Resistance and protest against asylum policy in the 
Netherlands. 
140  “Dieren voert actie voor asielzoekster” [Dieren in action for asylum seeker] in Reformatorisch Daglad April 25 2001 
“Waanzin om dit gezin uit te zetten” [Madness to expulse this family] in Trouw January 5 2001. 
“Hevien mag in Rotterdam blijven”: GroenLinks Rotterdam, December 8 2009, 22:52u - Ivo Rodermans 
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The Sahar case (2000-2010) 
 
Sahar Hbrahim Gel/ picture: ANP 
 
In 2010, a 14 year-old Afghan girl Sahar Hbrahim Gel and her family had unsuccessfully applied for 
asylum three times since the year 2000 and were about to be expulsed to Aghanistan. They had lived 
in the Netherlands illegally, because they did not feel they would be safe in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, 
Sahar and her two brothers went to school and became very successful students. In an attempt to get 
asylum, the family also went to Sweden for three months. Because of this short residence abroad, they 
could not apply for the Generaal Pardon-arrangements and they were requested to return to 
Afghanistan.  
As the decision that the family should leave became known in the town of Sint Annaparochie, protests 
soon were organized and local and national media were informed. The Doopsgezinde Church wrote a 
letter to Minister Leers, urging him to accept underage asylum seekers who have resided in the 
Netherlands for many years. Classmates of Sahar created a website with online petition 
(www.saharmoetblijven.nl) and a Hyves-site (Dutch equivalent of Facebook). Sahar and her lawyer 
appeared in television shows, as did the mayor of the municipality and the school principal. 
A court in Den Bosch ruled on the 21st of January, 2011, that Sahar and her family could stay, mainly 
because she had become too westernized. This was confirmed by a letter from the UNHCR, which 
stated Sahar should be acknowledged as refugee. Moreover, Minister Leers’ rejections of the initial 
requests for asylum had not been substantially motivated. The court decision was televised and printed 
in several newspapers. This caused the PVV to urge Leers to appeal, because it should not be 
rewarded that the family had decided to stay so long and re-appeal several times. However, the mayor 
of Leeuwarden, the provincial capital, said that Minister Leers should accept the outcome. 
On the 26th of January, Minister Leers announced that he would appeal the court’s decision at the 
Council of State, because the long stay of the family in the Netherlands had been due to their own 
decision to keep appealing. He wished also to further investigate whether or not “westernized” girls in 
Afghanistan face specific threats. He also stated on national television that in some cases, mayors 
should be able to decide whether a person may stay. This caused to the mayor of Het Bildt (Sahar’s 
municipality) to publicly announce he would immediately grant Sahar and her family permission to 
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stay if he would be given the opportunity.
141
 PVV-leader Wilders said it would be unwise to give 
mayors with “weak guts” such power.142  
On April 10th 2011, the Council of State ruled that Sahar and her family would get permission to stay 
in the Netherlands. The Mayor of St. Annaparochie offered her flowers. The Ministry of Immigration 
accepted the outcome, and added that its own investigation into “westernized girls in Afghanistan” had 
reached similar conclusion. The Ministry estimated that there might be 400 more girls like Sahar in the 
Netherlands who would also qualify to get residence status. 
In the following reader’s quotes, taken from the website of De Spits newspaper, the different 
argumentations in favour of and against Sahar’s residence status are presented. De Spits is a free 
newspaper, published by de Telegraaf . It is spread in train stations and is read both in print and online 
by a variety of readers, unlike de Volkskrant and Trouw which mainly have left-wing readers. As the 
Sahar case develops, all four discourses become engaged by readers, to frame Sahar as a victim or an 
intruder. The first Spits article of which the comments were analyzed, mentions a comment about 
Sahar by Socialist Party leader Roemer. Roemer criticizes PVV leader Geert Wilders for wanting to 
send Sahar, “a fully integrated girl, straight into the Afghan burqa”, simply because he “dislikes 
foreigners”. Roemer touches upon a sensitive nerve because Wilders is known for his criticism of 
Islam, headscarves and burqas. 
A first reader’s comment to this article argues that the initial rejection of Sahar and her family should 
have resulted in them leaving, thereby referring to arguments of asylum authenticity. The family’s 
asylum appeal was rejected, and thus they should leave. The media uproar around Sahar is considered 
to be strategic by this reader: 
“I don’t think it is about this child. She has been put into the spotlight by the Left, for political 
reasons. It’s her parents who stacked appeal upon appeal, and have continued to live here, 
instead of the poor individuals, with and without children, who have simply packed their stuff 
after the first negative court decision”.  
 
Another comment refers to asylum authenticity, but argues in favour of Sahar. Also global inequality 
is presented by this reader as a reason to accept more refugees, mainly because the Dutch are wealthy: 
“I am not an SP-voter, but Roemer is right. Every right-minded person would grant Sahar and 
other refugees a good future. And all those calculators should be ashamed. Going on a holiday 
twice a year, getting a bigger car than the neighbours. Buying cheap stuff from poor countries, 
so they can eat their fat belly even fatter, but no mercy for a refugee that calls for help. I am 
disgusted with these fat losers”. 
 
A comment using the accomplished cultural inclusion discourse, ends up expressing intolerance for 
any migrant who is different from the average Dutch: 
 “I suggest an exchange: all well-adapted, Dutch speaking, well-educated, having a job and 
good future perspectives, non -criminal allochtones may stay, and all un-adapted, burqa-
wearing, unworldly, criminal, lacking in prospect brothers and sisters pack their belongings 
and go back to their countries of origin. That seems a good deal to me. Besides: remarkable 
that Roemer finds a burqa a problem in Afghanistan, but not in the Netherlands”.  
 
As Sahar’s case was finally resolved and she was awarded a status, reader’s comments in Spits 
continued to be mixed (Spits, April 8 2011) .  
“Wonderful! What a retard by the way, everyone knew women in Afghanistan risk being killed, but 
Leers only found out now”. 
                                                     
141 Fries Dagblad, "Sahar mag blijven als het aan de burgemeester is", February 24 2011. 
142 idem. 
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“In the first place, she has been living here for 10 years, that means from the age of four. Besides that, 
what do you think a 14-year old Afghan girl will experience due to Islam, she will get killed or made a 
slave, or get raped. It was a scandal that the Minister appealed the court decision. You should look per 
case and have a heart, you don’t want to get people killed”. 
“This right wing cabinet does send a Kunduz mission that costs millions, but a highly intelligent 
Afghan refugee who wishes to be a doctor should get out???” 
“Sure why not, does Leers also pay all the expenses that she and her damn family have cost the Dutch 
state? Geert it’s enough with this cabinet, pull the plug out please. Fortune seekers still get everything 
for nothing and honest hard working people are being scrambled”. 
 “I am in favour. This is not about asylum seekers, who have spent their entire life in another country, 
but about children who were born here and have known nothing else besides our country”.  
 
The accomplished cultural inclusion discourse was used in the last quote, as well as asylum 
authenticity discourse in the first. There are also references to Sahar’s economic potential for Dutch 
society, but other people, as the quotes showed, still found her an intruder.  
The Mauro case (2002- 2011) 
  
Mauro Manuel/ picture: ANP 
 
In 2002, an eight-year old boy from Angola, named Mauro Manuel, entered the Netherlands after his 
mother had put him on a plane. Due to his minor age, and his arrival without accompanying adult, he 
received the temporary status as AMA (“solitary minor asylum-seeker”). 
The Aliens Act of 2000 had established that children arriving in the Netherlands without accompany, 
would be housed and receive an education, until the age of eighteen. Mauro applied for asylum but 
this was not granted, due to the fact that there was no indication that his life was in danger in Angola. 
He was illegal, but could wait for his expulsion and stay in the Netherlands until he would reach 
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maturity. He would only be admitted to the Netherlands in case he would stay longer than three years 
and if he had no more living relatives in his country of origin.  
The asylum requests of Mauro were initially rejected (2003), later granted (2004), and then rejected 
again (2006). Mauro was placed in a foster family. The family attempted twice to adopt him, but 
because of his illegal status this was impossible (2007 and 2008). Contact with his biological mother 
in Angola was scarce and became problematic because of Mauro’s declining skills in his native 
language.  
As a final request for asylum is denied in 2007, Mauro is officially obligated to leave. In 2009, 
Mauro's foster parents and the NGO Defence for Children attempted to request special status for 
Mauro as a “lamentable case”, due to his family life in the Netherlands and long stay. Minister Hirsch 
Ballin refuses. An MP of the Christian Democrats, Ger Koopman, requests secretary of State Albayrak 
to use her discretionary ability. She also refuses. The foster organisation Nidos argues it is best for 
Mauro to stay with his new Dutch family.  
In 2010, a court in Amsterdam rules that, since Mauro had become a member of a Dutch family, he 
should not be expelled due to Article 8 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and Human Rights 
(right to family life). Mauro would be allowed to stay. However, Minister Leers decided to appeal to 
this court decision. The Council of State decided that Leers’ decision was justified, because he still has 
a mother in Angola. Mauro would not be granted a permission to stay.  
The Mauro case was highly mediatized both in national and international press. According to Minister 
Leers, there was a risk of generating a precedent, and possibly hundreds of “Mauros” would attempt to 
apply for special arrangements as well. Adoption organizations however found only four other young 
men in a similar situation. Several academic experts on migration law wrote a public letter explaining 
that Minister Leers had solid legal grounds to admit Mauro based on the Child Rights, or use his 
discretionary abilities. Meanwhile Geert Wilders (PVV) made it clear that Mauro needed to be 
expelled and threatened to end his support to the Government.  
A national poll suggested that a majority of the Dutch population was in favour of Mauro's stay. Also 
the majority of Parliament is in favour. Especially the CDA voters (74%) deviate from the CDA-
Minister Leers and the members of Parliament. Two “deviant” CDA- MPs announced they would 
support Mauro, but later withdraw their support. A national congress of CDA-members accepts a 
resolution that it is undesirable to expel young asylum seekers without a diploma.  
On November 1st, Mauro was finally not granted with a permit, because all CDA members voted 
against the motion. However, he was allowed to request a scholarship for his vocational training, 
which he could request from within the Netherlands. Official regulations state that foreign students 
must send scholarship requests from within their country of origin. The only possibility for Mauro 
now is an appeal for European courts, in order to get a residence permit due to the (earlier mentioned) 
Article 8 of the Rights of the Child. CDA-Member of Parliament Sterk wrote on her Twitter-account 
that “without media-attention, more would have been possible for Mauro.”143 
Similar processes of framing and re-framing as victim or intruder were found in the Mauro case. In 
this first quote, Mauro is represented by NRC Handelsblad as a young boy who is deprived of a family 
and a home, first by his mother, later by Dutch courts and Minister Leers. He is described as a child 
that has become integrated in the Netherlands through family and education:  
“Angolan Mauro Manuel (18) has been living with his foster parents for eight years […] At 
nine years old he was put on a plane to the Netherlands by his mother. Mauro never had a 
residence permit. The judge prevented attempts by his foster parents to adopt him. Friends, 
family and classmates have requested attention for his case. Mauro wrote a letter to Leers 
requesting permission to stay. Leers refused. Mauro speaks Dutch (with Limburg accent), 
                                                     
143  De Volkskrant, “De lijdende Leers”: October 29 2011. 
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went to primary school in Venray and to the VMBO (secondary school). He currently attends 
a vocational education.”144 
Where the former quote referred to Mauro’s integration and connection to Dutch society, thus 
invoking the accomplished cultural integration discourse, the right wing newspaper De Telegraaf 
instead presents Mauro as an intruder: 
“The young Angolan Mauro Manuel turns out to have lied about his last name and about his 
date of birth. His real name is Mauro Estevao and he has a passport, which could have gotten 
him shortly after his arrival to our country, back to his mother in Angola.”145 
 
The framing here pushes strongly away from “accomplished cultural inclusion” and “victim”, because 
Mauro is described only in terms of Angolan ethnic identity (no reference to his Dutch upbringing or 
Limburg accent) with an Angolan mother. His “lies” represent him as an impostor in the accomplished 
cultural inclusion discourse, and he is himself to blame for his long residence.  
Comparison of the two cases 
Our respondents mostly felt that Sahar and Mauro both had to be legalized. Albeit in the case of 
Mauro not for reasons of asylum but for humanitarian reasons. Sahar and Mauro are both described as 
victims of the strict Dutch asylum policy, but Mauro is also considered to have become a scapegoat in 
political battles between CDA and PVV. The respondents believed that given the political situation 
and the media exposure, Minister Leers had become extremely reluctant to use his discretionary 
powers in this particular case. An academic expert on migration politics (interview 2) said: “He 
(Minister Leers) manoeuvred himself into an impossible position, by letting things explode like this in 
the media. Discretionary abilities are better used through the back door. But this case had already been 
done through the back door and failed. Leers felt the hot breath of Wilders and was scared that the 
Cabinet would fall because of this. In which event the CDA would have been reduced to zero”. 
The reluctance of the Minister to use discretionary powers when necessary is presented as a political 
and moral failure, and, by one of our respondents, even as a legal one: “It seems as though Leers 
thinks that applying his discretionary abilities is against the rules. That is a very problematic 
development. Because the discretionary ability is there to avoid humanitarian and human rights related 
mistakes on the individual level, and it is part of justice. It is not contradictory to it.” 146 
In the table below, we present the categorizations of Sahar and Mauro taken from various sources 
(interviews, media and political debate). In order to save space, the statements in the boxes are short, 
paraphrased quotations from our data (media, interviews and political debate) with reference to at least 
one original source. For example, in the debate about whether or not Mauro was to blame for certain 
lies in his asylum application, an original quote read: “Those who have been caring for Mauro, have 
provided wrong information on behalf and about the boy.”[…] From this newspaper quote, we 
extracted the argumentation, which is present in the choice of words, notably “those who have been 
caring”, and “boy”, implying Mauro was not to blame because he was under age. This line of 
argumentation was also found in other sources. In the table, this and similar quotes are paraphrased in 
short as: “Was only a child, cannot be held accountable for lies”. 
A recurring line of reasoning found in the opponents of Sahar and Mauro was the risk of a honeypot 
effect: if Sahar, or Mauro, would be granted status, this would attract many more new requests for 
reconsideration or even more new immigrants. For example, in the Mauro case, a Member of 
Parliament for the right wing, populist PVV
147
 stated that “if this behaviour is rewarded with a 
                                                     
144  “Completely integrated, Mauro must return to Angola” in NRC-Handelsblad, October 26 2011. 
145  “Mauro lied for asylum: the Angolan did have passport” in De Telegraaf December 3 2011. 
146 Interview 5: NGO representative (human rights). 
147 Member of Parliament Fritsma (PVV), in De Telegraaf January 21 2011. 
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residence permit, it will be copied due to its proven success. Such a signal will impair the entire alien 
policy and especially the return policy”. Quotes that made references to such risks are also 
paraphrased into short statements and are labelled as HP (honeypot effect).  
Table 3.3: Sahar and Mauro cases defended and contested in the four discourses (HP= Honeypot effect) 
 SAHAR CASE    
 
 
Asylum admission  
(danger) 
Global injustice  
(poverty)  
 
Duty of care (suffering) 
Inevitable inclusion  
(belonging) 
V
ictim
 
The country has changed. 
Afghanistan in 2004 is not 
Afghanistan in 2010
148
. 
Should be recognized as refugee 
(letter UNHCR)
149
 
Family fears torture: liberal 
muslims
150
 
The law does not work well
151
  
She is the 
personification of a 
world-wide problem: 
that of refugees
152
 
Has lived on 13 
asylum locations 
throughout the 
Netherlands
153
 
Children should not 
be expulsed
154
 
Does not speak the 
Afghan language
155
 
Has lived here too 
long. She will be seen 
as foreigner in her 
country of origin
156
 
In
tru
d
er 
Has been rejected many times. 
We have said “no” five times. 
They must accept no for an 
answer.
157
 
Giving in sends off a wrong 
signal
158
 (HP) 
NOT FOUND Has lived illegally 
and does not apply to 
criteria of Pardon due 
to stay in foreign 
country. Such are the 
rules
159
. 
(Refuted by court:) She 
can adapt to the 
Afghan customs
160
 
 
                                                     
148 Sahar lawyer Paul Stieger, in “Sahar moet terug, zo zijn de regels. Afgewezen Afghaanse Friezin is doodsbang”[Sahar 
must go back, such are the rules. Rejected Afghan Friesian girl terrified] in De Pers December 2 2010. 
149 High Commissioner UNHCR: letter to Minister Leers. January 18 2011. 
150 “Sahar and family can stay for the time being” in De Pers January 20 2011. 
151  “Netherlands still struggling with failure of asylum policy” Dagelijkse standaard.nl December 16 2010. 
152 (Former) Socialist Party leader Jan Marijnissen, in TV show Pauw and Witteman, source: Joop.nl. “Marijnissen: Sahar 
moet gewoon asiel krijgen”.[Marijnissen: Sahar simply should get asylum], December 16 2010. 
153 “Netherlands still struggling with failure of asylum policy” in Dagelijkse standaard.nl December 16 2010. 
154 Letter by Mennonite Church, in: “Doopsgezinden komen op voor minderjarige asielzoekers” [Mennonites protect minor 
asylum seekers], source: www.kerknieuws.nl 14 January 2011. 
155  “Sahar St Annaparochie: landelijke media duiken op zaak Afghaans meisje” [Sahar St Annaparochie: national media dive 
into case Afghan girl, in Franeker Dagblad December 8 2010. 
156  Frisian CDA-members, in: Omrop Fryslan, “Oprop CDA-Fryslan oan Leers”, January 7 2011. 
157 Minister Leers, in: Leeuwarder Courant, December 8 2010. 
158  Member of Parliament Fritsma (PVV), in De Telegraaf, January 21 2011. 
159  IND representative in “Sahar moet terug, zo zijn de regels. Afgewezen Afghaanse Friezin is doodsbang” [Sahar must go 
back, such are the rules. Rejected Afghan Friesian girl terrified]. In De Pers December 2 2010. 
160 Minister Leers, quoted in courtcase Den Bosch, won by Sahar and family, January 20 2011, source: DePers. 
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 MAURO CASE  
 
 
Asylum admission  
(danger) 
Global injustice  
(poverty) 
 
Duty of care (suffering) 
Inevitable inclusion  
(belonging) 
V
ictim
 
Was only a child, cannot be held 
accountable for lies
161
  
 
Will probably end 
up living on the 
street in Angola
162
 
Mother in Angola rejected 
him
163
 
Traumatized relationship 
with his mother
164
 
Right to a family life
165
, 
Defence for Children, 
ECHR 
Belongs here
166
 
Speaks no Portuguese 
 
In
tru
d
er 
Not a refugee
167
 
Fake identity
168
 
Told lies
169
 
Rules are rules
170
 (refuted: 
Minister himself appealed 
positive court decision
171
 
No reward for “stalling”; we must 
prevent honeypot effects
172
 
Angola is a 
booming 
economy, they 
need him there
173
 
 
Mother is still involved
174
 
Foster parents knew he 
could not stay
175
 
He resided illegally when 
he could leave, doesn't 
need help 
Passage of time: guilt 
lies with Mauro, his 
foster parents and his 
allies
176
 
 
 
 
As the tables show, categorization of Sahar as a victim in the accomplished cultural inclusion 
discourse was more prominent, and categorization as intruder overall was used less than in the Mauro 
case. Moreover, inevitable inclusion for Sahar (her being “westernised”) proved to be useful to 
categorize her as a victim in the asylum authenticity discourse. Precisely because she was so 
                                                     
161  “Fouten in dossier Mauro” [Mistakes in file Mauro]. Brabants Nieuwsblad De Stem (local newspaper) December 3 2011. 
162  “Al 2 jaar geen contact met zijn moeder. Teruggekeerde Agolese vrouw: Mauro heeft hier weinig te zoeken”. [No contact 
with his mother for two years. Returned Angolan woman: Mauro has no business here] in De Volkskrant November 16 
2011. 
163  MP Spekman (PvdA) Eindhovens Dagblad (local newspaper). “Foute gegevens over Mauro zijn "irrelevant"”.[False 
information about Mauro is “irrelevant”]. December 5 2011, Monday. 
164  MP Spekman (PvdA), in Eindhovens Dagblad December 5 2011. 
165  MP Dibi (GroenLinks) debate October 27 2011: “Can the Minister explain what is not lamentable about separating two 
brothers?” 16-15-80. 
166  Petition: Mauro must stay. 
167  Leers, in debate October 27 2011. He is not a refugee, he is not in danger, he is healthy. 16-15-74. 
168  De Telegraaf January 9 2012 “Doubts about Mauro” (Quotes Leers in news year lunch in Lanaken). 
169  MP Sietse Fritsma (PVV), in Trouw: “Mauro moet terug, geworteld of niet.” [Mauro must return, rooted or not] September 
28 2011. 
170 Leers, in debate October 27 2011. The asylum request has been denied and then you must be fair and say: we have rules. 
171 MP Dibi, (GroenLinks) debate October 27 2011 “At one given moment, the judge said he could stay and what did the 
Minister do? He appealed because he disagreed with the decisison.” 16-15-81. 
172 Minister Leers, in debate October 27 2011: ”If we do this today, I predict tomorrow there will be another Mauro, and the 
day after tomorrow another one.” 
173  “Bekijk de zaak-Mauro eens van de positieve kant”[Look at the Mauro case from the positive side] in De Telegraaf 
November 
1 2011. “For this healthy young man employers will be lining up in Angola” 
174  MP Sietse Fritsma (PVV) [Mauro must return, rooted or not] in Trouw September 28 2011 
175 Leers, in debate October 27 2011. Very early, he and his foster parents knew he would not get a status and would be going 
back.16-15-74. 
176 MP Sietse Fritsma (PVV): “Mauro moet terug, geworteld of niet.” [Mauro must return, rooted or not] in Trouw. September 
28 2011. 
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westernised, she would be in danger if she would return to her country of origin. The “lies” of Mauro 
were used repeatedly against him and created much doubt about his categorization as victim in the 
accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. He may speak in a Limburg accent, but what about his 
mother in Angola? The tables suggest that framing in the debate - particularly the success of victim 
categorization in all four discourses- have important consequences for the outcome of a mediatized 
case.  
On the level of policy, there may also be changes resulting from mediatisation. The motion Spekman-
Anker
177
, for example, which was accepted but not executed (see paragraph 3.1) was inspired by the 
Hevien case. The motion proposes to grant residence status to a child if: “…the child is rooted in 
Dutch society and, partially due to Dutch government, has spent more than eight years in the 
Netherlands, and has stayed legally in the Netherlands for at least two years” [our emphasis, IV and 
MM]. The Council of State, the highest court in asylum cases, deemed the initiative “inefficient, unfair 
and unnecessary”, and it presented a negative advice the day after the initiative law was presented.178 
According to the Council of State, the Children’s Pardon law: “does nothing to prevent long 
procedures, it creates inequality by rewarding those who stayed illegally over those who left on their 
own account, and it does not qualify ‘rootedness’ in other terms than a period of time”. 
Despite criticism, other attempts to legalize children are made. In 2012, right after the lost cases for 
Mauro and Jossef, the MP Tofik Dibi of GroenLinks (Green Left) proposed a “Children’s Pardon”.179 
In the campaign for this proposal, the children are described with ”typical Dutch” adjectives relating to 
Dutch local food and celebrations, and the conclusion is: these children should not be expelled, they 
belong here:  
“We want a children’s pardon. More Limburgian than vlaai (cake), more Northern Hollandish 
than cheese, more Zeeuwish than the Zeeuwish girl. More Frisian than the Elfstedentocht. 14 
years old, 10 years in the Netherlands. 9 years old, 8 years in the Netherlands. 13 years old, 13 
years in the Netherlands. If we don’t do anything, their future lies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Angola. Countries of which they don’t know the language, where they know nobody, where 
they are aliens. We will not let this happen. These children belong here. We want a children’s 
pardon. We want to get them out of insecurity and welcome them into their country. That is 
why we call from our hearts.” 
 
The petition got nearly 150,000 signatures in the first three months, and the initiative is being debated 
in local politics as well.  
How do these mediatized cases relate to tolerance or acceptance of rejected asylum seekers? Does the 
public outcry over Mauro and Sahar express the backlash against anti-immigrant sentiments, or does 
the focus on cultural adaptation in these cases only reveal a large amount of intolerance for diversity? 
Does the sympathy for children reveal hypocrisy or is it an expression of tolerance resulting from a 
perceptual shift? And are these mediatized cases effective in changing debate about asylum, or asylum 
policy? 
To start with the first question, it is difficult to know whether mediatisation has helped, because there 
are no numbers available about the percentage of rejected individual cases that are dealt with in 
discretion, compared to those that are done publicly. There is a difference too: when cases are brought 
to the media, they may have already been declined as discretionary case in private. According to the 
analytical framework developed by Alink (2006) a political crisis can only result in policy change if 
the politicians in charge are willing to change the policy. If they are inclined to be conservative, a 
crisis will simply pass by without any effect. But sometimes mediatisation can work to bring a specific 
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issue to public attention. One of our respondents from a church-related NGO explains how the 
mediatisation of one little boy, Hui, accelerated the campaign for “No child behind bars”: “We had 
already been on that subject for some time, on a daily basis there were 60 children in detention, I went 
there every day to check how many, but then Hui came and suddenly the action started to roll.” 
Another NGO-representative for human rights recalled the same dynamic in this case in which 
mediatization around the individual situation was helpful. 
 Besides support and activism in favour of Sahar and Mauro, our respondents 
expressed feelings of ambiguity with the strategy of mass media attention for individual cases, as well 
as their effect. Several reasons were mentioned why the cases of Mauro and Sahar did no good for the 
general problems of the rejected asylum seekers, or only partly so, and that the chosen strategy may 
not even have worked for the individuals concerned. An academic expert on human rights said:  
“I understand the strategy to put forward an individual case. It mobilizes public opinion. But it 
deters attention from the structural dimension. On the other hand, it can be seen as a symptom 
of a change of attitude. It may help to improve the general negative framing of migrants. First 
people talk about AMAs, now they say Mauro. Everyone knows who that is, it appeals to 
people. But I am unsure about the next step in this strategy.”  
 
Another respondent, working for a religious NGO, expressed her misgivings about the way Mauro was 
represented as a beautiful black boy within a white, Dutch foster family, playing football with 
predominantly authochtonous kids and appearing on television alongside his white younger brother. 
These culturalist (if not racist) representations of a “black boy fully assimilated in a white, Dutch 
family” were being used to argue in favour of letting Mauro stay. Duyvendak (2012) commented that 
such culturalism provides a false criterion based on tribalism. He argues in favour of a more objective 
criterion such as length of stay - without basing any judgements on whether or not Mauro likes to eat 
Limburgian vlaai or whether Sahar wants to wear a headscarf.  
But some effects might be emerging from the emotional aftermath of the Mauro-case. While residence 
statuses that are granted whimsically spark fears of honeypot effects, it seems that mediatized cases 
that are not resolved by means of a residence status, create a sense of dissatisfaction, which give rise to 
calls for changes in the overall asylum policy.  
Besides creating special measures for children through the idea of rootedness, there is a lobby in 
favour of shifting discretionary abilities from the Minister to mayors and other local decision-makers, 
for example resembling the German institution of a Härtefall-Kommission (Hard case commission), 
which is a local advisory committee for lamentable cases. The lobby has resulted in a recommendation 
from the Advice Commission for Alien Affairs (2012). Where the residence status of Sahar made way 
for a few hundred similar girls to reside in the Netherlands legally, the unsolved Mauro case may thus 
continue to resonate in the on-going debates on rejected asylum seekers for some time.  
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3.4. Discussion and conclusion 
This final paragraph is dedicated to answering the main question: do different actors resist (aspects of) 
the execution of asylum policy, what argumentations do they articulate in relation to concepts such as 
tolerance and respect? 
We begin by clarifying our results with the help of the general ACCEPT-framework and explain what 
our project is contributing to the academic debate.  
Four discourses could be deducted from the protest movement’s argumentations. These four 
discourses help framing rejected asylum seekers as victims or intruders and, combined with the debate 
on government responsibilities, create various possible outcomes which can be categorized as 
acceptance, tolerance, indifference or intolerance (see table 4.1).  
Table 3.5: Assessment of (rejected) asylum seekers and their right to government assistance 
(b) (a) Assistance No assistance 
Victim ACCEPTANCE  
(residence status)  
INDIFFERENCE 
(dealt with abroad)  
Intruder TOLERANCE   
(prevention of homelessness/  
assistance for return)  
INTOLERANCE 
(detention and forced return) 
 
Toleration and tolerance are commonly associated with “refraining” from acting and interfering on the 
basis of feelings of rejection of the other (Dobbernack and Modood 2011). However, in our model 
tolerance as in the case of “condoning” rejected asylum seekers is related to government action and 
not inaction, which would seem counterintuitive. Assistance is meant to balance out the negative 
effects of the various laws that are based on intolerance and that prevent rejected asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants from acquiring assets and obtaining accommodation. The negative effects are 
made undone, while still not recognizing or accepting the rejected asylum seeker as a legitimate 
resident. Hence we qualified this strategy as tolerance, whereas intolerance is associated with the penal 
state, using strategies such as detention, fines and expulsion. The 2x2 table logically called for a new 
category, which is labelled as indifference: it includes asylum requests, which are judged as correct, 
but not the responsibility of the Dutch State. These include Dublin claimants for example, and other 
refugees who are for various reasons prevented from entering. This category may in fact be the largest, 
since millions of people are taking refuge worldwide and over 99% never arrives at the European 
borders (Grütters 2011). 
The answer to the question whether one should accept, tolerate or not tolerate rejected asylum seekers 
depends on the policy framing that goes with the wider discourse that one uses. We have named these 
four discourses: (1) asylum authenticity discourse, (2) global injustice discourse, (3) duty of care 
discourse, and (4) accomplished cultural inclusion discourse.  
All four discourses offer a possibility for a “victim” categorization. These considerations and doubts 
surrounding the representation of asylum seekers as “victims” or “intruders”, in the context of 
determining whether they can legitimately reside in the Netherlands, resonate with the other debates 
throughout the ACCEPT project.  
The discourses are different ways to strategically determine the right of a (rejected) asylum seeker to 
stay or leave, as well as entitlement to (some) government assistance, e.g. while waiting for a decision. 
Victims are more likely to be granted access than intruders. The protesters of the strict asylum policy 
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will thus try to push the categorization of an individual upwards out of the “intruder” category and into 
the “victim” category. This can be done in two ways: the first is, by arguing within the discourse that 
the person should be viewed not as an intruder, but as a victim. The second way is, by moving 
“sideways” to the next discourse, in which an intruder of one discourse can become categorized as 
victim in another.  
Table 4.2 shows a model we have created based on our analysis. In this model, the re-categorization as 
victim is represented by arrows. The first way (arguing within the discourse, and pushing 
categorization “up”) is shown here by means of straight arrows, and the second way (shifting to 
another discourse where a former intruder can be re-categorized as victim due to other criteria) is 
shown by means of bended arrows. For the sake of clarity, we only present the arrows that represent 
the discursive strategies of the protesters. But arrows in opposite directions can be drawn for those in 
favour of a strict asylum and/or migration policy. A third way of enabling government assistance -not 
visible in this table- is by arguing in favour of assistance even for those who are intruders. 
Table 4.2: Discursive strategies of turning “intruders” into “victims” 
To clarify the model, we can imagine a person fleeing from Angola first to be rejected as asylum 
seeker (and this rejection may be accurate or not), then overstaying in the Netherlands and finding 
people who will represent him as a victim based on the global injustice discourse and suggest that 
assistance should be provided. But even if the person is regarded not as a victim in the global injustice 
discourse, he or she can still become a victim in the duty of care discourse, for example if he or she is 
a child, or if one becomes homeless, or is in need of medical care. Humanitarian motivations may then 
enter as reasons to provide help. Due to longer stay, the person may finally become integrated and 
then the discourse of accomplished cultural inclusion may be engaged to assess the person as a victim. 
In this final, last resort discourse, the former “intruder” has become a victim of time and government 
inertia, and has become an inseparable part of his or her local community.  
In the Mauro debate, the accomplished cultural inclusion discourse was used by protesters to establish 
Mauro as a victim who belonged in the Netherlands, and NGOs used the duty of care discourse to 
establish residence permit through the invocation of Children’s Rights. But the opponents used the 
asylum authenticity discourse to frame him as an impostor and intruder, because he had lied during his 
asylum application. Even the global injustice discourse was used by the opponents to represent Mauro 
as an exploiter, because Angola was presented as a new booming economy in which Mauro would 
flourish on return. Within the discourses, there were attempts to criticize the victim claims, by 
expressing doubts about his broken relation with his biological mother and by doubting his future 
contributions to Dutch society, because he was not a particularly bright student. 
The Sahar case instead showed more stable “victim” categorizations which were hard to refute. 
Because Sahar’s family had been roaming the streets and even went abroad they were not eligible for a 
pardon under the rules of the National Pardon of 2007, but within the duty of care discourse these 
stories became a powerful expression of her family’s suffering and vulnerability. Even in the asylum 
authenticity discourse, Sahar could be framed as someone who feared return to Afghanistan, mainly 
because she had become so westernized. Here the discourses went full circle and the accomplished 
cultural inclusion discourse served to make her a victim in hindsight in the asylum authenticity 
discourse.  
From tolerance to intolerance or acceptance 
Both Sahar and Mauro had been “tolerated” in Dutch society for a prolonged period of time (almost 10 
years in the case of Sahar, more than 8 years in the case of Mauro), when their future became subject 
to a wide public debate: should the Dutch state shift to intolerance, meaning it would seek to expulse 
them from the Netherlands, or should it shift towards acceptance and grant them a residence status? 
This fact alone shows how toleration is seen as an unsatisfactory and unstable way of engaging with 
the presence of rejected asylum seekers. When rejected asylum seekers are officially tolerated 
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(because they are awaiting the outcomes of an appeal, or because they are under age) or when they are 
merely “condoned” (as in the case of many undocumented migrants living in the Netherlands) the 
situation demands a more permanent settlement. There is thus a generally felt need to move away from 
“toleration”.  
One possibility is to shift towards intolerance, by seeing to the effective removal of unwanted 
immigrants from the Netherlands. In the case of Sahar and Mauro this meant that they were 
represented as “intruders”, for example by disqualifying the legitimacy of their asylum requests and by 
questioning the motives of their families for migrating to the Netherlands. This strategy was fully 
justifiable given existing Dutch asylum law and policy. Allowing Sahar and Mauro to stay might set a 
precedent and produce a “honeypot effect”, and it would be unfair towards others. Yet, the massive 
mobilization around these two cases demonstrates that this view was not so widely shared as one 
might expect. We will not repeat our analysis of the various arguments here, but instead single out two 
issues that are of particular relevance in the context of the shifting importance of concepts such as 
tolerance, respect and recognition. 
First, we have seen how in these case there occurred a shift of perspective and a transformation of 
attitude when Dutch society was confronted with two young people. The reasons for non-toleration 
can be changed when attention is shifted to the humanity and moral standing of the subject (Heyd in 
Dobberack and Modood 2011: 13). It is ironical, to say the least, that the outcry to “let Sahar and 
Mauro stay” found substantial support on the pages of de Telegraaf. One of our respondent argued that 
this illustrated how personal contact can change negative attitudes towards asylum seekers. Many 
voter who read the Telegraaf “are in favour of Sahar but against admitting immigrants”, so he 
observed. On the positive side, he believed the Mauro case has led to a change in public opinion; 
people felt it was wrong to evict someone who is well nested in a local community.  
Second, the importance of the accomplished cultural inclusion discourse to justify the use of 
discretionary powers raises important questions. In the first place, the emphasis on successful cultural 
assimilation implies that it is both easier and more just to grant asylum to people who “belong in the 
Netherlands”. Indeed, it would be very unjust to expel fully assimilated young adults. Cultural 
assimilation, “rootedness” and a demonstrated willingness to “embrace Western values” are thus being 
legitimized as grounds to decide who can stay and who should leave. In addition, cultural rootedness is 
made important at the detriment of attention for social rootedness and for the respect of emotional and 
affective ties. In a human rights perspective it makes much more sense to argue that it is wrong to 
destroy families and inflict suffering on individuals, than to say that migrants should stay because of 
cultural attitudes. Simultaneously, however, these cases have shown what kind of support 
undocumented migrant and asylum seekers can find in local communities and how local 
identifications and connections can induce people to stand up and protest against unjust consequence 
of asylum policy. As one of our respondents said, this kind of social mobilization based on strongly 
felt ideas about “moral wrongness” is fundamental to democracy and demonstrates that citizens will 
not tolerate a situation of lawlessness and the violation of basic human rights. 
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Conclusions and main findings 
This synthesis report has investigated how ethnic,  religious and cultural diversity is accommodated in 
education and political life in the Netherlands. It has also explored the ways in which policies of 
exclusion are being challenged, especially with regard to rejected asylum seekers. Different concepts 
and principles for accommodating diversity were examined in order to establish how the notions of 
tolerance, intolerance and recognition are employed and perceived by different actors. The social 
construction of the meaning of cultural diversity and in- or exclusion also is drawing on concepts such 
as citizenship, multiculturalism, national identity, minority rights, pluralism, practices of toleration, 
condoning, and the need for acceptance and respect.  
Whereas the Netherlands used to have a reputation as a country welcoming other cultures and 
respecting the rights of immigrants, it is now often mentioned as an example of the way the critique of 
Islam and multiculturalism dominate public debates on immigration and integration issues in Europe. 
Throughout the report it has become clear that two categories of communities are most outspokenly 
challenged in debates on cultural pluralism. These are religious groups and immigrants. Especially 
with regard to Muslims the debate is more focused on defining the boundaries of what is tolerable and 
what is intolerable than on moving from tolerance to genuine recognition and acceptance.  
A major issue in Dutch public debates on diversity relates to the relationship between, on the one 
hand, the cultural and institutional legacies of pillarisation and, on the other hand, immigrant 
integration policies and the ways ethnic organisations and institutions have been recognised by Dutch 
authorities. In public debate Muslims are on centre stage, but depending on the events or issues that set 
off debates, other religious groups (Orthodox Calvinists or Jews) or other immigrant groups enter the 
picture. A major concern is whether the existence of special religious institutions and networks of 
ethnic organisations will not result in a highly segregated society in which different groups lead 
“parallel lives”. Another major concern is whether there is not too much room for conservative 
religious groups and immigrants in the Netherlands to adhere to extremely illiberal ideas and values 
and to uphold forms of behaviour and cultural practices that violate liberal norms of equality and 
individual freedom. Some people argue that at present the Dutch context provides too many 
associational freedoms and grants too much collective autonomy to conservative religious and 
immigrant groups. These debates are therefore concentrated on what practices and ideas should not be 
tolerated in a liberal society.  
Education 
State funding for confessional schools is still in place but over the past decade there is more and more 
debate on the structure of the Dutch educational system. There is a discussion on secularism and 
whether or not the state should finance faith-based schools. There are also discussions about the 
degrees of associational autonomy of denominational schools, for example with regard to curriculum, 
the hiring of teachers and the right to refuse to admit pupils. Especially the will to see immigrant 
Muslim minorities assimilate into “Dutch Culture” has led to questioning on the desirability of state 
funded confessional education. 
The principals of Reformed and Islamic schools that we interviewed expressed a concern about 
existing stereotypes and misconceptions about their schools. Nevertheless, there are also important 
differences with respect to the negative views of these schools. Islamic schools are more often 
perceived as outsiders and they are often not seen as Dutch schools, whereas Reformed schools are 
associated with the Dutch “in-group”. The Dutch Reformed are seen as a small group which has an 
established, though exceptional, position in Dutch society. Incidents at Reformed schools are often 
framed as a result of conservatism and are met with shrugging of shoulders, such as when Reformed 
Marcel Maussen with Thijs Bogers and Inge Versteegt 
100 
school girls were turning to the municipality because they were not allowed to wear trousers on their 
bicycle ride to school in the freezing cold.
180
 Muslims, by contrast, are perceived as an out-group in 
terms of ethnicity, nationality and religion and are continually scrutinized regarding their level of 
integration. Islamic schools are called upon to do their best to prepare children for “Dutch society” and 
in the case of Muslim immigrants orthodoxy is commonly seen as a sign of non-integration. 
In the light of these diverging views of both schools we found interesting differences between 
conceptions of tolerance and recognition among Reformed and Islamic school principals. Principals of 
Reformed schools wanted their schools to be positively recognized as a part of Dutch society and 
objected to the image of their schools as “abnormal” or “isolationist”. However, the concept of 
tolerance also plays an important role for the way the Reformed view their position in Dutch society. 
Even though the majority may disapprove of the ideas and ways of living of the Reformed, they feel 
they have a right to exist and not to be discriminated against. To them tolerance means they should 
have the opportunity to live according to their convictions and rules, also in the domain of education. 
For Islamic schools this appears to be different. Muslims are not (yet) an established religious minority 
and are still fighting for the right to be seen as normal and Dutch (i.e. not “foreign”). At Islamic 
schools the management seems to be primarily concerned with improving the performance of the 
school, both in terms of teaching and in terms of management. 
 The debate about Reformed and Islamic schools deals with defining whether some of their practices 
and regulations are beyond what is tolerable in a liberal-democratic society. The most sensitive issue 
in this respect is when these schools select pupils or staff in such a way that they violate norms of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination. Some Reformed schools want to be able to refuse teachers 
because of their sexual orientation, because of their civil status (e.g. being divorced) or because of 
their religion. There is less and less understanding for religious schools discriminating in this way, 
first, because they are faith-based organizations that employ regular personnel (i.e. teachers) and not 
core religious organizations (such as churches) that employ religious personnel, second, because they 
are publicly financed, and, third, because as educational institutions they should exemplify, not 
violate, key legal norms, such as non-discrimination. More complex is the discussion about whether a 
religious school can demand that teachers “subscribe” to the religious identity of the school, agree to 
execute the school’s teaching program (also if it goes against their own views) and refrain from 
expressing aspects of their own identity or ideas (e.g. with regard to sexuality or religion) and 
discussing these with the students. The principals of Reformed schools we interviewed often expressed 
the fear that this imposition of secular-liberal norms runs the risk of reducing the associational 
freedoms of schools. For them, a school has a fundamental right not to accept certain people and 
practices in its midst, if they violate norms and values that are in their view constitutive of their 
religious community.  
 
When these findings are situated against the background of theories and concepts of acceptance a first 
important broader conclusion can be drawn. This is that with regard to the deeper forms of cultural 
pluralism, being those that (are perceived as a) risk to transgress the norms of “comprehensive 
liberalism”, meaning liberalism as a distinctive “philosophy of life” centred around notions such as 
autonomy, rationality, agnosticism and individualism, tolerance and toleration remain important 
concepts and practices to engage with difference and conflict. For more orthodox religious groups 
“tolerance” remains an important trope, because they argue that the fact they deviate strongly from 
some of the mainstream norms still obliges that majority to tolerate them, even if it is with “gritted 
teeth” (Bader 2007). 
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Teaching citizenship and conceptions of tolerance 
In the Netherlands the general and increasing insistence on defending “shared values” has been 
associated strongly with a call for citizenship education. Citizenship education should help install 
liberal-democratic values in children and teach them about the norms enshrined in the Dutch 
constitution and in mainstream, so-called liberal-secular society. The presumed need to teach about 
Dutch cultural values and Dutch history, important in putting citizenship education on the political 
agenda, was quickly diverted in the policy process. Researchers and experts involved with the 
implementation actively are bending citizenship education in the direction of trying to increase debate, 
critical thinking and reducing prejudice, far more than aiming to teach “Dutch norms and values”. The 
experts we interviewed underlined that in order for citizenship education to be successful in increasing 
social coherence, schools should not just teach tolerance but they should practice tolerance and clearly 
focus on non-discrimination. They also stressed that the implementation of European curriculum 
requirements with regard to Human Rights Education as well as Anti-Racist Education must become 
effective as soon as possible. This most urgently is needed for the lower-class “white” pupils, as 
international and national research shows a decline in civic competencies and knowledge among this 
Dutch group in particular.  
Again we can draw a broader conclusion here with regard to developments in Dutch society. It is 
obvious that in political rhetoric, public debate and at the level of “policy declarations” concepts such 
as the “need for integration”, “ending multiculturalism and cultural relativism”, “pride of Dutch 
culture” or “good citizenship” have gained tremendous popularity. However, it is also obvious that 
they have largely contributed to a “politics of symbolic action”: policy goals such as “teaching good 
citizenship and respect for constitutional values” have remained extremely vague, effective 
instruments to introduce cultural assimilation top-down simply do not exist or policy measures are 
obstructed by liberal institutions, including basic rights such as religious freedom and the right to 
privacy. This does not mean we should underestimate the impact of the important changes at the level 
of public and policy discourse, but that we should not automatically assume they correspond to the 
practice of governance of diversity in the Netherlands.  
Embodiment of tolerance in everyday school practice 
Our case studies have shown that in order to present everyday forms of tolerance in discourses and 
practices in Dutch schools we need to go beyond the sometimes alarmist tone of public debate. In our 
interviews, we found school principals who are able to negotiate between educational goals, religious 
dogma and more pragmatic concerns. In a context of increased public scrutiny religious schools 
navigate between more strict and more liberal interpretations of religious identity and its relationship 
with school policy. Examples are discussions between school management, school boards, teachers 
and parents about the content of religious education, about dress codes, acceptance of homosexual 
teachers and pupils and teaching about sexuality. 
This finding by and large confirms what is known from the literature on the teaching of tolerance. The 
emphasis should be less on cognitive change or on the need to assimilate into the dominant values of 
the host society, but on learning to cope with diversity in practice, learning restraint in action and 
creating safe and respectful environments for social interactions. Especially school environments 
should be shielded from unfriendliness, hostility and outright racist, ethnocentrist or religious 
discrimination (Bader 2007: 274-5). Introducing assimilationist policy discourses and instruments 
risks to undermine the practical learning of tolerance and respect in schools. 
Politics and policies of exclusion 
The second field of empirical research has focussed on the politics of social exclusion and on the way 
they are being challenged in the Netherlands. Importantly, the significance of concepts such as respect, 
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recognition or tolerance thereby changes, from being about the engagement with (cultural and 
religious) practices, it become related to issues such as the basic right to be a part of a society and 
access to rights (of residence, housing, employment). The hardening of asylum policy discourse and 
practice had resulted in individual people and groups finding themselves in situations that are deemed 
“intolerable” by many citizens, NGO’s and even public authorities, notably at the local level.  
Building on the ACCEPT-pluralism conceptual framework we were able to identify four discourses 
that help framing rejected asylum seekers as victims or intruders and, combined with the debate on 
government responsibilities, create various possible outcomes which can be categorized as acceptance, 
tolerance, indifference or intolerance (see table).  
Table 4.1: Assessment of (rejected) asylum seekers and their right to government assistance 
(b) (a) Assistance No assistance 
Victim ACCEPTANCE  
(residence status)  
INDIFFERENCE 
(dealt with abroad)  
Intruder TOLERANCE   
(prevention of homelessness/  
assistance for return)  
INTOLERANCE 
(detention and forced return) 
 
The answer to the question whether one should accept, tolerate or not tolerate rejected asylum seekers 
depends on the policy framing that goes with the wider discourse that one uses. We have named these 
four discourses: (1) asylum authenticity discourse, (2) global injustice discourse, (3) duty of care 
discourse, and (4) accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. All four discourses offer a possibility for 
a “victim” categorization. These considerations and doubts surrounding the representation of asylum 
seekers as “victims” or “intruders”, in the context of determining whether they can legitimately reside 
in the Netherlands, resonate with the other debates throughout the ACCEPT project.  
The discourses are different ways to strategically determine the right of a (rejected) asylum seeker to 
stay or leave, as well as entitlement to (some) government assistance, e.g. while waiting for a decision. 
Victims are more likely to be granted access than intruders. The protesters of the strict asylum policy 
will thus try to push the categorization of an individual upwards out of the “intruder” category and into 
the “victim” category.  
The teenagers who’s cases were discussed in the report, Sahar and Mauro, had been “tolerated” in 
Dutch society for a prolonged period of time (almost 10 years in the case of Sahar, more than 8 years 
in the case of Mauro), when their future became subject to a wide public debate: should the Dutch 
state shift to intolerance, meaning it would seek to expell them from the Netherlands, or should it shift 
towards acceptance and grant them a residence status? This fact alone shows how toleration is seen as 
an unsatisfactory and unstable way of engaging with the presence of rejected asylum seekers. When 
rejected asylum seekers are officially tolerated (because they are awaiting the outcomes of an appeal, 
or because they are under age) or when they are merely “condoned” (as in the case of many 
undocumented migrants living in the Netherlands) the situation demands a more permanent settlement. 
There is thus a generally felt need to move away from “toleration”.  
One possibility is to shift towards intolerance, by seeing to the effective removal of unwanted 
immigrants from the Netherlands. In the case of Sahar and Mauro this meant that they were 
represented as “intruders”, for example by disqualifying the legitimacy of their asylum requests and by 
questioning the motives of their families for migrating to the Netherlands. This strategy was fully 
justifiable given existing Dutch asylum law and policy. Allowing Sahar and Mauro to stay might set a 
precedent and produce a “honeypot effect”, and it would be unfair towards others. Yet, the massive 
mobilization around these two cases demonstrates that this view was not so widely shared as one 
might expect. We will not repeat our analysis of the various arguments here, but instead single out two 
issues that are of particular relevance in the context of the shifting importance of concepts such as 
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tolerance, respect and recognition. These are also broader conclusions that we derive from the 
findings in relation to the concepts of ACCEPT. 
First, we have seen how in these cases there occurred a shift of perspective and a transformation of 
attitude when Dutch society was confronted with two young people. The reasons for non-toleration 
can be changed when attention is shifted to the humanity and moral standing of the subject (Heyd in 
Dobberack and Modood 2011: 13). It is ironical, to say the least, that the outcry to “let Sahar and 
Mauro stay” found substantial support on the pages of the popular, if not populist, newspaper, de 
Telegraaf. One of our respondent argued that this illustrated how personal contact can change negative 
attitudes towards asylum seekers. Many voter who read the Telegraaf “are in favour of Sahar but 
against admitting immigrants”, so he observed. On the positive side, he believed the Mauro case has 
led to a change in public opinion; people felt it was wrong to evict someone who is well nested in a 
local community.  
Second, the importance of the accomplished cultural inclusion discourse to justify the use of 
discretionary powers raises important questions. In the first place, the emphasis on successful cultural 
assimilation implies that it is both easier and more just to grant asylum to people who “belong in the 
Netherlands”. Indeed, it would be very unjust to expel fully assimilated young adults. Cultural 
assimilation, “rootedness” and a demonstrated willingness to “embrace Western values” are thus being 
legitimized as grounds to decide who can stay and who should leave. In addition, cultural rootedness is 
made important at the detriment of attention for social rootedness and for the respect of emotional and 
affective ties. In a human rights perspective it makes much more sense to argue that it is wrong to 
destroy families and inflict suffering on individuals, than to say that migrants should stay because of 
cultural attitudes. Simultaneously, however, these cases have shown what kind of support 
undocumented migrant and asylum seekers can find in local communities and how local 
identifications and connections can induce people to stand up and protest against unjust consequences 
of asylum policy. As one of our respondents said, this kind of social mobilization based on strongly 
felt ideas about “moral wrongness” is fundamental to democracy and demonstrates that citizens will 
not tolerate a situation of lawlessness and the violation of basic human rights. 
Accept-Pluralism and conceptions of tolerance in the Netherlands 
We began this research with the assumption that tolerance and toleration continue to constitute 
important concepts and practices to deal with “deep pluralism”. Whether or not there is a need to move 
“beyond” tolerance very much depends on the issues at hand, the minorities involved and the broader 
social and political circumstances. Both “liberal intolerance” and the “celebration of diversity” risk to 
undermine basic institutional guarantees and practices that, on closer look, have allowed for 
substantial space for cultural difference, including “institutional pluralism”, some degree of 
“parallelism” in society, and “gritted teeth toleration”. Tolerance is usually defined as “putting up with 
something one disagrees with”. It requires the ability (power) to do something against it, but deciding 
not to act upon it in order to avoid conflict or other negative outcomes (Vogt 1997). The Dutch case 
studies in the domain of education studies demonstrate that the search for shared liberal-secular values 
makes it more difficult for all orthodox religious groups (Christian ones amongst them) to live their 
lives and operate their institutions and organizations according to their interpretation of the Scriptures. 
Conceptions of tolerance and toleration should not only be analysed at the level of normative theory, 
they should also be discussed in the context of distinct national traditions and political culture. We 
have argued that five conceptualisations of tolerance
181
 structure the discursive space in which ideas 
about tolerance, respect and recognition are being articulated in the Netherlands: (1) the need to 
                                                     
181
  This typology developed by Maussen/Bogers for the Dutch situation was also used to characterize concepts of tolerance 
in the European context, see A.Triandafyllidou (ed.) (2011) Addressing cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges 
in Europe. A comparative overview of 15 European countries, pp.67-70. 
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tolerate minorities, even if their religion and practices are disapproved of  by the majority, (2) 
principled tolerance of other groups based on ideas about pluralism and of the Dutch nation as 
composed of various minorities, (3) pragmatic toleration or ‘condoning’ (gedogen) of practices and 
forms of behaviour that transgress social and legal norms, in order to create a ‘live and let live’ 
climate, (4) multicultural recognition, based on the idea that immigrant communities can retain and 
develop distinctive cultural practices and identities and on normative principles such as equal 
treatment and non-discrimination, (5) Dutch liberal intolerance, focusing on the need to identify 
clearly the non-negotiable core of liberal values and principles, and arguing that religious groups and 
immigrants should respect these values in their daily lives as well as in their cultural and religious 
practices and institutions. In this light a broader conclusion based on this research is that we witness  
a radical change in prevailing Dutch conceptualisations of tolerance. For a long time, ‘principled 
acceptance’ has been crucial to Dutch governing traditions. Its philosophical foundations were 
developed in the second half of the 19
th
 century, amongst others by Abraham Kuyper. It was 
institutionalised in the course of the 20
th
 century, especially in the form of church-state traditions, in 
the model of consensus-democracy and in the educational system. However, at present, secular voices 
demand less room for religious schools, a ban on ritual slaughtering and less accommodation of 
religiously motivated demands with regard to dress. Other elements of Dutch traditions of tolerance 
are also criticised. The notion that a majority in society may well disapprove of the ideas and practices 
of a religious minority whilst still “tolerating” them, has lost much of its appeal in public discourse. 
The same applies to the idea that “pragmatic toleration” or “condoning” is an adequate governing 
strategy in a deeply plural society. At present public discourse on toleration centres around the ideas 
that tolerance should not mean value relativism and avoidance, but confrontation, defining what is 
acceptable and combating that which is intolerable. Interestingly, the autochthonous majority often 
expresses its unwillingness to ‘put up with’ or ‘tolerate’ other cultures and religions.  
Concluding remarks and future challenges 
The history of the Netherlands is not the history of a distinct development of toleration. It is important 
to emphasise this point because portrayals of the tumultuous political developments in the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century are often contrasted to a supposed ‘Dutch tradition of tolerance’. It would be wrong 
to maintain the image that until recently the Netherlands was an exemplary tolerant country and that it 
recently has become ‘intolerant’ and has fallen victim to a ‘backlash against multiculturalism’. In 
practice, however, as we have argued in this report, each time is confronted with its own specific 
challenges which are met with their own specific answers.  
First of all, it is clear that since about ten years, notably since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002 and the 
following stable presence of populist parties in Dutch politics, the discourses of ‘liberal intolerance’ 
have become particularly influential in the Netherlands. The main thrust of this shift in public debate 
is that there is a need to identify the core values that characterise ‘Dutch culture’, ‘liberalism’ and 
‘secularism’ and that these should become ‘non-negotiable’. As a result, so it is argued, there is a need 
to confront immigrant communities to enforce full respect for these values and principles. Another 
aspect of this shift in the dominant discourse on diversity issues is a widely advocated need to 
strengthen the principles of the separation between church and state. In the Netherlands people who 
position themselves as modern, liberal and progressive speak out loudly to defend values such as 
equality, individualism and secularism. Often this is taken to mean that religious groups and 
organisations should no longer be allowed to use their collective and institutional autonomy to divert 
from core values and norms. According to these voices, liberal values are under siege, mainly from 
religious groups and immigrant communities.  
It is impossible to classify the changing discourses and practices of tolerance in the Netherlands in 
terms of the country becoming “more or less tolerant”. Especially in the Dutch case, it would be 
wrong to maintain the image that until recently the Netherlands was an exemplary country and that it 
recently has become “intolerant” and has fallen victim to a “backlash against multiculturalism”. Five 
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distinct conceptualisations continue to structure the discursive space to think about tolerance in the 
Netherlands, but around specific issues (such as the associational autonomy of religious schools or the 
room for cultural difference in the public domain) some of these conceptualisation are seen as less 
legitimate. This is notably the case for argumentations in terms of “condoning” or “pragmatic 
toleration” and those in terms of “multicultural recognition” and “principled acceptance”. Notably in 
the domain of education the emphasis is increasingly on the need for “civic integration” and defining 
the “intolerable”, rather than moving towards further recognition of religious groups and supporting 
the “right to be different”. However, protest against an important form of policies of exclusion, namely 
with regard to rejected asylum seekers that risk to be expulsed demonstrates that the politics of ‘liberal 
intolerance’ are also backfiring. The liberal state stands accused of engaging in intolerable practices 
and policies, and more acceptance is asked for vulnerable individuals. Yet, the prominence of 
discourses of “cultural citizenship” also pollute the asylum debate, because it is argued that only those 
who are “well integrated” deserve a residence status. Whereas debates on cultural diversity issues and 
Islam have dominated public and political debate in the Netherlands since 2000, more recently a kind 
of “fatigue” is visible and socio-economic issues tend to become more prominent and are framed as 
more urgent than issues of cultural diversity.  
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